Massachusetts General Laws

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231B, § 3 (2026)

Enforcement of contribution; limitation; effect of judgment against one tortfeasor; judgment determining liability

✓ current as of July 2026
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Section 3. (a) Whether or not judgment has been entered in an action against two or more tortfeasors for the same injury, contribution may be enforced by separate action.

(b) Where a judgment has been entered in an action against two or more tortfeasors for the same injury, contribution may be enforced in that action by judgment in favor of one against other judgment defendants by motion upon notice to all parties to the action.

(c) If there is a judgment for the injury against the tortfeasor seeking contribution, any separate action by him to enforce contribution must be commenced within one year after the judgment has become final by lapse of time for appeal or after appellate review.

(d) If there is no judgment for the injury against the tortfeasor seeking contribution, his right of contribution shall be barred unless he has either (1) discharged by payment the common liability within the statute of limitations period applicable to claimant's right of action against him and has commenced his action for contribution within one year after payment, or (2) agreed while action is pending against him to discharge the common liability and has within one year after the agreement paid the liability and commenced his action for contribution.

(e) The recovery of a judgment for an injury against one tortfeasor shall not of itself discharge the other tortfeasors from liability for the injury unless the judgment is satisfied. The satisfaction of the judgment shall not impair any right of contribution.

(f) The judgment of the court in determining the liability of the several defendants to the claimant for an injury shall be binding as among such defendants in determining their right to contribution.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 24 cases (2 in the last 5 years), 1969–2025 · leading case: Med. Prof'l Mut. Ins. v. Breon Labs., Inc., 966 F. Supp. 120 (D. Mass. 1997).
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Med. Prof'l Mut. Ins. v. Breon Labs., Inc., 966 F. Supp. 120 (D. Mass. 1997). · cites it 7× “These requirements are set forth in Mass. Gen. L. ch. 231B, § 3 which provides: (c) If there is a judgment for the injury against the tortfeasor seeking contribution, any separate action by him to enforce contribution must be commenced within one year after the judgment has…”
Mongeau v. Boutelle, 407 N.E.2d 352 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980). · cites it 2× “pendency of a prior action, (2) by reason of the prior judgment for the plaintiff buyer under principles of res judicata, and (3) by reason of the satisfaction of the judgment pursuant to G. L. c. 231B, § 3(e). 4 The defendant also argues that the action should be dismissed…”
Hernandez v. City of Boston, 277 F. Supp. 3d 176 (D. Mass. 2017). · cites it 2× “1997) (citing Mass Gen. Laws ch. 231B, § 3). See also Commonwealth v.”
LeBlanc v. Logan Hilton Jt. Venture, 463 Mass. 316 (Mass. 2012). “231B, § 3 (d), which requires a settling party either to make a payment discharging the common liability or to agree to discharge the common liability and then pursue the claim for contribution within one year of the payment. Id. at 711. Second, the court declared that…”
Wolfe v. Ford Motor Co., 434 N.E.2d 1008 (Mass. 1982). “Donahue, pursuant to G. L. c. 231B, §3 (b), is vacated, and the case is remanded for further consideration in the Superior Court.”
Bishop v. Klein Fuller, 402 N.E.2d 1365 (Mass. 1980). “Our conclusion that §4 (b) does not nullify a preexisting judgment is supported by the statute itself, which states: “The judgment of the court in determining the liability of the several defendants to the claimant for an injury shall be binding as among such defendants in…”
Zeller v. Cantu, 478 N.E.2d 930 (Mass. 1985). “ASRC then moved for enforcement of contribution against Cantu, pursuant to G.L.c. 231B, § 3 ( b ) (1984 ed.), which was allowed.”
Boston Edison Co. v. Tritsch, 346 N.E.2d 901 (Mass. 1976). “G. L. c. 231B, § 3 (c). it “... Edison’s exceptions are overruled but, in order to provide Edison with an orderly opportunity for reasonable protection in an equity proceeding as discussed above, execution herein shall not be issued from the Superior Court for at least sixty…”
Hays v. Mobil Oil Corp., 736 F. Supp. 387 (D. Mass. 1990). “1981); M.G.L. c. 231B, § 3(c)-(d) (limitations period for contribu *397 tion claim against joint tortfeasor begins running upon entry of final judgment against or payment of common liability by the third-party plaintiff).”
Hopper Feeds, Inc. v. Cincinnati Milacron, Inc., 581 N.E.2d 1023 (Mass. 1991). · cites it 2× “Accordingly, the judge ordered judgment to enter against CM pursuant to G. L. c. 231B, § 3, for CM’s *276 full pro rata share of the judgments against Hopper in the underlying action.”
Bio-Vita, Ltd. v. Rausch, 759 F. Supp. 33 (D. Mass. 1991). “Count V — Contribution In Count V of their Counterclaim, defendants claim they are entitled to contribution under Mass.Gen.L. ch. 231B, § 3 from plaintiffs for any judgment against them in the action brought by Peter Fisher and Balfour Holding, Inc.”
Monize v. Frisoli, 372 N.E.2d 539 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978). “See G. L. c. 231B, § 3; G. L. c. 231, § 4B, as in effect prior to St.”
Show all 24 citing cases →
— Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231B, § 3(c) — 5 cases
Hays v. Mobil Oil Corp., 736 F. Supp. 387 (D. Mass. 1990). “1981); M.G.L. c. 231B, § 3(c)-(d) (limitations period for contribu *397 tion claim against joint tortfeasor begins running upon entry of final judgment against or payment of common liability by the third-party plaintiff).”
Med. Prof'l Mut. Ins. v. Breon Labs., Inc., 966 F. Supp. 120 (D. Mass. 1997). “These requirements are set forth in Mass. Gen. L. ch. 231B, § 3 which provides: (c) If there is a judgment for the injury against the tortfeasor seeking contribution, any separate action by him to enforce contribution must be commenced within one year after the judgment has…”
McCrohan v. Sandulli Grace, P.C., 369 F. Supp. 3d 324 (2019).
Richard v. Wilde, 12 Mass. L. Rptr. 669 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2001).
McCrohan v. Sandulli Grace, P.C. (D. Mass. 2019).
— Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231B, § 3(d) — 7 cases
Med. Prof'l Mut. Ins. v. Breon Labs., Inc., 966 F. Supp. 120 (D. Mass. 1997). “These requirements are set forth in Mass. Gen. L. ch. 231B, § 3 which provides: (c) If there is a judgment for the injury against the tortfeasor seeking contribution, any separate action by him to enforce contribution must be commenced within one year after the judgment has…”
Hernandez v. City of Boston, 277 F. Supp. 3d 176 (D. Mass. 2017). “1997) (citing Mass Gen. Laws ch. 231B, § 3). See also Commonwealth v.”
McCrohan v. Sandulli Grace, P.C., 369 F. Supp. 3d 324 (2019).
McCrohan v. Sandulli Grace, P.C. (D. Mass. 2019).
Aspen Am. Ins. Co. v. BrassCraft Mfg. Co. (D. Mass. 2024).
— Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231B, § 3(d)(2) — 1 case
Richard v. Wilde, 12 Mass. L. Rptr. 669 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2001).
— Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231B, § 3(e) — 3 cases
Mongeau v. Boutelle, 407 N.E.2d 352 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980). “pendency of a prior action, (2) by reason of the prior judgment for the plaintiff buyer under principles of res judicata, and (3) by reason of the satisfaction of the judgment pursuant to G. L. c. 231B, § 3(e). 4 The defendant also argues that the action should be dismissed…”
Boucher v. Lowell Automatic Transmission, 2001 Mass. App. Div. 176 (Mass. Dist. Ct., App. Div. 2001).
Kerins v. McConnell, 1998 Mass. App. Div. 149 (Mass. Dist. Ct., App. Div. 1998).
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