Michigan Compiled Laws

Mich. Comp. Laws § 418.301 (2026)

Compensation for personal injury or death in course of employment; time or date of injury; compensation for mental disabilities and conditions of aging process; presumption; injury incurred in pursuit of social or recreational activity; definitions; burden of production of evidence; determining entitlement to weekly wage loss benefits; notice to agency; “reasonable employment” defined; payment of benefits to persons incarcerated in penal institution or confined in mental institution; discrimination prohibited; personal injuries and work related diseases to which section applicable.

✓ current as of July 2026
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WORKER'S DISABILITY COMPENSATION ACT OF 1969


Act 317 of 1969


418.301 Compensation for personal injury or death in course of employment; time or date of injury; compensation for mental disabilities and conditions of aging process; presumption; injury incurred in pursuit of social or recreational activity; definitions; burden of production of evidence; determining entitlement to weekly wage loss benefits; notice to agency; “reasonable employment” defined; payment of benefits to persons incarcerated in penal institution or confined in mental institution; discrimination prohibited; personal injuries and work related diseases to which section applicable.

Sec. 301.

    (1) An employee, who receives a personal injury arising out of and in the course of employment by an employer who is subject to this act at the time of the injury, shall be paid compensation as provided in this act. A personal injury under this act is compensable if work causes, contributes to, or aggravates pathology in a manner so as to create a pathology that is medically distinguishable from any pathology that existed prior to the injury. In the case of death resulting from the personal injury to the employee, compensation shall be paid to the employee's dependents as provided in this act. Time of injury or date of injury as used in this act in the case of a disease or in the case of an injury not attributable to a single event is the last day of work in the employment in which the employee was last subjected to the conditions that resulted in the employee's disability or death.

    (2) Mental disabilities and conditions of the aging process, including but not limited to heart and cardiovascular conditions and degenerative arthritis, are compensable if contributed to or aggravated or accelerated by the employment in a significant manner. Mental disabilities are compensable if arising out of actual events of employment, not unfounded perceptions thereof, and if the employee's perception of the actual events is reasonably grounded in fact or reality.

    (3) An employee going to or from his or her work, while on the premises where the employee's work is to be performed, and within a reasonable time before and after his or her working hours, is presumed to be in the course of his or her employment. Notwithstanding this presumption, an injury incurred in the pursuit of an activity the major purpose of which is social or recreational is not covered under this act. Any cause of action brought for such an injury is not subject to section 131.

    (4) As used in this chapter:

    (a) "Disability" means a limitation of an employee's wage earning capacity in work suitable to his or her qualifications and training resulting from a personal injury or work-related disease. A limitation of wage earning capacity occurs only if a personal injury covered under this act results in the employee's being unable to perform all jobs paying the maximum wages in work suitable to that employee's qualifications and training, which includes work that may be performed using the employee's transferable work skills. A disability is total if the employee is unable to earn in any job paying maximum wages in work suitable to the employee's qualifications and training. A disability is partial if the employee retains a wage earning capacity at a pay level less than his or her maximum wages in work suitable to his or her qualifications and training. The establishment of disability does not create a presumption of wage loss.

    (b) Except as provided in section 302, "wage earning capacity" means the wages the employee earns or is capable of earning at a job reasonably available to that employee, whether or not wages are actually earned. For the purposes of establishing a limitation of wage earning capacity, an employee has an affirmative duty to seek work reasonably available to that employee, taking into consideration the limitations from the work-related personal injury or disease. A magistrate may consider good-faith job search efforts to determine whether jobs are reasonably available.

    (c) "Wage loss" means the amount of wages lost due to a disability. The employee shall establish a connection between the disability and reduced wages in establishing the wage loss. Wage loss may be established, among other methods, by demonstrating the employee's good-faith effort to procure work within his or her wage earning capacity. A partially disabled employee who establishes a good-faith effort to procure work but cannot obtain work within his or her wage earning capacity is entitled to weekly benefits under subsection (7) as if totally disabled.

    (5) To establish an initial showing of disability, an employee shall do all of the following:

    (a) Disclose his or her qualifications and training, including education, skills, and experience, whether or not they are relevant to the job the employee was performing at the time of the injury.

    (b) Provide evidence as to the jobs, if any, he or she is qualified and trained to perform within the same salary range as his or her maximum wage earning capacity at the time of the injury.

    (c) Demonstrate that the work-related injury prevents the employee from performing jobs identified as within his or her qualifications and training that pay maximum wages.

    (d) If the employee is capable of performing any of the jobs identified in subdivision (c), show that he or she cannot obtain any of those jobs. The evidence shall include a showing of a good-faith attempt to procure post-injury employment if there are jobs at the employee's maximum wage earning capacity at the time of the injury.

    (6) Once an employee establishes an initial showing of a disability under subsection (5), the employer bears the burden of production of evidence to refute the employee's showing. In satisfying its burden of production of evidence, the employer has a right to discovery if necessary for the employer to sustain its burden and present a meaningful defense. The employee may present additional evidence to challenge the evidence submitted by the employer.

    (7) If a personal injury arising out of the course of employment causes total disability and wage loss and the employee is entitled to wage loss benefits, the employer shall pay or cause to be paid to the injured employee as provided in this section weekly compensation equal to 80% of the employee's after-tax average weekly wage, but not more than the maximum weekly rate determined under section 355. Compensation shall be paid for the duration of the disability.

    (8) If a personal injury arising out of the course of employment causes partial disability and wage loss and the employee is entitled to wage loss benefits, the employer shall pay or cause to be paid to the injured employee as provided in this section weekly compensation equal to 80% of the difference between the injured employee's after-tax average weekly wage before the personal injury and the employee's wage earning capacity after the personal injury, but not more than the maximum weekly rate determined under section 355. Compensation shall be paid for the duration of the disability.

    (9) If disability and wage loss are established, entitlement to weekly wage loss benefits shall be determined as applicable pursuant to this section and as follows:

    (a) If an employee receives a bona fide offer of reasonable employment from the previous employer, another employer, or through the Michigan unemployment insurance agency and the employee refuses that employment without good and reasonable cause, the employee shall be considered to have voluntarily removed himself or herself from the work force and is not entitled to any wage loss benefits under this act during the period of refusal.

    (b) If an employee is terminated from reasonable employment for fault of the employee, the employee is considered to have voluntarily removed himself or herself from the work force and is not entitled to any wage loss benefits under this act.

    (c) If an employee is employed and the weekly wage of the employee is less than that which the employee received before the date of injury, the employee shall receive weekly benefits under this act equal to 80% of the difference between the injured employee's after-tax weekly wage before the date of injury and the after-tax weekly wage that the injured employee earns after the date of injury, but not more than the maximum weekly rate of compensation, as determined under section 355.

    (d) If an employee is employed and the average weekly wage of the employee is equal to or more than the average weekly wage the employee received before the date of injury, the employee is not entitled to any wage loss benefits under this act for the duration of that employment.

    (e) If the employee, after having been employed pursuant to this subsection loses his or her job through no fault of the employee and the employee is still disabled, the employee shall receive compensation under this act as follows:

    (i) If the employee was employed for less than 100 weeks, the employee shall receive compensation based upon his or her average weekly wage at the time of the original injury.

    (ii) If the employee was employed for 100 weeks or more but less than 250 weeks, then after exhausting unemployment benefit eligibility, a worker's compensation magistrate may determine that the employment since the time of the injury has not established a new wage earning capacity and, if the magistrate makes that determination, benefits shall be based on his or her average weekly wage at the original date of injury. If the magistrate does not make that determination, the employee is presumed to have established a post-injury wage earning capacity and benefits shall not be paid based on the wage at the original date of injury.

    (iii) If the employee was employed for 250 weeks or more, the employee is presumed to have established a post-injury wage earning capacity.

    (10) The Michigan unemployment insurance agency shall notify the agency in writing of the name of any employee who refuses any bona fide offer of reasonable employment. Upon notification to the agency, the agency shall notify the carrier who shall terminate the benefits of the employee pursuant to subsection (9)(a).

    (11) "Reasonable employment", as used in this section, means work that is within the employee's capacity to perform that poses no clear and proximate threat to that employee's health and safety, and that is within a reasonable distance from that employee's residence. The employee's capacity to perform shall not be limited to jobs in work suitable to his or her qualifications and training.

    (12) Weekly benefits are not payable during the period of confinement to a person who is incarcerated in a penal institution for violation of the criminal laws of this state or who is confined in a mental institution pending trial for a violation of the criminal laws of this state, if the violation or reason for the confinement occurred while at work and is directly related to the claim.

    (13) A person shall not discharge an employee or in any manner discriminate against an employee because the employee filed a complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted a proceeding under this act or because of the exercise by the employee on behalf of himself or herself or others of a right afforded by this act.

    (14) This section applies to personal injuries and work related diseases occurring on or after June 30, 1985.

History: Add. 1985, Act 103, Imd. Eff. July 30, 1985 ;-- Am. 1986, Act 313, Imd. Eff. Dec. 23, 1986 ;-- Am. 1987, Act 28, Imd. Eff. May 14, 1987 ;-- Am. 2011, Act 266, Imd. Eff. Dec. 19, 2011

Compiler's Notes:

    For legislative intent as to severability, see Compiler's note to MCL 418.213.

    Former MCL 418.301, which pertained to compensation for personal injury or death resulting from personal injury, was repealed by Act 103 of 1985, Imd. Eff. July 30, 1985.

    Enacting section 2 of Act 266 of 2011 provides:

    "Enacting section 2. This amendatory act applies to injuries incurred on or after its effective date."

PopularName Notes:

Act 317

PopularName Notes:

Heart and Lung Act
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 402 cases (35 in the last 5 years), 1971–2026 · leading case: Sington v. Chrysler Corp., 648 N.W.2d 624 (Mich. 2002).
Sington v. Chrysler Corp., 648 N.W.2d 624 (Mich. 2002). · cites it 44× “§ 418.301[5]) [5] an employee *629 must first suffer a "disability," as defined in M.”
Gardner v. Van Buren Pub. Schs., 517 N.W.2d 1 (Mich. 1994). · cites it 76× “INTRODUCTION The issue presented in these cases calls upon the Court to construe MCL 418.301(2); MSA 17.237(301)(2). [1] Specifically, we must decide whether the statute requires an objective or subjective analysis when examining the significance of "actual events of employment"…”
Stokes v. Chrysler LLC, 750 N.W.2d 129 (Mich. 2008). · cites it 48× “The majority reads a new requirement into the act: an injured worker must now provide the equivalent of a "transferable-skills analysis" to show a limitation of wage-earning capacity when establishing a disability under MCL 418.”
Cuddington v. United Health Servs., Inc., 826 N.W.2d 519 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012). · cites it 18× “Hall examined plaintiff on January 12,2009, diagnosed a “cervical sprain,” and noted that “since he is driving and has to lift heavy equipment I am going to keep him off for a while.”
Robertson v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 641 N.W.2d 567 (Mich. 2002). · cites it 18× “§ 418.301(2). The Court of Appeals determined that such considerations by the magistrate were irrelevant to a mental disability analysis.”
Rakestraw v. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc, 666 N.W.2d 199 (Mich. 2003). · cites it 18× “§ 418.301 et seq., on the basis of aggravation of the symptoms of a nonwork-related condition.”
Eversman v. Concrete Cutting & Breaking, 614 N.W.2d 862 (Mich. 2000). · cites it 39× “[MCL 418.301(1); MSA 17.237(301)(1).] It is well settled that an employee who seeks worker's compensation must show by competent evidence not only the fact of an injury, but also that the injury occurred in connection with his employment, arising out of and in the course of that…”
DiBenedetto v. West Shore Hosp., 605 N.W.2d 300 (Mich. 2000). · cites it 10× “MCL 418.301(5)(c); MSA 17.237(301)(5)(c).”
Paschke v. Retool Indus., 519 N.W.2d 441 (Mich. 1994). · cites it 10× “[MCL 418.301(4); MSA 17.237(301)(4). Emphasis added.”
Deziel v. Difco Labs., Inc., 268 N.W.2d 1 (Mich. 2009). · cites it 6× “MCLA 418.301; MSA 17.237(301). In cases such as these, which involve an alleged pre-existing mental condition, the question of whether a disability arose out of the employment should be resolved by establishing a work nexus.”
Layman v. Newkirk Elec. Assocs. Inc., 581 N.W.2d 244 (Mich. 1998). · cites it 18× “§ 418.301; M.S.A. § 17.237(301). The commission stated: "A review of the Magistrate's opinion reveals that he failed to apply the `significant manner' test, apparently applying a less stringent `causal relationship' standard.”
Farrington v. Total Petroleum, Inc., 501 N.W.2d 76 (Mich. 1993). · cites it 6× “237(401), and that of specific injuries under chapter 3, MCL 418.301; MSA 17.237(301). The enacted amendments, effective January 1, 1982, added the following language to the definitions of these sections: Mental disabilities and conditions of the aging process, including but not…”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 418.301(1) — 106 cases
Rakestraw v. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc, 666 N.W.2d 199 (Mich. 2003). “§ 418.301 et seq., on the basis of aggravation of the symptoms of a nonwork-related condition.”
Paige v. City of Sterling Heights, 720 N.W.2d 219 (Mich. 2006).
Deziel v. Difco Labs., Inc., 268 N.W.2d 1 (Mich. 2009). “MCLA 418.301; MSA 17.237(301). In cases such as these, which involve an alleged pre-existing mental condition, the question of whether a disability arose out of the employment should be resolved by establishing a work nexus.”
Hagerman v. Gencorp Auto., 579 N.W.2d 347 (Mich. 1998).
Peters v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 377 N.W.2d 774 (Mich. 1985).
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 418.301(10) — 1 case
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 418.301(11) — 25 cases
Dunbar v. Dep't of Mental Health, 495 N.W.2d 152 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992).
Phillips v. Butterball Farms Co., 531 N.W.2d 144 (Mich. 1995).
Cuddington v. United Health Servs., Inc., 826 N.W.2d 519 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012). “Hall examined plaintiff on January 12,2009, diagnosed a “cervical sprain,” and noted that “since he is driving and has to lift heavy equipment I am going to keep him off for a while.”
Clifford v. Cactus Drilling Corp., 353 N.W.2d 469 (Mich. 1984).
Ashworth v. Jefferson Screw Prods., Inc, 440 N.W.2d 101 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989).
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 418.301(13) — 22 cases
Cuddington v. United Health Servs., Inc., 826 N.W.2d 519 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012). “Hall examined plaintiff on January 12,2009, diagnosed a “cervical sprain,” and noted that “since he is driving and has to lift heavy equipment I am going to keep him off for a while.”
Dwight Gregg v. Creative Foam Corp. (Mich. Ct. App. 2023).
Ansel v. Erie Twp. (E.D. Mich. 2023).
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 418.301(2) — 72 cases
Gardner v. Van Buren Pub. Schs., 517 N.W.2d 1 (Mich. 1994). “INTRODUCTION The issue presented in these cases calls upon the Court to construe MCL 418.301(2); MSA 17.237(301)(2). [1] Specifically, we must decide whether the statute requires an objective or subjective analysis when examining the significance of "actual events of employment"…”
Robertson v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 641 N.W.2d 567 (Mich. 2002). “§ 418.301(2). The Court of Appeals determined that such considerations by the magistrate were irrelevant to a mental disability analysis.”
Layman v. Newkirk Elec. Assocs. Inc., 581 N.W.2d 244 (Mich. 1998). “§ 418.301; M.S.A. § 17.237(301). The commission stated: "A review of the Magistrate's opinion reveals that he failed to apply the `significant manner' test, apparently applying a less stringent `causal relationship' standard.”
Hurd v. Ford Motor Co., 377 N.W.2d 300 (Mich. 1985).
White v. Gen. Motors Corp., 429 N.W.2d 576 (Mich. 1988).
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 418.301(3) — 30 cases
Eversman v. Concrete Cutting & Breaking, 614 N.W.2d 862 (Mich. 2000). “[MCL 418.301(1); MSA 17.237(301)(1).] It is well settled that an employee who seeks worker's compensation must show by competent evidence not only the fact of an injury, but also that the injury occurred in connection with his employment, arising out of and in the course of that…”
Simkins v. Gen. Motors Corp., 556 N.W.2d 839 (Mich. 1996).
Smith v. Greenville Prods. Co., 462 N.W.2d 789 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990).
Harris v. Vernier, 617 N.W.2d 764 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000).
Sazima v. Shepherd Bar & Restaurant, 758 N.W.2d 270 (Mich. 2008).
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 418.301(4) — 45 cases
Stokes v. Chrysler LLC, 750 N.W.2d 129 (Mich. 2008). “The majority reads a new requirement into the act: an injured worker must now provide the equivalent of a "transferable-skills analysis" to show a limitation of wage-earning capacity when establishing a disability under MCL 418.”
Sington v. Chrysler Corp., 648 N.W.2d 624 (Mich. 2002). “§ 418.301[5]) [5] an employee *629 must first suffer a "disability," as defined in M.”
Paschke v. Retool Indus., 519 N.W.2d 441 (Mich. 1994). “[MCL 418.301(4); MSA 17.237(301)(4). Emphasis added.”
Stokes v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 727 N.W.2d 637 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007).
People v. Tennyson, 790 N.W.2d 354 (Mich. 2010).
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 418.301(4)(a) — 8 cases
Ahmed Omer v. Steel Tech. Inc. (Mich. Ct. App. 2020).
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 418.301(4)(b) — 2 cases
Omian v. Chrysler Grp. LLC, 869 N.W.2d 625 (Mich. Ct. App. 2015).
Monasser Omian v. Chrysler Grp. LLC (Mich. Ct. App. 2015).
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 418.301(5) — 28 cases
Sington v. Chrysler Corp., 648 N.W.2d 624 (Mich. 2002). “§ 418.301[5]) [5] an employee *629 must first suffer a "disability," as defined in M.”
Pulver v. Dundee Cement Co., 515 N.W.2d 728 (Mich. 1994).
Sobotka v. Chrysler Corp., 523 N.W.2d 454 (Mich. 1994).
Perez v. Keeler Brass Co., 608 N.W.2d 45 (Mich. 2000).
McKissack v. Comprehensive Health Servs., 523 N.W.2d 444 (Mich. 1994).
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 418.301(5)(6) — 1 case
Sobotka v. Chrysler Corp., 499 N.W.2d 777 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993).
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 418.301(5)(a) — 22 cases
Derr v. Murphy Motor Freight Lines, 550 N.W.2d 759 (Mich. 1996).
Pulver v. Dundee Cement Co., 515 N.W.2d 728 (Mich. 1994).
Jones-Jennings v. Hutzel Hosp., 565 N.W.2d 680 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997).
McJunkin v. Cellasto Plastic Corp., 608 N.W.2d 57 (Mich. 2000).
Nederhood v. Cadillac Malleable Iron Co., 518 N.W.2d 390 (Mich. 1994).
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 418.301(5)(b) — 6 cases
Lincoln v. Gen. Motors Corp., 586 N.W.2d 241 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998).
Benito T. Perez, Jr. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 96 F.3d 813 (6th Cir. 1996).
Schmaltz v. Troy Metal Concepts, Inc, 673 N.W.2d 95 (Mich. 2003).
Kurz v. Michigan Wheel Corp., 601 N.W.2d 130 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999).
Wright v. Vos Steel Co., 517 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994).
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 418.301(5)(c) — 2 cases
DiBenedetto v. West Shore Hosp., 605 N.W.2d 300 (Mich. 2000). “MCL 418.301(5)(c); MSA 17.237(301)(5)(c).”
Lincoln v. Gen. Motors Corp., 586 N.W.2d 241 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998).
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 418.301(5)(d) — 4 cases
Sington v. Chrysler Corp., 648 N.W.2d 624 (Mich. 2002). “§ 418.301[5]) [5] an employee *629 must first suffer a "disability," as defined in M.”
Perez v. Keeler Brass Co., 608 N.W.2d 45 (Mich. 2000).
Paschke v. Retool Indus., 499 N.W.2d 453 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993).
Sington v. Chrysler Corp., 630 N.W.2d 337 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001).
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 418.301(5)(d)(i) — 2 cases
Maier v. Gen. Tel. Co., 637 N.W.2d 263 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001).
Maier v. Gen. Tel. Co. of Michigan, 645 N.W.2d 654 (Mich. 2002).
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 418.301(5)(e) — 9 cases
Perez v. Keeler Brass Co., 608 N.W.2d 45 (Mich. 2000).
Maier v. Gen. Tel. Co., 637 N.W.2d 263 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001).
Lee v. Koegel Meats, 502 N.W.2d 711 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993).
Miles v. Russell Mem'l Hosp., 507 N.W.2d 784 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993).
Arnold v. Gen. Motors Corp., 575 N.W.2d 540 (Mich. 1998).
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 418.301(6) — 2 cases
Ahmed Omer v. Steel Tech. Inc. (Mich. Ct. App. 2020).
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 418.301(7) — 1 case
Ahmed Omer v. Steel Tech. Inc. (Mich. Ct. App. 2020).
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 418.301(8) — 2 cases
Derr v. Murphy Motor Freight Lines, 550 N.W.2d 759 (Mich. 1996).
Ahmed Omer v. Steel Tech. Inc. (Mich. Ct. App. 2020).
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 418.301(9) — 14 cases
Sington v. Chrysler Corp., 648 N.W.2d 624 (Mich. 2002). “§ 418.301[5]) [5] an employee *629 must first suffer a "disability," as defined in M.”
Jones-Jennings v. Hutzel Hosp., 565 N.W.2d 680 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997).
Derr v. Murphy Motor Freight Lines, 550 N.W.2d 759 (Mich. 1996).
Sweatt v. Dep't of Corr., 661 N.W.2d 201 (Mich. 2003).
Sington v. Chrysler Corp., 630 N.W.2d 337 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001).
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 418.301(9)(a) — 2 cases
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