Massachusetts General Laws

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, § 6D (2026)

Damages for pain and suffering in tort actions arising out of operation, etc., of motor vehicles; restrictions

✓ current as of July 2026

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Section 6D. In any action of tort brought as a result of bodily injury, sickness or disease, arising out of the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle within this commonwealth by the defendant, a plaintiff may recover damages for pain and suffering, including mental suffering associated with such injury, sickness or disease, only if the reasonable and necessary expenses incurred in treating such injury, sickness or disease for necessary medical, surgical, x-ray and dental services, including prosthetic devices, and necessary ambulance, hospital, professional nursing and funeral expenses are determined to be in excess of two thousand dollars unless such injury, sickness or disease (1) causes death, or (2) consists in whole or in part of loss of a body member, or (3) consists in whole or in part of permanent and serious disfigurement, or (4) results in such loss of sight or hearing as is described in paragraphs (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f) and (g) of section thirty-six of chapter one hundred and fifty-two or (5) consists of a fracture.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 70 cases, 1973–2018 · leading case: Dziokonski v. Babineau, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (Mass. 1978).

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Dziokonski v. Babineau, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (Mass. 1978). · cites it 4× “[5] Neither complaint involves any claim on behalf of Norma for her own injuries. We do not know whether an action has been brought by or on behalf of Norma, nor whether the circumstances are such that under the no-fault law (St.”

Murphy v. Bohn, 387 N.E.2d 119 (Mass. 1979). · cites it 8× “We are called on to resolve a single question here: Can an operator of a motorcycle, duly registered in this Commonwealth, as a matter of law, recover damages in tort for conscious pain and suffering, when he has neither incurred $500 in medical expenses nor suffered any of the…”

Cousineau v. Laramee, 448 N.E.2d 756 (Mass. 1983). · cites it 2× “670, § 5, the Legislature enacted G. L. c. 231, § 6D, which provides that a person injured in a motor vehicle accident in this State may recover damages for pain and suffering only if his medical expenses exceed $500, or if his injury qualifies under any one of five other…”

Chipman v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 316 N.E.2d 725 (Mass. 1974). · cites it 5× “The case is before us on the defendant’s exceptions to the *255 denial of its request for rulings that the plaintiff is barred from such recovery by the terms of G. L. c. 231, § 6D , 2 From the statement of agreed facts it appears that the plaintiff was injured when a door…”

Vieira v. Schupp, 421 N.E.2d 771 (Mass. 1981). · cites it 4× “14 in personal injury protection benefits for medical expenses conclusively establish that her reasonable and necessary medical expenses were less than $500, and therefore, under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, § 6D, compel dismissal of her tort claim for damages for pain and…”

Cobb v. Gosnell, 2003 Mass. App. Div. 21 (Mass. Dist. Ct., App. Div. 2003). · cites it 5× “00 threshold for recovery for pain and suffering required by G.L.c. 231, §6D. This Dist./Mun. Cts. R. A.”

Scalia v. Liberty Mut. Ins., 1995 Mass. App. Div. 69 (Mass. Dist. Ct., App. Div. 1995). · cites it 2× “G.L.c. 231, §6D. That finding is not unsupported by evidence simply because no expert testimony was presented [emphasis supplied].”

Phelps v. MacIntyre, 491 N.E.2d 1067 (Mass. 1986). · cites it 2× “This case, which arose out of an ordinary intersection accident in Foxborough between two Massachusetts motor vehicles, presents issues concerned solely with the limitation on plaintiffs’ rights to recover damages for pain and suffering expressed in G. L. c. 231, § 6D (1984…”

Cyr v. Farias, 327 N.E.2d 890 (Mass. 1975). · cites it 5× “The Appellate Division took the position that the disposition of the matter was governed by G. L. c. 231, § 6D, which was inserted by St.”

Parrell v. Keenan, 452 N.E.2d 506 (Mass. 1983). “On appeal, the defendant does not challenge the Appellate Division’s conclusions as to these requests for rulings.”

Golchin v. Liberty Mut. Ins., 993 N.E.2d 684 (Mass. 2013). “G. L. c. 231, § 6D (authorizing damages for pain and suffering in tort actions for “reasonable and necessary expenses incurred in treating such injury”).”

Mailhot v. Travelers Ins., 377 N.E.2d 681 (Mass. 1978). “The plaintiff had no PIP coverage because neither she nor any member of her household owned a car, and the Authority as a “political subdivision,” was exempted from the requirement of procuring motor vehicle liability insurance (see G.”

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