DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT
Act 90 of 1992
333.1033 Determination of death; conditions; accepted medical standards; persons authorized to pronounce death of person.
Sec. 3.
(1) An individual who has sustained either of the following is dead:
(a) Irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions.
(b) Irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem.
(2) A determination of death shall be made in accordance with accepted medical standards.
(3) A physician or registered nurse may pronounce the death of a person in accordance with this act. This subsection does not prohibit a health facility or agency licensed under article 17 of the public health code, Act No. 368 of the Public Acts of 1978, being sections 333.20101 to 333.22260 of the Michigan Compiled Laws, from determining which of its medical personnel may pronounce the death of a person in that health facility or agency.
History: 1992, Act 90, Imd. Eff. June 4, 1992
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
4
cases, 1995–2000 · leading case:
People v. Selwa, 543 N.W.2d 321 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995).
People v. Selwa, 543 N.W.2d 321 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995).
· cites it 6× “]" While both parties cite and do not appear to dispute the applicability of the definition of "death," they do not rely on the statutory definition of "death" at the time of the incident, but, instead, rely on the definition provided in the subsequently enacted Determination of…”
People v. Bowles, 607 N.W.2d 715 (Mich. 2000).
“15(1033)(1), the Court of Appeals offered the view that “[a] rational trier of fact could have found that the victim came within the statutory definition of being ‘dead’ before being removed from the ventilator.”
People v. Bowles, 594 N.W.2d 100 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999).
· cites it 2× “” MCL 333.1033(2); MSA 14.15(1033)(2). Because of the injuries to her brain, the victim had sustained a cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions.”
Thomas v. Stubbs, 553 N.W.2d 634 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996).
“MCL 333.1033; MSA 14.15(1033) states in pertinent part: (1) An individual who has sustained either of the following is dead: (a) Irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions.”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 333.1033(1) — 1 case
People v. Bowles, 607 N.W.2d 715 (Mich. 2000).
“15(1033)(1), the Court of Appeals offered the view that “[a] rational trier of fact could have found that the victim came within the statutory definition of being ‘dead’ before being removed from the ventilator.”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 333.1033(2) — 1 case
People v. Bowles, 594 N.W.2d 100 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999).
“” MCL 333.1033(2); MSA 14.15(1033)(2). Because of the injuries to her brain, the victim had sustained a cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions.”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 333.1033(l)(a) — 1 case
People v. Bowles, 594 N.W.2d 100 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999).
“” MCL 333.1033(2); MSA 14.15(1033)(2). Because of the injuries to her brain, the victim had sustained a cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions.”
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