THE MICHIGAN PENAL CODE
Act 328 of 1931
750.520j Evidence of victim's sexual conduct.
Sec. 520j.
(1) Evidence of specific instances of the victim's sexual conduct, opinion evidence of the victim's sexual conduct, and reputation evidence of the victim's sexual conduct shall not be admitted under sections 520b to 520g unless and only to the extent that the judge finds that the following proposed evidence is material to a fact at issue in the case and that its inflammatory or prejudicial nature does not outweigh its probative value:
(a) Evidence of the victim's past sexual conduct with the actor.
(b) Evidence of specific instances of sexual activity showing the source or origin of semen, pregnancy, or disease.
(2) If the defendant proposes to offer evidence described in subsection (1)(a) or (b), the defendant within 10 days after the arraignment on the information shall file a written motion and offer of proof. The court may order an in camera hearing to determine whether the proposed evidence is admissible under subsection (1). If new information is discovered during the course of the trial that may make the evidence described in subsection (1)(a) or (b) admissible, the judge may order an in camera hearing to determine whether the proposed evidence is admissible under subsection (1).
History: Add. 1974, Act 266, Eff. Apr. 1, 1975
Constitutionality Notes:
This section, the rape-shield law, is not unconstitutional. People v Arenda, 416 Mich 1; 330 NW2nd 814 (1982).
In Michigan v Lucas, 500 US 145; 111 S Ct 1743; 114 L Ed2d 205 (1991), the United States Supreme Court held that the Michigan Court of Appeals had erred in adopting a “per se rule” that the notice-and-hearing requirement of Michigan's rape-shield law violated the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution in all cases where it was used to preclude evidence of past sexual conduct between a rape victim and a defendant (see People v Lucas, 160 Mich App 692; 408 NW2d 431 (1987)). The Court found that the statute “serves legitimate state interests in protecting against surprise, harassment, and undue delay. Failure to comply with this requirement may ... justify even the severe sanction of preclusion.”
Compiler's Notes:
Section 2 of Act 266 of 1974 provides:
“Saving clause.
“All proceedings pending and all rights and liabilities existing, acquired, or incurred at the time this amendatory act takes effect are saved and may be consummated according to the law in force when they are commenced. This amendatory act shall not be construed to affect any prosecution pending or begun before the effective date of this amendatory act.”
Notes of Decisions
People v. Hackett, 365 N.W.2d 120 (Mich. 1985).
· cites it 34× “We granted leave to consider the constitutionality of the rape-shield statute, MCL 750.520j; MSA 28.788(10), as applied in these two cases.”
People v. Dixon, 688 N.W.2d 308 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004).
· cites it 16× “§ 750.520j does not necessarily preclude the admission of evidence of past sexual relations between a victim and a defendant.”
People v. McLaughlin, 672 N.W.2d 860 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003).
· cites it 6× “” MCL 750.520j(2), however, contains a specific notice provision applicable to a defendant who wishes to admit evidence of the kind described under subsection 1: If the defendant proposes to offer evidence described in subsection (l)(a) or (b), the defendant within 10 days after…”
People v. Parks, 766 N.W.2d 650 (Mich. 2009).
· cites it 23× “" [11] The rape shield statute, MCL 750.520j, provides in part: (1) Evidence of specific instances of the victim's sexual conduct .”
People v. LaLone, 437 N.W.2d 611 (Mich. 1989).
· cites it 14× “In the committee comment to the evidentiary rule, it is clear that the commentators were aware of the potential unconstitutional application of the Michigan rape-shield statute: In adopting Rule 404(a)(3) the Committee was aware that questions have been raised regarding the…”
People v. Arenda, 330 N.W.2d 814 (Mich. 1982).
· cites it 11× “Our conclusions are that MCL 750.520j; MSA 28.788(10), the rape-shield law, is not unconstitutional and that reversal is not required on the facts before us in this case.”
People v. Adair, 550 N.W.2d 505 (Mich. 1996).
· cites it 10× “§ 750.520j; M.S.A. § 28.788(10) (emphasis added).”
People v. Watkins; People v. Pullen, 818 N.W.2d 296 (Mich. 2012).
· cites it 4× “Finally, we note as one example that the dissent’s proposed test would mean the end of Michigan’s rape-shield statute, MCL 750.520j, a consequence that the dissent does not dispute.”
People v. Stanaway, 521 N.W.2d 557 (Mich. 1994).
· cites it 6× “[43] We are fully cognizant that under the rape shield statute, MCL 750.520j(1); MSA 28.788(10)(1), evidence of past sexual conduct with others is generally legally irrelevant.”
People v. Gaines, 306 Mich. App. 289 (Mich. Ct. App. 2014).
· cites it 4× “MCL 750.520j provides, in relevant part: (1) Evidence of specific instances of the victim’s sexual conduct, opinion evidence of the victim’s sexual conduct, and reputation evidence of the victim’s sexual conduct shall not be admitted under sections 520b to 520g unless and only…”
People v. Duenaz, 854 N.W.2d 531 (Mich. Ct. App. 2014).
· cites it 4× “The trial court reviewed the police reports in the instant case and those from the earlier case and ruled that under the rape- *90 shield statute, MCL 750.520j, the defense could not inquire into the prior case involving the victim.”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520j(1) — 50 cases
People v. Hackett, 365 N.W.2d 120 (Mich. 1985).
“We granted leave to consider the constitutionality of the rape-shield statute, MCL 750.520j; MSA 28.788(10), as applied in these two cases.”
People v. LaLone, 437 N.W.2d 611 (Mich. 1989).
“In the committee comment to the evidentiary rule, it is clear that the commentators were aware of the potential unconstitutional application of the Michigan rape-shield statute: In adopting Rule 404(a)(3) the Committee was aware that questions have been raised regarding the…”
People v. Parks, 766 N.W.2d 650 (Mich. 2009).
“" [11] The rape shield statute, MCL 750.520j, provides in part: (1) Evidence of specific instances of the victim's sexual conduct .”
People v. Stanaway, 521 N.W.2d 557 (Mich. 1994).
“[43] We are fully cognizant that under the rape shield statute, MCL 750.520j(1); MSA 28.788(10)(1), evidence of past sexual conduct with others is generally legally irrelevant.”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520j(1)(a) — 29 cases
People v. Adair, 550 N.W.2d 505 (Mich. 1996).
“§ 750.520j; M.S.A. § 28.788(10) (emphasis added).”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520j(1)(b) — 17 cases
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520j(2) — 31 cases
People v. Dixon, 688 N.W.2d 308 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004).
“§ 750.520j does not necessarily preclude the admission of evidence of past sexual relations between a victim and a defendant.”
People v. McLaughlin, 672 N.W.2d 860 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003).
“” MCL 750.520j(2), however, contains a specific notice provision applicable to a defendant who wishes to admit evidence of the kind described under subsection 1: If the defendant proposes to offer evidence described in subsection (l)(a) or (b), the defendant within 10 days after…”
People v. Hackett, 365 N.W.2d 120 (Mich. 1985).
“We granted leave to consider the constitutionality of the rape-shield statute, MCL 750.520j; MSA 28.788(10), as applied in these two cases.”
People v. Stanaway, 521 N.W.2d 557 (Mich. 1994).
“[43] We are fully cognizant that under the rape shield statute, MCL 750.520j(1); MSA 28.788(10)(1), evidence of past sexual conduct with others is generally legally irrelevant.”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520j(a) — 1 case
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520j(l) — 17 cases
People v. LaLone, 437 N.W.2d 611 (Mich. 1989).
“In the committee comment to the evidentiary rule, it is clear that the commentators were aware of the potential unconstitutional application of the Michigan rape-shield statute: In adopting Rule 404(a)(3) the Committee was aware that questions have been raised regarding the…”
People v. Stanaway, 521 N.W.2d 557 (Mich. 1994).
“[43] We are fully cognizant that under the rape shield statute, MCL 750.520j(1); MSA 28.788(10)(1), evidence of past sexual conduct with others is generally legally irrelevant.”
People v. Adair, 550 N.W.2d 505 (Mich. 1996).
“§ 750.520j; M.S.A. § 28.788(10) (emphasis added).”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520j(l)(a) — 8 cases
People v. McLaughlin, 672 N.W.2d 860 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003).
“” MCL 750.520j(2), however, contains a specific notice provision applicable to a defendant who wishes to admit evidence of the kind described under subsection 1: If the defendant proposes to offer evidence described in subsection (l)(a) or (b), the defendant within 10 days after…”
People v. Adair, 550 N.W.2d 505 (Mich. 1996).
“§ 750.520j; M.S.A. § 28.788(10) (emphasis added).”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520j(l)(b) — 4 cases
People v. McLaughlin, 672 N.W.2d 860 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003).
“” MCL 750.520j(2), however, contains a specific notice provision applicable to a defendant who wishes to admit evidence of the kind described under subsection 1: If the defendant proposes to offer evidence described in subsection (l)(a) or (b), the defendant within 10 days after…”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.