Section 17. No person operating a motor vehicle on any way shall run it at a rate of speed greater than is reasonable and proper, having regard to traffic and the use of the way and the safety of the public. Unless a way is otherwise posted in accordance with the provisions of section eighteen, it shall be prima facie evidence of a rate of speed greater than is reasonable and proper as aforesaid (1) if a motor vehicle is operated on a divided highway outside a thickly settled or business district at a rate of speed exceeding fifty miles per hour for a distance of a quarter of a mile, or (2) on any other way outside a thickly settled or business district at a rate of speed exceeding forty miles per hour for a distance of a quarter of a mile, or (3) inside a thickly settled or business district at a rate of speed exceeding thirty miles per hour for a distance of one-eighth of a mile, or (4) within a school zone which may be established by a city or town as provided in section two of chapter eighty-five at a rate of speed exceeding twenty miles per hour. Operation of a motor vehicle at a speed in excess of fifteen miles per hour within one-tenth of a mile of a vehicle used in hawking or peddling merchandise and which displays flashing amber lights shall likewise be prima facie evidence of a rate of speed greater than is reasonable and proper. If a speed limit has been duly established upon any way, in accordance with the provisions of said section, operation of a motor vehicle at a rate of speed in excess of such limit shall be prima facie evidence that such speed is greater than is reasonable and proper; but, notwithstanding such establishment of a speed limit, every person operating a motor vehicle shall decrease the speed of the same when a special hazard exists with respect to pedestrians or other traffic, or by reason of weather or highway conditions. Any person in violation of this section, while operating a motor vehicle through the parameters of a marked construction zone or construction area, at a speed which exceeds the posted limit, or at a speed that is greater than is reasonable and proper, shall be subject to a fine of 2 times the amount currently in effect for the violation issued. Except on a limited access highway, no person shall operate a school bus at a rate of speed exceeding forty miles per hour, while actually engaged in carrying school children.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
82
cases (
6 in the last 5 years), 1923–2026 · leading case:
Commonwealth v. LeBlanc, 62 N.E.3d 34 (Mass. 2016).
Commonwealth v. LeBlanc, 62 N.E.3d 34 (Mass. 2016).
· cites it 2× “access, or any place to which members of the public have access as invitees or licensees, operates a motor vehicle recklessly, or operates such a vehicle negligently so that the lives or safety of the public might be endangered, or upon a bet or wager or in a race, or [2]…”
Commonwealth v. McCravy, 723 N.E.2d 517 (Mass. 2000).
· cites it 2× “); and (6) speeding in violation of G. L. c. 90, § 17. In October, 1997, the defendant was tried before a jury in the Superior Court.”
Noyes v. Raymond, 548 N.E.2d 196 (Mass. App. Ct. 1990).
· cites it 2× “Finally, Joseph asserts that the judge erred by giving an instruction based upon G. L. c. 90, § 17, which makes it prima facie evidence of operation at an unreasonable rate of speed to exceed a speed of thirty miles per hour for a distance of more, than one-eighth of a mile…”
Deguio v. United States, 732 F. Supp. 1240 (D. Mass. 1990).
· cites it 7× “[and that] notwithstanding [the] establishment of a speed limit, every person operating a motor vehicle shall decrease the speed of the same when a special hazard exists with respect to pedestrians or other traffic, or by reason of weather or highway conditions.”
Commonwealth v. Zimmermann, 873 N.E.2d 1215 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007).
· cites it 2× “Based on his observations, information learned in the course of the investigation, and his training and experience, Walsh “deem[ed] that there [was] probable cause to believe that [the defendant] was operating the GMC at a rate of speed that was greater than reasonable and…”
Commonwealth v. Whynaught, 384 N.E.2d 1212 (Mass. 1979).
· cites it 2× “The defendant, Kathleen Whynaught, was convicted of speeding pursuant to G. L. c. 90, § 17, after a jury waived trial in the First District Court of Southern Middlesex.”
Commonwealth v. Merry, 904 N.E.2d 413 (Mass. 2009).
“89, § 4A, and G. L. c. 90, § 17 (civil traffic infractions included for procedural purposes), were filed.”
Swenson v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 317 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D. Mass. 2004).
· cites it 3× “Such conduct, according to the plaintiffs, also violated Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 90, § 17 , which makes it unlawful to operate a motor vehicle at an excessive rate of speed.”
Commonwealth v. Jefferson, 965 N.E.2d 800 (Mass. 2012).
“He was found “not responsible” for speeding, G. L. c. 90, § 17. Charges against each defendant of resisting arrest, in violation of G.”
Commonwealth v. Dussault, 883 N.E.2d 1243 (Mass. App. Ct. 2008).
“89, § 4A; and exceeding the posted speed limit in violation of G. L. c. 90, § 17. While the jury was deliberating, defense counsel notified the judge that if the defendant was found guilty of the underlying GUI charge, he would waive a trial by jury on the third offense portion…”
Petras v. Storm, 465 N.E.2d 283 (Mass. App. Ct. 1984).
· cites it 2× “90, §14, which establishes precautions for the safety of bicyclists, G. L. c. 90, § 17, which penalizes speeding, and G.”
Commonwealth v. Riche, 741 N.E.2d 871 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001).
“645, 649 (1993), and of speeding, see G. L. c. 90, § 17; Commonwealth v. Heughan, 40 Mass.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.