MICHIGAN VEHICLE CODE
Act 300 of 1949
257.252d Removal of vehicle from public or private property to place of safekeeping; circumstances; arrival of owner or legally entitled person; duties of police agency; release of vehicle; entry of vehicle as abandoned.
Sec. 252d.
(1) A police agency or a governmental agency designated by the police agency may provide for the immediate removal of a vehicle from public or private property to a place of safekeeping at the expense of the last titled owner of the vehicle in any of the following circumstances:
(a) If the vehicle is in such a condition that the continued operation of the vehicle upon the highway would constitute an immediate hazard to the public.
(b) If the vehicle is parked or standing upon the highway in such a manner as to create an immediate public hazard or an obstruction of traffic.
(c) If a vehicle is parked in a posted tow away zone.
(d) If there is reasonable cause to believe that the vehicle or any part of the vehicle is stolen.
(e) If the vehicle must be seized to preserve evidence of a crime, or if there is reasonable cause to believe that the vehicle was used in the commission of a crime.
(f) If removal is necessary in the interest of public safety because of fire, flood, storm, snow, natural or man-made disaster, or other emergency.
(g) If the vehicle is hampering the use of private property by the owner or person in charge of that property or is parked in a manner that impedes the movement of another vehicle.
(h) If the vehicle is stopped, standing, or parked in a space designated as parking for persons with disabilities and is not permitted by law to be stopped, standing, or parked in a space designated as parking for persons with disabilities.
(i) If the vehicle is located in a clearly identified access aisle or access lane immediately adjacent to a space designated as parking for persons with disabilities.
(j) If the vehicle is interfering with the use of a ramp or a curb-cut by persons with disabilities.
(k) If the vehicle has been involved in a traffic crash and cannot be safely operated from the scene of the crash.
(2) Unless the vehicle is ordered to be towed by a police agency or a governmental agency designated by a police agency under subsection (1)(a), (d), (e), or (k), if the owner or other person that is legally entitled to possess a vehicle to be towed or removed arrives at the location where the vehicle is located before the actual towing or removal of the vehicle, the vehicle must be disconnected from the tow truck, and the owner or other person that is legally entitled to possess the vehicle may take possession of the vehicle and remove it without interference upon the payment of the reasonable service fee, for which a receipt must be provided.
(3) A police agency that authorizes the removal of a vehicle under subsection (1) shall do all of the following:
(a) Check to determine if the vehicle has been reported stolen before authorizing the removal of the vehicle.
(b) Enter the vehicle into the law enforcement information network as an impounded vehicle within 24 hours after ordering the impound of the vehicle. Except as provided in subsection (5), if the vehicle has not been redeemed by the owner within 7 days after the impound, the towing agency shall notify the police agency of that fact and the police agency shall deem the vehicle abandoned. The police agency shall enter the vehicle into the law enforcement information network as abandoned within 24 hours of notification by the towing agency, and follow the procedures set forth in section 252a.
(4) If an impounded vehicle is released before the police agency enters the vehicle into the law enforcement information network as abandoned, the towing agency or custodian shall notify the police agency that authorized the removal within 24 hours of releasing the impounded vehicle.
(5) A vehicle impounded under subsection (1)(d), (e), or (k) must first be released by the police agency that authorized the removal prior to the towing agency or custodian releasing the vehicle to the vehicle owner.
(6) Not less than 20 days but not more than 30 days after a vehicle has been released under subsection (5), the towing agency or custodian shall notify the police agency to enter the vehicle as abandoned and the police agency shall enter the vehicle into the law enforcement information network as abandoned within 24 hours of receiving notice and follow the procedures set forth in section 252a if the impounded vehicle has not been redeemed.
History: Add. 1980, Act 249, Imd. Eff. July 28, 1980 ;-- Am. 1981, Act 104, Eff. Oct. 1, 1981 ;-- Am. 1989, Act 89, Eff. Sept. 19, 1989 ;-- Am. 1998, Act 68, Imd. Eff. May 4, 1998 ;-- Am. 2000, Act 76, Eff. Oct. 1, 2000 ;-- Am. 2004, Act 495, Eff. Oct. 1, 2005 ;-- Am. 2008, Act 539, Imd. Eff. Jan. 13, 2009 ;-- Am. 2012, Act 498, Eff. Mar. 28, 2013 ;-- Am. 2022, Act 89, Eff. Aug. 24, 2022
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
13
cases (
8 in the last 5 years), 1995–2026 · leading case:
Noll v. Ritzer, 895 N.W.2d 192 (Mich. Ct. App. 2016).
Noll v. Ritzer, 895 N.W.2d 192 (Mich. Ct. App. 2016).
· cites it 2× “252b, and MCL 257.252d to MCL 257.252m. In this case, petitioner’s vehicle was removed pursuant to MCL 257.”
In re Forfeiture of 1987 Mercury, 652 N.W.2d 675 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002).
· cites it 5× “a court hearing a forfeiture case with “the discretion, post-hearing, to ensure that the ancillary costs such as towing and storage expenses incurred by disinterested parties are paid,” especially in a case in which the officers had reasonable cause to seize the Mercury and the…”
Auto Club Ins. Ass'n v. City of Farmington Hills, 559 N.W.2d 314 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997).
· cites it 3× “MCL 257.252d; MSA 9.1952(4) provides for the removal of vehicles in such situations: (1) A police agency or a governmental agency designated by the police agency may provide for the immediate removal of a vehicle from public or private property to a *95 place of safekeeping at…”
People of Michigan v. David Ryan Baumann (Mich. Ct. App. 2023).
· cites it 14× “The district court held that inventory searches required “impoundment” rather than “towing” of the vehicle; that defendant’s vehicle was merely towed, not impounded; and that MCL 257.252d required that the vehicle be released to defendant because he was present at the scene of…”
Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. J & T Towing (Mich. Ct. App. 2026).
· cites it 13× “252b, or MCL 257.252d.” Petitioner appealed this order by right to the circuit court on August 10, 2021, and respondent filed a claim of cross-appeal on August 23, 2021.”
City of Detroit v. Nationwide Recovery Inc (Mich. Ct. App. 2021).
· cites it 8× “In particular, Nationwide contends that the trial court’s holding infringes on the Legislature’s policymaking prerogative by, in essence, judicially adding such a requirement to MCL 257.252d(1), which provides: A police agency or a governmental agency designated by the police…”
Robertson v. Breakthrough Towing, LLC (E.D. Mich. 2022).
· cites it 8× “§ 257.252d—allowing police to wait seven days before entering vehicles that were towed at direction of police into LEIN—violated their procedural due process rights).”
People v. Sheldon, 527 N.W.2d 76 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995).
“If there had been testimony that the vehicle was parked in an unsafe manner or in a tow away zone, for example, then we could easily conclude that it was subject to impoundment under MCL 257.252d(l); MSA 9.1952(4)(1), which also requires the payment of the impoundment fees or…”
People of Michigan v. Joseph John Blair Jr (Mich. Ct. App. 2019).
· cites it 4× “The impoundment policy of the Berrien County Sheriff’s Department incorporates this statute. MCL 257.252d(1) provides in relevant part: A police agency or a governmental agency designated by the police agency may provide for the immediate removal of a vehicle from public or…”
Robertson v. Breakthrough Towing, LLC (E.D. Mich. 2024).
· cites it 2× “§ 257.252d(2). In their complaint, Plaintiffs appeared to allege that Defendants violated their due process rights by failing to enforce this provision and “illegally prevent[ing] car owners from retrieving their cars before their cars were removed by Breakthrough.”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 257.252d(1) — 2 cases
City of Detroit v. Nationwide Recovery Inc (Mich. Ct. App. 2021).
“In particular, Nationwide contends that the trial court’s holding infringes on the Legislature’s policymaking prerogative by, in essence, judicially adding such a requirement to MCL 257.252d(1), which provides: A police agency or a governmental agency designated by the police…”
People of Michigan v. Joseph John Blair Jr (Mich. Ct. App. 2019).
“The impoundment policy of the Berrien County Sheriff’s Department incorporates this statute. MCL 257.252d(1) provides in relevant part: A police agency or a governmental agency designated by the police agency may provide for the immediate removal of a vehicle from public or…”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 257.252d(1)(d) — 1 case
Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. J & T Towing (Mich. Ct. App. 2026).
“252b, or MCL 257.252d.” Petitioner appealed this order by right to the circuit court on August 10, 2021, and respondent filed a claim of cross-appeal on August 23, 2021.”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 257.252d(1)(e) — 1 case
People of Michigan v. Joseph John Blair Jr (Mich. Ct. App. 2019).
“The impoundment policy of the Berrien County Sheriff’s Department incorporates this statute. MCL 257.252d(1) provides in relevant part: A police agency or a governmental agency designated by the police agency may provide for the immediate removal of a vehicle from public or…”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 257.252d(1)(g) — 1 case
People of Michigan v. Joseph John Blair Jr (Mich. Ct. App. 2019).
“The impoundment policy of the Berrien County Sheriff’s Department incorporates this statute. MCL 257.252d(1) provides in relevant part: A police agency or a governmental agency designated by the police agency may provide for the immediate removal of a vehicle from public or…”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 257.252d(1)(k) — 1 case
People of Michigan v. David Ryan Baumann (Mich. Ct. App. 2023).
“The district court held that inventory searches required “impoundment” rather than “towing” of the vehicle; that defendant’s vehicle was merely towed, not impounded; and that MCL 257.252d required that the vehicle be released to defendant because he was present at the scene of…”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 257.252d(2) — 3 cases
Robertson v. Breakthrough Towing, LLC (E.D. Mich. 2022).
“§ 257.252d—allowing police to wait seven days before entering vehicles that were towed at direction of police into LEIN—violated their procedural due process rights).”
People of Michigan v. David Ryan Baumann (Mich. Ct. App. 2023).
“The district court held that inventory searches required “impoundment” rather than “towing” of the vehicle; that defendant’s vehicle was merely towed, not impounded; and that MCL 257.252d required that the vehicle be released to defendant because he was present at the scene of…”
Robertson v. Breakthrough Towing, LLC (E.D. Mich. 2024).
“§ 257.252d(2). In their complaint, Plaintiffs appeared to allege that Defendants violated their due process rights by failing to enforce this provision and “illegally prevent[ing] car owners from retrieving their cars before their cars were removed by Breakthrough.”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 257.252d(3) — 1 case
City of Detroit v. Nationwide Recovery Inc (Mich. Ct. App. 2021).
“In particular, Nationwide contends that the trial court’s holding infringes on the Legislature’s policymaking prerogative by, in essence, judicially adding such a requirement to MCL 257.252d(1), which provides: A police agency or a governmental agency designated by the police…”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 257.252d(3)(b) — 2 cases
City of Detroit v. Nationwide Recovery Inc (Mich. Ct. App. 2021).
“In particular, Nationwide contends that the trial court’s holding infringes on the Legislature’s policymaking prerogative by, in essence, judicially adding such a requirement to MCL 257.252d(1), which provides: A police agency or a governmental agency designated by the police…”
People of Michigan v. David Ryan Baumann (Mich. Ct. App. 2023).
“The district court held that inventory searches required “impoundment” rather than “towing” of the vehicle; that defendant’s vehicle was merely towed, not impounded; and that MCL 257.252d required that the vehicle be released to defendant because he was present at the scene of…”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 257.252d(4) — 1 case
Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. J & T Towing (Mich. Ct. App. 2026).
“252b, or MCL 257.252d.” Petitioner appealed this order by right to the circuit court on August 10, 2021, and respondent filed a claim of cross-appeal on August 23, 2021.”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 257.252d(5) — 1 case
Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. J & T Towing (Mich. Ct. App. 2026).
“252b, or MCL 257.252d.” Petitioner appealed this order by right to the circuit court on August 10, 2021, and respondent filed a claim of cross-appeal on August 23, 2021.”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 257.252d(6) — 1 case
Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. J & T Towing (Mich. Ct. App. 2026).
“252b, or MCL 257.252d.” Petitioner appealed this order by right to the circuit court on August 10, 2021, and respondent filed a claim of cross-appeal on August 23, 2021.”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 257.252d(l) — 1 case
People v. Sheldon, 527 N.W.2d 76 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995).
“If there had been testimony that the vehicle was parked in an unsafe manner or in a tow away zone, for example, then we could easily conclude that it was subject to impoundment under MCL 257.252d(l); MSA 9.1952(4)(1), which also requires the payment of the impoundment fees or…”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 257.252d(l)(e) — 1 case
Noll v. Ritzer, 895 N.W.2d 192 (Mich. Ct. App. 2016).
“252b, and MCL 257.252d to MCL 257.252m. In this case, petitioner’s vehicle was removed pursuant to MCL 257.”
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