Massachusetts General Laws

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 259, § 7 (2026)

Agreements to pay compensation for service as a broker or finder; necessity of writing

✓ current as of July 2026

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Section 7. Any agreement to pay compensation for service as a broker or finder or for service rendered in negotiating a loan or in negotiating the purchase, sale or exchange of a business, its good will, inventory, fixtures, or an interest therein, including a majority of voting interest in a corporation, shall be void and unenforceable unless such agreement is in writing, signed by the party to be charged therewith, or by some other person authorized. For the purpose of this section, the term ''negotiating'' shall include identifying prospective parties, providing information concerning prospective parties, procuring an introduction to a party to the transaction or assisting in the negotiation or consummation of the transaction. The provisions of this section shall apply to a contract implied in fact or in law to pay reasonable compensation but shall not apply to a contract to pay compensation for professional services of an attorney-at-law or a licensed real estate broker or real estate salesman acting in their professional capacity.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 36 cases (4 in the last 5 years), 1988–2025 · leading case: Cantell v. Hill Holliday Connors Cosmopulos, Inc., 772 N.E.2d 1078 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002).

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Cantell v. Hill Holliday Connors Cosmopulos, Inc., 772 N.E.2d 1078 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002). · cites it 5× “We consider in this appeal the applicability of the Statute of Frauds, G. L. c. 259, § 7, to a claim by an employment agency for services.”

Shea v. Millett, 36 F.4th 1 (1st Cir. 2022). · cites it 4× “The district court correctly concluded that Shea had not satisfied the special provision of the Massachusetts statute of frauds for brokers and finders, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 259, § 7 , to establish a contractual obligation for Millett to make payments to Shea beyond June 30, 2016.”

Saggese v. Kelley, 837 N.E.2d 699 (Mass. 2005). · cites it 3× “On appeal the Kelleys argue that the judge erred by finding that there was an enforceable oral agreement, where (1) there was no present consideration for the agreement; (2) the agreement falls under the Statute of Frauds, G. L. c. 259, § 7, 2 and thereby is unenforceable; and…”

Biping Huang & Another v. Re/max Leading Edge & Others., 190 N.E.3d 518 (Mass. App. Ct. 2022). · cites it 3× “As Huang correctly observes, however, the Statute of Frauds contains an express exemption for "contract[s] to pay compensation for professional services of .”

Meredith & Grew, Inc. v. Worcester Lincoln, LLC, 831 N.E.2d 940 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005). · cites it 5× “acting in [its] professional capacity” under the Statute of Frauds, G. L. c. 259, § 7, inserted by St. 1984, c.”

Geller v. Allied-Lyons PLC, 674 N.E.2d 1334 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997). · cites it 2× “The Superior Court judge determined that the oral finder’s fee agreement was unenforceable for reasons of public policy and the Statute of Frauds, G. L. c. 259, § 7. We affirm on the ground of public policy.”

Stavaridis v. Dynamic Mach. Works, Inc., 2 Mass. L. Rptr. 446 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1994). · cites it 9× “” Therefore, Stavaridis is a “broker" within the plain and ordinary meaning of G.L.c. 259, §7. Stavaridis contends that G.”

Tpk. Motors, Inc. v. Newbury Grp., Inc., 528 N.E.2d 1176 (Mass. 1988). · cites it 2× “The argument that § 87RR is inapplicable would point (a) to the Legislature's separate treatment of business brokers (see G.L.c. 259, § 7 [1986 ed.], requiring enforceable commission agreements of business brokers to be in writing and signed) and (b) to G.”

Alexander v. Berman, 560 N.E.2d 1295 (Mass. App. Ct. 1990). · cites it 2× “Effective beginning in March, 1985, G. L. c. 259, § 7, requires that a business brokerage commission agreement be set out in writing, and signed by the party to be charged, in *459 order to be legally enforceable.”

Cox v. Thornton Assocs., Inc., 8 Mass. L. Rptr. 715 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1998). · cites it 5× “Thornton argues that Cox’s claims are barred by the broker’s Statute of Frauds, as set forth at G.L.c. 259, §7. Thornton contends that Staples’ oral promise to Cox to “make it worth his while" for Cox to increase his sales efforts is unenforceable for lack of a sufficient…”

Bay Colony Mktg. Co. v. Fruit Salad, Inc., 672 N.E.2d 987 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996). “This appeal turns on whether the Statute of Frauds, G. L. c. 259, § 7, bars the plaintiff food broker’s recovery on an oral contract for the placement of the defendant seller’s food products with various other food brokers and markets.”

Charles River Mortg. Co. v. Baptist Home of Massachusetts, Inc., 630 N.E.2d 304 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994). “Finally, the defendant argues that the agreement of the parties, although purporting to be a contract for a mortgage, is really a brokerage contract and that therefore any oral agreement that may have existed is barred from enforcement by the Statute of Frauds, G. L. c. 259, §…”

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