Mass. Gen. Laws » Part III Title III Chapter 239
Massachusetts General Laws

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 239, § 3 (2026)

Judgment and execution; costs; appeal

✓ current as of July 2026
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Section 3. Except as hereinafter provided, if the court finds that the plaintiff is entitled to possession, he shall have judgment and execution for possession and costs, and, if rent is claimed as provided in section two and found due, the judgment and execution shall include the amount of the award. If the plaintiff becomes nonsuit or fails to prove his right to possession, the defendant shall have judgment and execution for costs.

At least forty-eight hours prior to serving or levying upon an execution issued on a judgment for the plaintiff for possession of land or tenements rented or leased for dwelling purposes, the officer serving or levying upon the execution shall give the defendant written notice that at a specified date and time he will serve or levy upon the execution and that at that time he will physically remove the defendant and his personal possessions from the premises if the defendant has not prior to that time vacated the premises voluntarily.

The notice shall contain (1) the signature, full name, full business address and business telephone number of the officer; (2) the name of the court and the docket number of the action; (3) a statement that the officer will place any personal property remaining on the premises at the time the execution is levied in storage at a licensed public warehouse, and the full name, full business address, and business telephone number of the warehouse to be used; (4) a statement that the warehouser's storage rates may be ascertained by contacting the commissioner of the division of occupational licensure and the address and telephone number of such agency; (5) a statement that the warehouser may sell at auction any property that is unclaimed after 6 months and may retain that portion of the proceeds necessary to compensate him for any unpaid storage fees accrued as of the date of the auction, except as provided in section 4; and (6) a statement that the defendant should notify the warehouser in writing at the business address listed in the notice of any change in the defendant's mailing address. The notice referred to in this section shall be served in the same manner as the summary process summons and complaint and shall be filed in the court that issued the execution.

The officer shall select the public warehouser identified in the notice described in the preceding paragraph in a manner calculated to ensure that the defendant's personal property will be stored within a reasonable distance of the premises at issue in the summary process action. The officer shall not select pursuant to this section a warehouser whom the officer knows or reasonably believes to be in violation of any provision of section 4.

No execution for possession of premises rented or leased for dwelling purposes shall be served or levied upon after five o'clock p.m. or before nine o'clock a.m., nor on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday.

If the underlying money judgment in any summary process action for nonpayment of rent in premises rented or leased for dwelling purposes has been fully satisfied, together with any use and occupancy accruing since the date of judgment, the plaintiff shall be barred from levying on any execution for possession that has issued and shall return the execution to the court fully satisfied. If no execution has issued, the plaintiff shall notify the court of the satisfaction of judgment and no execution shall issue thereafter. If the underlying money judgment has been fully satisfied and use and occupancy fully paid, the defendant shall be considered a lawful tenant and may enforce this right through judicial process, including injunctions barring the issuance of or levying upon the execution and motions to supersede or recall the execution. Notwithstanding this paragraph, the plaintiff shall not be required to accept full satisfaction of the money judgment. Any refusal by the plaintiff to accept full satisfaction of the money judgment under this paragraph shall not be a bar to the enforcement of said judgment in any lawful manner.

In case of appeal from the district court on either or both issues involved or on any counterclaim, the appeal shall be to the appellate division under section 5.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 28 cases (2 in the last 5 years), 1922–2025 · leading case: Adjartey v. Cent. Div. of the Hous. Court Departmentand, 120 N.E.3d 297 (Mass. 2019).
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Adjartey v. Cent. Div. of the Hous. Court Departmentand, 120 N.E.3d 297 (Mass. 2019). · cites it 5× “G. L. c. 239, §§ 3, 5 ( a ). Once these forty-eight hours have expired, a tenant and his *306 or her possessions may be physically removed from the property.”
ROPT Ltd. P'ship v. Katin, 729 N.E.2d 282 (Mass. 2000). · cites it 7× “The summary process statute itself, G. L. c. 239, § 3, explicitly states that appeals to the Superior Court, from a judgment in the District Court, “shall be .”
Shea v. Neponset River Marine & Sportfishing, Inc., 437 N.E.2d 250 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982). · cites it 8× “They argue that summary process appeals are governed not by § 103, but rather by G. L. c. 239, § 3. See also Commentary to Rule 12 of the Uniform Summary Process Rules.”
Tamber v. Desrochers, 696 N.E.2d 969 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998). · cites it 2× “20 in costs was entered on February 16, 1996, and the tenants timely appealed to the Superior Court, conformably with G. L. c. 239, §§ 3 and 5. They moved that the District Court judge waive the appeal bond provided for in § 5 because they were indigent and because they had…”
Nalbandian v. Patrizzi, 340 N.E.2d 499 (Mass. 1976). · cites it 2× “1114, § 196, provides that there shall be an appellate division of each District Court for “the rehearing of matters of law arising in civil cases therein,” it is also true that review of summary process is solely by appeal to the Superior Court, where trial de nova may be had…”
Home Sav. Bank of Am., FSB v. Camillo, 697 N.E.2d 134 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998). · cites it 2× “Camillo claimed an appeal to Superior Court, as permitted by G. L. c. 239, §§ 3 & 5, and moved, in the District Court, for waiver of an appeal bond.”
Jones v. Manns, 602 N.E.2d 217 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992). “Jones argues, correctly, that there is a fundamental contradiction in the Mannses’ position in this court: that if, as they contend, the judgment from which they appeal was entered on a counterclaim in a summary process action, thus making available relief in the form of a trial…”
Kargman v. Superior Court, 357 N.E.2d 300 (Mass. 1976). “231, § 97, and G. L. c. 239, § 3.) The District Court judge relieved the appealing tenants from the statutory requirement that they give a bond securing the payment of rent then due or rent which might become due pending the appeal, costs, and certain damages which *326 might be…”
Martin A. Dale v. H.B. Smith Co., Inc., Martin A. Dale v. H.B. Smith Co., Inc., Martin A. Dale v. H.B. Smith Co., Inc., 136 F.3d 843 (1st Cir. 1998). “See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 239, § 3 (“[IJf ihe court finds that the [property owner ] is entitled to possession, [the property owner] shall have judgment and execution for possession____” (emphasis added)); see also Ghoti Estates, Inc.”
Klevisha v. Provident Funding Assocs. L.P., 167 F. Supp. 3d 250 (D. Mass. 2016). “Mass. Gen. L. c. 239, § 3. Having found that, as the owner of record, Freddie Mae is entitled to possession of the Property, it follows that Freddie Mac has the right to an execution to enforce the judgment.”
Ablondi v. Chase, 414 N.E.2d 617 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981). “G. L. c. 239, § 3. The Lessees, the defendants therein, filed a claim of trial by jury, but they have argued their appeal as if they *903 had waived this jury claim.”
Labao v. Rudnicki, 258 N.E.2d 70 (Mass. 1970). “See G. L. c. 239, § 3, as amended. Order dismissing petition affirmed.”
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