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Mass. Gen. LawsPart I Title XV Chapter 93A

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, § 3 (2026)

Exempted transactions

Edition and currency
text as last checked Sept. 2026 (this copy records no edition or section history). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTtext as last checked Sept. 2026 (this copy records no edition or section history) cited 1972–2025 61citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 61 opinions since 1972, 2 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (l) (10 cases).

Section 3. Nothing in this chapter shall apply to transactions or actions otherwise permitted under laws as administered by any regulatory board or officer acting under statutory authority of the commonwealth or of the United States.

For the purpose of this section, the burden of proving exemptions from the provisions of this chapter shall be upon the person claiming the exemptions.

The 20 cases that cite Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, § 3 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENBushkin Assocs., Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 473 N.E.2d 662 (Mass. 1985).
cites § 3 6×subsections: (l)cited by 306 cases
Where it cites § 3
“If the answer to question 2 is in the affirmative, is defendant entitled to the exemption of G. L. c. 93A, § 3 (1) (b) (i) in that the alleged actions forming the basis of the chapter 93A claim did not occur ‘primarily and substantially’ in Massachusetts?” 2 The Court of Appeals…”
The case’s holding
A consumer protection claim fails if the alleged deceptive acts did not occur primarily and substantially within the forum state.
Later courts cite it for
“functional choice-of-law approach that responds to the interests of the parties, the states involved, and the interstate system as a whole.” · 53 citing courts
2
GREENCommonwealth v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, 897 N.E.2d 548 (Mass. 2008).
cites § 3 3×cited by 76 cases
Where it cites § 3
“183C; and second, the judge failed to recognize that under G. L. c. 93A, § 3, Fremont’s loans are exempt from c.”
The case’s holding
A lender violates consumer protection laws by originating mortgage loans with features that the lender should recognize will likely result in borrower default and foreclosure.
Later courts cite it for
“the origination of a home mortgage loan that the lender should recognize at the outset the borrower is not likely to be able to repay.” · 5 citing courts
3
GREENBurnham v. Mark IV Homes, Inc., 441 N.E.2d 1027 (Mass. 1982).
cites § 3 4×cited by 81 cases
Where it cites § 3
“We conclude, further, that the exemption relied on by Mark IV, G. L. c. 93A, § 3 (1) (b), does not apply, and consequently remand for further proceedings as to this aspect of the case.”
The case’s holding
The sale of modular homes constitutes a transaction in goods because the units are movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale.
Later courts cite it for
“the general rule with respect to mitigation of damages is that a plaintiff may not recover for damages that were avoidable by the use of reasonable precautions on his part.” · 12 citing courts
4
GREENIn re Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price Lit., 582 F.3d 156 (1st Cir. 2009).
cites § 3 2×cited by 88 cases
Where it cites § 3
“93A, § 3 ("Nothing in this chapter shall apply to transactions or actions otherwise permitted under laws as administered by any regulatory board or officer acting under statutory authority of the commonwealth or of the United States. For the purpose of this section, the burden…”
The case’s holding
Federal Medicare statutes do not preempt state consumer protection laws from addressing pharmaceutical companies that engage in unfair and deceptive practices by inflating average wholesale prices.
Later courts cite it for
“the crucial factors in an unfairness inquiry are the nature of the challenged conduct and on the purpose and effect of that conduct.” · 2 citing courts
5
GREENFleming v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins., 445 Mass. 381 (2005).
cites § 3 4×cited by 18 cases
Where it cites § 3
“Exemption under G. L. c. 93A, § 3. We comment briefly on the exemption from liability set forth in G.”
6
GREENMakino, U.S.A., Inc. v. Metlife Capital Credit Corp., 518 N.E.2d 519 (Mass. App. Ct. 1988).
cites § 3 3×subsections: (l)cited by 86 cases
Where it cites § 3
“Under G. L. c. 93A, § 3, from 1967 to 1983, i.e.”
The case’s holding
A consumer protection claim is valid if the preponderance of the wrongful conduct and the essential elements of the transaction occur within the state.
Later courts cite it for
“if the place of injury were the only test, practically no case involving a massachusetts plaintiff would be exempt from c. 93a status, no matter how negligible the defendant's business activity in this state.” · 2 citing courts
7
GREENAspinall v. Philip Morris, Inc., 902 N.E.2d 421 (Mass. 2009).
cites § 3 6×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 3
“93A is barred by G. L. c. 93A, § 3, or, alternatively, preempted by Federal law.”
Later courts cite it for
“mere existence of a related or even overlapping regulatory scheme that covers the transaction” · 3 citing courts
8
GREENLowell Gas Co. v. Attorney Gen., 385 N.E.2d 240 (Mass. 1979).
cites § 3 2×subsections: (1) (l)cited by 100 cases
Where it cites § 3
“[24] The companies' claim of exemption under G.L.c. 93A, § 3(1)( a ), is similarly misguided.”
The case’s holding
A practice is deceptive under consumer protection law if it could reasonably be found to have caused a person to act differently than they otherwise would have.
Later courts cite it for
“if it could reasonably be found to have caused a person to act differently from the way he otherwise would have acted.” · 20 citing courts
cites § 3 3×cited by 34 cases
Where it cites § 3
“by limiting it to documents which relate to transactions and actions occurring primarily and substantially in Massachusetts because Yankee falls within the exemption provision of G. L. c. 93A, §3 (1) (6). In addition, he struck the four paragraphs referred to above (3, 20, 36…”
The case’s holding
The scope of a civil investigative demand is defined by relevance to the investigation rather than the degree of contact a transaction has with a specific jurisdiction.
Later courts cite it for
“established principle of statutory construction that every word in a statute should be given meaning” · 6 citing courts
10
GREENAnoush Cab, Inc. v. Uber Tech. Inc., 8 F.4th 1 (1st Cir. 2021).
cites § 3 1×cited by 17 cases
Where it cites § 3
“In its Answer, Uber asserted various affirmative defenses, including that it was not liable because Uber's actions were permitted practices under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, § 3 ("Permitted Practices Defense") and that the actions of others, and events unrelated to Uber,…”
Later courts cite it for
“does not diverge from the chapter 93a principle that 'something more' than negligence and rising to the level of extreme or egregious conduct is required for a successful chapter 93a claim” · 5 citing courts
11
GREENBellermann v. Fitchburg Gas & Elec. Light Co., 54 N.E.3d 1106 (Mass. 2016).
cites § 3 1×cited by 16 cases
Where it cites § 3
“See G. L. c. 93A, § 3 (exempting from treatment as “unfair' business practice” transactions permitted by regulatory board of Commonwealth).”
Later courts cite it for
“a plaintiff must have suffered a 'separate, identifiable harm arising from the regulatory violation' that is distinct 'from the claimed unfair or deceptive conduct itself.” · 3 citing courts
12
GREENReckis v. Johnson & Johnson, 28 N.E.3d 445 (Mass. 2015).
cites § 3 1×cited by 41 cases
Where it cites § 3
“See G. L. c. 93A, § 3 (“Nothing in this chapter shall apply to transactions or actions otherwise permitted under laws as administered by any regulatory board or officer acting under statutory authority of the commonwealth or of the United States”).”
The case’s holding
Expert testimony is required to establish medical causation in a failure-to-warn claim.
Later courts cite it for
“even assuming for sake of argument that we could predict the fda would have rejected a citizen petition proposal to add only this warning, that would not answer whether the fda would have rejected the warning had it been sought by the defendants themselves” · 2 citing courts
13
GREENFlotech, Inc. v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours Co., 627 F. Supp. 358 (D. Mass. 1985).
cites § 3 2×subsections: (l) 2×cited by 24 cases
Where it cites § 3
“56, Du Pont now moves for summary judgment or, in the alternative, for partial summary judgment on the grounds that (a) the First Amendment bars the action in its entirety, (b) Flotech’s claims for lost profits fail as a matter of law absent evidence in the present record that…”
14
GREENYork v. Sullivan, 338 N.E.2d 341 (Mass. 1975).
cites § 3 2×cited by 83 cases
Where it cites § 3
“93A, and (3) the defendants’ stipulation at the March 5 hearing had the effect of a reasonable tender of settlement under G.”
The case’s holding
The thirty-day demand requirement is a prerequisite to statutory action but does not bar the pursuit of independent nonstatutory remedies.
Later courts cite it for
“the purpose of a 9 demand letter is 'to give the defendants an opportunity to review the facts and the law involved to see if the requested relief should be granted or denied and to enable them to make a reasonable tender of settlement in order to limit the recoverable damages.” · 4 citing courts
15
GREENServ. Publications, Inc. v. Goverman, 487 N.E.2d 520 (Mass. 1986).
cites § 3 1×cited by 86 cases
Where it cites § 3
“It was not error for the judge to decide these issues for reasons stated earlier in this opinion.”
The case’s holding
Inconsistent verdicts exist only when the verdicts are based on inconsistent findings of fact.
Later courts cite it for
“to constitute inconsistent verdicts, it must be shown that the verdicts are based on inconsistent findings of fact.” · 3 citing courts
16
GREENEstrada v. Progressive Direct Ins., 53 F. Supp. 3d 484 (D. Mass. 2014).
cites § 3 2×cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 3
“In response, plaintiffs contend that defendant violated Chapter 93A by recommending that customers with health insurance purchase PIP coverage with an $8,000 deductible, defaulting such customers to an $8,000 deductible, and failing to disclose to customers that they could…”
17
GREENAnderson v. Phoenix Inv. Couns. of Boston, Inc., 440 N.E.2d 1164 (Mass. 1982).
cites § 3 1×cited by 77 cases
Where it cites § 3
“93A, he denied the motion to the extent that it invoked exemption under G. L. c. 93A, § 3 (1 )(b), because the transactions occurred primarily and substantially in Massachusetts.”
The case’s holding
A state court must apply federal law of res judicata when determining the preclusive effect of a federal judgment.
Later courts cite it for
“when a state court is faced with the issue of determining the preclusive effect of a federal court's judgment, it is the federal law of res judicata which must be examined.” · 13 citing courts
18
GREENGordon v. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co., 281 N.E.2d 573 (Mass. 1972).
cites § 3 2×cited by 44 cases
Where it cites § 3
“The defendant did not assign as a ground of demurrer G. L. c. 93A, § 3 (1) (a), inserted by St.”
The case’s holding
Administrative remedies must be exhausted before seeking judicial relief in the absence of a statutory directive to the contrary.
Later courts cite it for
“in the absence of a statutory directive to the contrary, the administrative remedies should be exhausted before resort to the courts.” · 3 citing courts
19
GREENDorrian v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 94 N.E.3d 370 (Mass. 2018).
cites § 3 1×cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 3
“93A, the judge granted summary judgment to LVNV because it met the exemption from liability in G. L. c. 93A, § 3, as the division of banks of the Office of Consumer Affairs and Business Regulation (division) had permitted LVNV to operate without a license.”
Later courts cite it for
“where the words of a statute are 'plain and unambiguous' in their meaning, we view them as 'conclusive as to legislative intent.” · 2 citing courts
20
GREENPlay Time, Inc. v. LDDS Metromedia Commc'ns, Inc., 123 F.3d 23 (1st Cir. 1997).
cites § 3 1×subsections: (l)cited by 53 cases
Where it cites § 3
“Although Bushkin construed the operative language — "primarily and substantially” — in the context of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, § 3(l)(b)(i), as appearing in St.”
The case’s holding
A party failing to object to a jury instruction with requisite particularity forfeits appellate review, except for plain error causing a miscarriage of justice or undermining judicial integrity.
Later courts cite it for
“failure to object with the requisite particularity forfeits review under the 'harmless error' rule.” · 3 citing courts

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
197219982025

One bar per year. Tallest: 5 cases in 1985. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Mass.19D. Mass.14Mass. Super. Ct.10Mass. App. Ct.61st Cir.5Mass. Dist. Ct., App. Div.4D. Conn.1Mass. Dist. Ct.1

The 8 courts with the most citing cases, of 9 courts in all.

By subsection
(1)4 cases
Lowell Gas Co. v. Attorney Gen., 385 N.E.2d 240 (Mass. 1979).“[24] The companies' claim of exemption under G.L.c. 93A, § 3(1)( a ), is similarly misguided.”
Goldstein Oil Co. v. C.K. Smith Co., 479 N.E.2d 728 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985).
Boston Super Tools, Inc. v. RW Tech., Inc., 467 F. Supp. 558 (D. Mass. 1979).
Constantino v. Massachusetts Elec. Co., 1983 Mass. App. Div. 19 (Mass. Dist. Ct., App. Div. 1983).
(2)4 cases
A.F.M. Corp. v. Corp. Aircraft Mgmt., 626 F. Supp. 1533 (D. Mass. 1985).
U. S. Broad. Co. v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 439 F. Supp. 8 (D. Mass. 1977).
Bierig v. Everett Square Plaza Assocs., 611 N.E.2d 720 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993).
Manhattan Tops, USA, Inc. v. Kenneth Leventhal & Co., 4 Mass. L. Rptr. 700 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1995).
(b)2 cases
Am. Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Roy Lapidus, Inc., 493 F. Supp. 1076 (D. Mass. 1980).
Worldwide Commodities, Inc. v. J. Amicone Co., 1991 Mass. App. Div. 157 (Mass. Dist. Ct., App. Div. 1991).
(l)10 cases
Bushkin Assocs., Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 473 N.E.2d 662 (Mass. 1985).“If the answer to question 2 is in the affirmative, is defendant entitled to the exemption of G. L. c. 93A, § 3 (1) (b) (i) in that the alleged actions forming the basis of the chapter 93A claim did not occur ‘primarily and substantially’ in Massachusetts?” 2 The Court of Appeals…”
Flotech, Inc. v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours Co., 627 F. Supp. 358 (D. Mass. 1985).“56, Du Pont now moves for summary judgment or, in the alternative, for partial summary judgment on the grounds that (a) the First Amendment bars the action in its entirety, (b) Flotech’s claims for lost profits fail as a matter of law absent evidence in the present record that…”
Lowell Gas Co. v. Attorney Gen., 385 N.E.2d 240 (Mass. 1979).
Makino, U.S.A., Inc. v. Metlife Capital Credit Corp., 518 N.E.2d 519 (Mass. App. Ct. 1988).“Under G. L. c. 93A, § 3, from 1967 to 1983, i.e.”
Play Time, Inc. v. LDDS Metromedia Commc'ns, Inc., 123 F.3d 23 (1st Cir. 1997).“Although Bushkin construed the operative language — "primarily and substantially” — in the context of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, § 3(l)(b)(i), as appearing in St.”
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Enactment and amendments

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Versions

Edition shown: text as last checked Sept. 2026 (this copy records no edition or section history). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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