Mich. Comp. Laws » Michigan Compiled Laws / Chapter 722 / Act 205 of 1956
Michigan Compiled Laws

Mich. Comp. Laws § 722.716 (2026)

Pretrial proceedings; blood or tissue typing determinations as to mother, child, and alleged father; court order; refusal to submit to typing or identification profiling; qualifications of person conducting typing or identification profiling; compensation of expert; result of typing or identification profiling; filing summary report; objection; admissibility; establishment of paternity.

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THE PATERNITY ACT


Act 205 of 1956


722.716 Pretrial proceedings; blood or tissue typing determinations as to mother, child, and alleged father; court order; refusal to submit to typing or identification profiling; qualifications of person conducting typing or identification profiling; compensation of expert; result of typing or identification profiling; filing summary report; objection; admissibility; establishment of paternity.

Sec. 6.

    (1) In a proceeding under this act before trial, the court, upon application made by or on behalf of either party, or on its own motion, shall order that the mother, child, and alleged father submit to blood or tissue typing determinations that may include, but are not limited to, determinations of red cell antigens, red cell isoenzymes, human leukocyte antigens, serum proteins, or DNA identification profiling, to determine whether the alleged father is likely to be, or is not, the father of the child. If the court orders a blood or tissue typing or DNA identification profiling to be conducted and a party refuses to submit to the typing or DNA identification profiling, in addition to any other remedies available, the court may do either of the following:

    (a) Enter a default judgment at the request of the appropriate party.

    (b) If a trial is held, allow the disclosure of the fact of the refusal unless good cause is shown for not disclosing the fact of refusal.

    (2) A blood or tissue typing or DNA identification profiling shall be conducted by a person accredited for paternity determinations by a nationally recognized scientific organization, including, but not limited to, the American association of blood banks.

    (3) The court shall fix the compensation of an expert at a reasonable amount and may direct the compensation to be paid by the county or by any other party to the case, or by both in the proportions and at the times the court prescribes. Before blood or tissue typing or DNA identification profiling is conducted, the court may order a part or all of the compensation paid in advance. If the department of human services paid for the genetic testing expenses, the court may order repayment by the alleged father if the court declares paternity. Documentation of the genetic testing expenses is admissible as evidence of the amount, which evidence constitutes prima facie evidence of the amount of those expenses without third party foundation testimony.

    (4) Subject to subsection (5), the result of blood or tissue typing or a DNA identification profile and the summary report shall be served on the mother and alleged father. The summary report shall be filed with the court. Objection to the DNA identification profile or summary report is waived unless made in writing, setting forth the specific basis for the objection, within 14 calendar days after service on the mother and alleged father. The court shall not schedule a trial on the issue of paternity until after the expiration of the 14-day period. If an objection is not filed, the court shall admit in proceedings under this act the result of the blood or tissue typing or the DNA identification profile and the summary report without requiring foundation testimony or other proof of authenticity or accuracy. If an objection is filed within the 14-day period, on the motion of either party, the court shall hold a hearing to determine the admissibility of the DNA identification profile or summary report. The objecting party has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence by a qualified person described in subsection (2) that foundation testimony or other proof of authenticity or accuracy is necessary for admission of the DNA identification profile or summary report.

    (5) If the probability of paternity determined by the qualified person described in subsection (2) conducting the blood or tissue typing or DNA identification profiling is 99% or higher, and the DNA identification profile and summary report are admissible as provided in subsection (4), paternity is established. If the results of the analysis of genetic testing material from 2 or more persons indicate a probability of paternity greater than 99%, the contracting laboratory shall conduct additional genetic paternity testing until all but 1 of the putative fathers is eliminated, unless the dispute involves 2 or more putative fathers who have identical DNA.

    (6) This section does not abrogate the right of either party to child support from the date of birth of the child if applicable under section 7.

History: 1956, Act 205, Eff. Aug. 11, 1956 ;-- Am. 1982, Act 129, Imd. Eff. Apr. 20, 1982 ;-- Am. 1989, Act 258, Imd. Eff. Dec. 26, 1989 ;-- Am. 1990, Act 303, Imd. Eff. Dec. 14, 1990 ;-- Am. 1994, Act 388, Imd. Eff. Dec. 29, 1994 ;-- Am. 1996, Act 308, Eff. June 1, 1997 ;-- Am. 1998, Act 113, Eff. Aug. 10, 1998 ;-- Am. 2000, Act 31, Imd. Eff. Mar. 15, 2000 ;-- Am. 2014, Act 364, Eff. Mar. 17, 2015

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 42 cases (2 in the last 5 years), 1966–2023 · leading case: In re Moiles, 840 N.W.2d 790 (Mich. Ct. App. 2013).
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In re Moiles, 840 N.W.2d 790 (Mich. Ct. App. 2013). · cites it 7× “1443(5); see MCL 722.716. MCL 722.716(5). MCL 722.716(6).”
In Re Mkk, 781 N.W.2d 132 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009). · cites it 2× “MCL 722.716(1). If the testing shows that there is a 99 percent or higher probability of paternity, paternity is presumed.”
Bowerman v. MacDonald, 427 N.W.2d 477 (Mich. 1988). · cites it 5× “[MCL 722.716(1); MSA 25.496(1).][ 24 ] In light of this explicit requirement of the Paternity Act, any reliance upon it to limit blood testing is mistaken.”
Sturak v. Ozomaro, 606 N.W.2d 411 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000). · cites it 4× “[MCL 722.716(1); MSA 25.496(1).] Because the statute in effect at the time defendant disobeyed the trial court’s order specifically contemplated the trial court’s entry of a default against him, defendant’s argument that the trial court improperly applied subsection 6(1)…”
People v. Young, 340 N.W.2d 805 (Mich. 1983). · cites it 2× “, MCL 722.716; MSA 25.496. Shaw, Electrophoresis (New York: Academic, 1969); Carpenter, Immunology and Serology (Philadelphia: Saunders, 1965); Ribeiro, Mitidieri & Affonso, Paper Electrophoresis (New York: Elsevier, 1961).”
Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981). “1980); Mich. Comp. Laws § 722.716 (e) (1970); Minn.”
Pizana v. Jones, 339 N.W.2d 1 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983). · cites it 4× “” MCL 722.716; MSA 25.496 as amended by 1982 PA 129 .”
Willerick v. Hanshalli, 356 N.W.2d 36 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984). · cites it 5× “Since its amendment by 1982 PA 129 , MCL 722.716(1); MSA 25.496(1) expressly has provided for HLA testing of the mother, child, and alleged father in paternity proceedings pursuant to court order, as was done in this case.”
Klein v. Franks, 314 N.W.2d 602 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981). · cites it 4× “The first issue raised on appeal is whether the trial court erred in finding the HLA test to be a blood test within the meaning of MCL 722.716; MSA 25.496. We conclude that it did not.”
Crego v. Coleman, 591 N.W.2d 277 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999). · cites it 3× “MCL 722.716(5); MSA 25.496(5). With these advances, there is no longer a difference between the state's interest in finality and *283 settlement in paternity actions and divorce actions on the basis of difficulty of proof.”
People v. Camon, 313 N.W.2d 322 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981). · cites it 2× “The decision found support in the provisions of the Paternity Act, MCL 722.716; MSA 25.496, banning the use of blood-test evidence in paternity proceedings except to protect the putative father.”
Helton v. Beaman, 850 N.W.2d 515 (Mich. Ct. App. 2014). “Blood or tissue typing or DNA identification profiling shall be conducted in accordance with section 6 of the paternity act, 1956 PA 205 , MCL 722.716. The results of blood or tissue typing or DNA identification profiling are not binding on a court in making a determination…”
Show all 42 citing cases →
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 722.716(1) — 9 cases
In Re Mkk, 781 N.W.2d 132 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009). “MCL 722.716(1). If the testing shows that there is a 99 percent or higher probability of paternity, paternity is presumed.”
Bowerman v. MacDonald, 427 N.W.2d 477 (Mich. 1988). “[MCL 722.716(1); MSA 25.496(1).][ 24 ] In light of this explicit requirement of the Paternity Act, any reliance upon it to limit blood testing is mistaken.”
Willerick v. Hanshalli, 356 N.W.2d 36 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984). “Since its amendment by 1982 PA 129 , MCL 722.716(1); MSA 25.496(1) expressly has provided for HLA testing of the mother, child, and alleged father in paternity proceedings pursuant to court order, as was done in this case.”
Sturak v. Ozomaro, 606 N.W.2d 411 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000). “[MCL 722.716(1); MSA 25.496(1).] Because the statute in effect at the time defendant disobeyed the trial court’s order specifically contemplated the trial court’s entry of a default against him, defendant’s argument that the trial court improperly applied subsection 6(1)…”
People v. Taylor, 460 N.W.2d 582 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990).
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 722.716(1)(a) — 1 case
Kelly Marie Graham v. Kevin Dwayne Craft (Mich. Ct. App. 2023).
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 722.716(2) — 1 case
Willerick v. Hanshalli, 356 N.W.2d 36 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984). “Since its amendment by 1982 PA 129 , MCL 722.716(1); MSA 25.496(1) expressly has provided for HLA testing of the mother, child, and alleged father in paternity proceedings pursuant to court order, as was done in this case.”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 722.716(4) — 2 cases
Bowerman v. MacDonald, 427 N.W.2d 477 (Mich. 1988). “[MCL 722.716(1); MSA 25.496(1).][ 24 ] In light of this explicit requirement of the Paternity Act, any reliance upon it to limit blood testing is mistaken.”
Willerick v. Hanshalli, 356 N.W.2d 36 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984). “Since its amendment by 1982 PA 129 , MCL 722.716(1); MSA 25.496(1) expressly has provided for HLA testing of the mother, child, and alleged father in paternity proceedings pursuant to court order, as was done in this case.”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 722.716(5) — 7 cases
In Re Mkk, 781 N.W.2d 132 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009). “MCL 722.716(1). If the testing shows that there is a 99 percent or higher probability of paternity, paternity is presumed.”
In re Moiles, 840 N.W.2d 790 (Mich. Ct. App. 2013). “1443(5); see MCL 722.716. MCL 722.716(5). MCL 722.716(6).”
Crego v. Coleman, 591 N.W.2d 277 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999). “MCL 722.716(5); MSA 25.496(5). With these advances, there is no longer a difference between the state's interest in finality and *283 settlement in paternity actions and divorce actions on the basis of difficulty of proof.”
Sturak v. Ozomaro, 606 N.W.2d 411 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000). “[MCL 722.716(1); MSA 25.496(1).] Because the statute in effect at the time defendant disobeyed the trial court’s order specifically contemplated the trial court’s entry of a default against him, defendant’s argument that the trial court improperly applied subsection 6(1)…”
Dones v. Thomas, 534 N.W.2d 221 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995).
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 722.716(6) — 1 case
In re Moiles, 840 N.W.2d 790 (Mich. Ct. App. 2013). “1443(5); see MCL 722.716. MCL 722.716(5). MCL 722.716(6).”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 722.716(a) — 4 cases
Bowerman v. MacDonald, 427 N.W.2d 477 (Mich. 1988). “[MCL 722.716(1); MSA 25.496(1).][ 24 ] In light of this explicit requirement of the Paternity Act, any reliance upon it to limit blood testing is mistaken.”
Sturak v. Ozomaro, 606 N.W.2d 411 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000). “[MCL 722.716(1); MSA 25.496(1).] Because the statute in effect at the time defendant disobeyed the trial court’s order specifically contemplated the trial court’s entry of a default against him, defendant’s argument that the trial court improperly applied subsection 6(1)…”
People v. Marshall, 266 N.W.2d 678 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978).
Covington v. Cox, 267 N.W.2d 469 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978).
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 722.716(b) — 1 case
Tune v. Blaney, 348 N.W.2d 19 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984).
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 722.716(c) — 2 cases
People v. Marshall, 266 N.W.2d 678 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978).
Madary v. Engel, 314 N.W.2d 676 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981).
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 722.716(d) — 7 cases
Pizana v. Jones, 339 N.W.2d 1 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983). “” MCL 722.716; MSA 25.496 as amended by 1982 PA 129 .”
Cardenas v. Chavez, 303 N.W.2d 3 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980).
Shifter v. Wolf, 327 N.W.2d 429 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982).
Hoffman v. Campbell, 341 N.W.2d 246 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983).
Varney v. Young, 308 N.W.2d 276 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981).
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 722.716(l)(a) — 1 case
Sturak v. Ozomaro, 606 N.W.2d 411 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000). “[MCL 722.716(1); MSA 25.496(1).] Because the statute in effect at the time defendant disobeyed the trial court’s order specifically contemplated the trial court’s entry of a default against him, defendant’s argument that the trial court improperly applied subsection 6(1)…”
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