Massachusetts General Laws

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 277, § 38 (2026)

Allegations, bill of particulars, presumption and proof in prosecutions involving controlled substances

✓ current as of July 2026

Find cases: SyfertCases citing this section MAmalegislature.gov (official) JustiaChapter on Justia CornellLII Search CasesGoogle Scholar

Section 38. In a prosecution under any provision of chapter ninety-four C, for unlawfully manufacturing, dispensing or distributing a controlled substance in violation of any provision of said chapter, it shall be sufficient to allege that the defendant did unlawfully manufacture, dispense or distribute, as the case may be, such alleged substance, without any further allegations, without naming the person to whom it dispensed or distributed, or quantity of the substance; but the defendant shall be entitled to a bill of particulars. In such a prosecution, a defendant relying upon a prescription, written order, receipt, registration, appointment or authority, or exemption as a defense or justification shall prove the same, and until he has proved it the presumption shall be that he is not so justified or authorized.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 9 cases, 1972–2012 · leading case: Commonwealth v. Cantres, 540 N.E.2d 149 (Mass. 1989).

Sort: Relevance Newest Treatment

Commonwealth v. Cantres, 540 N.E.2d 149 (Mass. 1989). · cites it 2× “the defendant shall be entitled to a bill of particulars.” It is unclear whether the defendant argues that, even if the indictment met constitutional requirements, the indictment should nevertheless be dismissed because his motion for particulars was denied.”

Commonwealth v. Comins, 356 N.E.2d 241 (Mass. 1976). “Although a knowing or intentional delivery is clearly an element of the crimes charged, as § 32 states, the form of these indictments was proper by reason of G. L. c. 277, § 38, as appearing in St. 1971, c.”

Commonwealth v. Williams, 393 N.E.2d 937 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979). · cites it 2× “We therefore need not consider the applicability of G. L. c. 277, § 38, or Commonwealth v. Baker, 368 Mass.”

Commonwealth v. Miller, 282 N.E.2d 394 (Mass. 1972). “G. L. c. 277, § 38. However, the two indictments are repetitious, charging the same crime arising out of a single incident and a single act of the defendant.”

Commonwealth v. Salcedo, 540 N.E.2d 1304 (Mass. 1989). “See G. L. c. 277, § 38 (1986 ed.). 3. Expert testimony.”

Commonwealth v. Pero, 524 N.E.2d 63 (Mass. 1988). “If a defendant relies on a prescription as a defense or justification, G. L. c. 277, § 38 (1986 ed.), he must produce it.”

Commonwealth v. Garcia, 972 N.E.2d 40 (Mass. App. Ct. 2012). “” Although the indictment does not use the word “dagger,” the fact that a “dagger” is specifically referred to in § 10(6) and, as we explain in this opinion, is a general term that includes blades like the one possessed by the defendant, renders any variation between the…”

Commonwealth v. Dean, 486 N.E.2d 61 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985). “In any event, the defendant is unable to show any material prejudice to himself in consequence of the instruction, nor does he claim to have been misled or surprised by the evidence brought against him (the prior trial was itself informing, see note 1, supra).”

Commonwealth v. Brown, 904 N.E.2d 452 (Mass. App. Ct. 2009). “at 224-225 ; G. L. c. 277, § 38. The defendant’s actions were unlawful under G.”

Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.