Massachusetts General Laws

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260, § 32 (2026)

Dismissal of action or reversal or vacation of judgment; commencement of new action

✓ current as of July 2026

Find cases: SyfertCases citing this section MAmalegislature.gov (official) JustiaChapter on Justia CornellLII Search CasesGoogle Scholar

Section 32. If an action duly commenced within the time limited in this chapter is dismissed for insufficient service of process by reason of an unavoidable accident or of a default or neglect of the officer to whom such process is committed or is dismissed because of the death of a party or for any matter of form, or if, after judgment for the plaintiff, the judgment of any court is vacated or reversed, the plaintiff or any person claiming under him may commence a new action for the same cause within one year after the dismissal or other determination of the original action, or after the reversal of the judgment; and if the cause of action by law survives the executor or administrator or the heir or devisee of the plaintiff may commence such new action within said year.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 61 cases (4 in the last 5 years), 1929–2025 · leading case: Corliss v. City of Fall River, 397 F. Supp. 2d 260 (D. Mass. 2005).

Sort: Relevance Newest Treatment

Corliss v. City of Fall River, 397 F. Supp. 2d 260 (D. Mass. 2005). · cites it 15× “The Renewal Statute Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260, § 32 , the renewal statute provides: If an action duly commenced within the time limited in this chapter is dismissed for insufficient service of process by reason of an unavoidable accident or of a default or neglect of the officer…”

Cannonball Fund, Ltd. v. Dutchess Capital Mgmt., LLC, 993 N.E.2d 350 (Mass. App. Ct. 2013). · cites it 8× “The primary issue on appeal is whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the benefit of the Massachusetts savings statute, G. L. c. 260, § 32, which permits claims that were timely when *77 originally filed to be refiled (despite the subsequent running of the limitations period)…”

Abrahamson v. Est. of LeBold, 47 N.E.3d 686 (Mass. App. Ct. 2016). · cites it 13× “Abrahamson contends that his suit was timely filed pursuant to the savings statute, see G. L. c. 260 § 32, and, alternatively, he should have been granted equitable relief from the one-year limitations period in the MUPC.”

Global NAPs, Inc. v. Awiszus, 930 N.E.2d 1262 (Mass. 2010). · cites it 4× “[19] Contrary to Awiszus's contention, the so-called "savings statute" or "renewal statute," G. L. c. 260, § 32, does not confer on Stephens the right to commence a new action against Global.”

Liberace v. Conway, 574 N.E.2d 1010 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991). · cites it 6× “Applicability of G. L. c. 260, § 32, to cases which originate in a Federal court.”

Chao v. Ballista, 630 F. Supp. 2d 170 (D. Mass. 2009). · cites it 5× “The Court must resolve, however, whether the Massachusetts “savings statute,” Mass. Gen. L. ch. 260, § 32, applies to this action, which would bring Chao’s claims within the statute of limitations.”

Rodi v. S. New England Sch. of Law, 389 F.3d 5 (1st Cir. 2004). “This history is significant because, under Massachusetts law, if an action is duly commenced within the limitations period and then dismissed for “any matter of form,” the plaintiff is entitled to “commence a new action for the same cause within one year after the dismissal.”

Picciotto v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 512 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2008). “See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260, § 32 (providing one year to file a new action following a dismissal “for any matter of form.”

Maltz v. Smith Barney, Inc., 427 Mass. 560 (Mass. 1998). · cites it 5× “The plaintiffs argue that their application was timely because G. L. c. 260, § 32, 7 permitted its filing in the Superior Court, within one year from the Federal dismissal, where that dismissal was for a matter of form.”

Patterson v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 909 F. Supp. 2d 116 (D.R.I. 2012). · cites it 8× “Objections to the Report and Recommendation Plaintiffs object to the Magistrate Judge’s findings that (1) the Massachusetts savings statute, Mass. Gen. Laws. ch. 260, § 32, (2) cross jurisdictional class-action tolling, and (3) equitable tolling, are not applicable to…”

Krasnow v. Allen, 562 N.E.2d 1375 (Mass. App. Ct. 1990). · cites it 2× “260, § 4), that the present suit was not brought until September of 1983, and that the claim was *565 timely only if “saved” from the running of the statute of limitations by G. L. c. 260, § 32, as appearing in St. 1973, c.”

Boutiette v. Dickinson, 768 N.E.2d 562 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002). · cites it 2× “See G. L. c. 260, § 32. That statute provides that “[i]f an action duly commenced within the time limited in this chapter is dismissed .”

Show all 61 citing cases →

Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.