MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT CLAIMS ACT
Act 198 of 1965
257.1108 Default judgment; notice to secretary of state; reopening; settlements.
Sec. 8.
(1) Section 7 does not apply in the case of a judgment entered in an action in which the defendant did not enter an appearance, did not file an answer, or did not appear in person or by counsel at the trial, or judgment was entered upon the consent or with the agreement of the defendant, unless the secretary has been given notice in writing of the failure, consent or agreement and has been afforded an opportunity to take such action as he may deem advisable under subsection (2).
(2) Where the secretary is served with notice in writing under this section, he may enter an appearance within 30 days, file an answer, make payment into court, appear by counsel at the trial or take such other action as he may deem appropriate on behalf and in the name of the defendant, and thereupon, on behalf and in the name of the defendant, may conduct his defense, and may consent to judgment in such amount as he may deem proper in all the circumstances, and all acts done in accordance therewith shall be deemed to be the acts of the defendants.
(3) Where pleadings have been closed, the secretary, upon giving notice to the court and to all proper parties to the action that he intends to defend the action on behalf and in the name of the defendant, may reopen the pleadings upon praecipe.
(4) In any action to recover damages arising out of the use or operation of an uninsured motor vehicle any settlement made between the plaintiff and defendant shall not be binding upon the secretary or the fund unless the secretary consents thereto.
History: 1965, Act 198, Eff. Nov. 1, 1965 ;-- Am. 1968, Act 223, Eff. July 1, 1968
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
17
cases, 1969–1994 · leading case:
Steele v. Wilson, 185 N.W.2d 417 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971).
Steele v. Wilson, 185 N.W.2d 417 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971).
· cites it 2× “2808[4]), which provides that “any settlement made between the plaintiff and defendant shall not be binding upon the secretary or the fund unless the secretary consents thereto”. It is clear from the earlier language of the section that the “defendant” referred to is the owner…”
Stacey v. Sankovich, 173 N.W.2d 225 (Mich. Ct. App. 1969).
· cites it 2× “” 5 MCLA § 257.1108 (Stat Ann 1968 Rev § 9.2808), provides in part: “(1) Seetion 7 does not apply in the case of a judgment entered in an action in which the defendant did not enter an appearance, did not file an answer, or did not appear in person or by counsel at the trial, or…”
Abbott v. Sec'y of State, 240 N.W.2d 800 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976).
“The Secretary by and through his attorneys thereupon entered his appearance and answer in the Schafer v Abbott action, pursuant to the provisions of MCLA 257.1108; MSA 9.2808, on about April 12, 1973.”
Moore v. Baugh, 308 N.W.2d 698 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981).
“Intervening defendant-appellant, the Secretary of State, had defended the suit pursuant to the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Act, MCL 257.1108; MSA 9.2808. 1 The Secretary of *818 State was ordered to pay the judgment pursuant to §§ 7 and 8 of the act.”
Seffens v. Muradian, 169 N.W.2d 657 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994).
· cites it 2× “This appeal involves the interpretation of the provisions of PA 1965, No 198, § 8 (MCLA § 257.1108 [Stat Ann 1968 Rev § 9.2808]), known as the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Act.”
Johnson v. Woodson, 310 N.W.2d 898 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981).
· cites it 2× “Following Woodson’s default, the Secretary of State actively entered the case pursuant to MCL 257.1108; MSA 9.2808, the same being a part of the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Act.”
Smith v. Lloyd, 224 N.W.2d 670 (Mich. Ct. App. 1974).
· cites it 4× “For instance, MCLA 257.1108(2); MSA 9.2808(2) gives the Secretary, as director of the Fund, wide discretion in handling the defense of a case against an uninsured motorist who did not enter an appearance or who seeks to enter into a consent judgment or settlement agreement.”
Forsee v. Kohari, 168 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. Ct. App. 1969).
“7 CL 1948, § 257.1108 as added by PA 1965, No 198 (Stat Ann 1968 Rev § 9.”
Peoples v. Brown, 258 N.W.2d 66 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977).
· cites it 2× “On February 1, 1973, pursuant to §8 of the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Act, MCLA 257.1108; MSA 9.2808, 1 the Secretary of State by its attorneys, the Attorney General and Special Assistant Attorney General William Ellman, entered an appearance on behalf of defendant Brown.”
Abbott v. Sec'y of State, 269 N.W.2d 292 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978).
· cites it 2× “The Court stated: "[T]he MV ACA provisions do not fit under either of the traditionally invoked labels. Instead, they are unique.”
Thyne v. Beggs, 233 N.W.2d 278 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975).
· cites it 2× “On June 5, 1974, a written motion to set aside the default judgment based in part upon § 8 of the Motor Vehicle Accident Claim Act, being MCLA 257.1108; MSA 9.2808 was filed by thé Secretary of State.”
Frey v. Islas, 235 N.W.2d 758 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975).
“” MCLA 257.1108; MSA 9.2808. The Secretary of State takes the position that subsection 2, supra, requires a lapse of 30 days between written notice of default and entry of default judgment so as to afford the Secretary an opportunity to appear and answer.”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 257.1108(2) — 2 cases
Smith v. Lloyd, 224 N.W.2d 670 (Mich. Ct. App. 1974).
“For instance, MCLA 257.1108(2); MSA 9.2808(2) gives the Secretary, as director of the Fund, wide discretion in handling the defense of a case against an uninsured motorist who did not enter an appearance or who seeks to enter into a consent judgment or settlement agreement.”
Abbott v. Sec'y of State, 269 N.W.2d 292 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978).
“The Court stated: "[T]he MV ACA provisions do not fit under either of the traditionally invoked labels. Instead, they are unique.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.