Massachusetts General Laws

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93, § 2 (2026)

Definitions

✓ current as of July 2026

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Section 2. For purpose of this chapter, the following words and terms shall have the following meanings:

''Attorney general'', the attorney general of the commonwealth and individuals designated by him in writing to act on his behalf in carrying out the purposes of this chapter.

''Demand'', a civil investigative demand issued pursuant to section eight of this chapter.

''Natural person'', not proprietorships, partnerships or any commercial entity.

''New England'', the states of Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island and Vermont.

''Person'', natural persons, corporations and other legal entities.

''Trade or commerce'', the advertising, offering for sale, rent or lease, or the sale, rent, lease, furnishing or distribution of any service or any article, commodity or property, tangible or intangible, which directly and substantially affects the people of the commonwealth; provided, however, that trade or commerce shall not include the conveyance, transfer or use of real property.

''Trade secrets'', anything which constitutes, represents, evidences, or records secret or confidential scientific, technical, merchandising, production, management or commercial information.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 16 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1923–2021 · leading case: SDK Med. Comput. Servs. Corp. v. Prof'l Operating Mgmt. Grp., Inc., 354 N.E.2d 852 (Mass. 1976).

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SDK Med. Comput. Servs. Corp. v. Prof'l Operating Mgmt. Grp., Inc., 354 N.E.2d 852 (Mass. 1976). · cites it 4× “93, §§ 1-14, charges the defendants with maintaining a monopoly and causing restraint of trade in violation of G. L. c. 93, § 2. It charges also monopolization under G.”

J. & J. Enter., Inc. v. Martignetti, 341 N.E.2d 645 (Mass. 1976). · cites it 2× “They also claim that some of the acts or practices violated G. L. c. 93, §§ 2 and 9, and G. L. c. 138, §§ 15, 18, 25 and 25A.”

Ciardi v. F. Hoffmann-La Roche, Ltd., 436 Mass. 53 (Mass. 2002). “See G. L. c. 93, §§ 2, 4. Section 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act states: “Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are hereby declared unlawful.”

Ricky Smith Pontiac, Inc. v. Subaru of New England, Inc., 440 N.E.2d 29 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982). “See also G. L. c. 93, § 2, as in effect prior to St.”

A. T. Stearns Lumber Co. v. Howlett, 157 N.E. 82 (Mass. 1927). · cites it 2× “321, 324 , that “The facts material to the case should be found to aid the court in determining whether the agreement and lease are in violation of the provisions of G. L. c. 93, § 2, which forbids those agreements, arrangements and combinations that violate the common law in…”

Pacella v. Metro. Dist. Comm'n, 159 N.E.2d 75 (Mass. 1959). · cites it 2× “29, § 8A, (b) the regulations of the commission on administration and finance requiring contractors to give preferences, other things being equal, to goods made in Massachusetts, and (c) common law and statutory (see G.”

Boos v. Abbott Labs., 925 F. Supp. 49 (D. Mass. 1996). “The Court further noted in a footnote that “[t]he relation of the common-law action to G.L. c. 93 § 2 has not been exactly elucidated and need not be for the purposes of the present case.”

Keith v. Heywood Boot & Shoe Co., 151 N.E. 309 (Mass. 1926). · cites it 2× “The defendant demurred to the bill on the grounds (1) that the lease as a whole is illegal and unenforceable under G. L. c. 93, § 2, and (2) that material provisions thereof are illegal and unenforceable under G.”

Berenson v. H. G. Vogel Co., 148 N.E. 450 (Mass. 1925). “The material prayers are, that the contract be declared illegal and void, with injunctive relief, on the ground that when made, and during its performance, the defendant with other dealers in sprinklers was engaged in an illegal combination, trust, or conspiracy forbidden by St.”

Lovely v. Gill, 245 Mass. 577 (Mass. 1923). · cites it 2× “G. L. c. 93, § 2. The union stamp is not a trading stamp, the control of which under certain conditions may result in a monopoly, as pointed *593 out in Merchants Legal Stamp Co.”

Ericson v. Conagra Foods, Inc. (N.D. Ill. 2021). “¶¶ 94, 170; see also G. L. c. 93, § 2(a). Defendants again argue that the two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims in Illinois governs because personal injuries underlie the MGL claims.”

O'Keeffe v. Superior Carpet, Inc., 1987 Mass. App. Div. 108 (Mass. Dist. Ct., App. Div. 1987). · cites it 2× “Plaintiffs complaint asserts three counts of recovery: breach of contract, conversion, and violations of M.G.L. c. 93 §§ 2 and 9. As to each count of plaintiff’s complaint, the Defendants entered a general denial.”

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— Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93, § 2(a) — 2 cases

Ericson v. Conagra Foods, Inc. (N.D. Ill. 2021). “¶¶ 94, 170; see also G. L. c. 93, § 2(a). Defendants again argue that the two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims in Illinois governs because personal injuries underlie the MGL claims.”

Deane v. Snelling & Snelling Pers. Servs., 7 Mass. L. Rptr. 433 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1997).

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