THE MICHIGAN PENAL CODE
Act 328 of 1931
750.539g Exceptions.
Sec. 539g.
Sections 539a to 539f do not prohibit any of the following:
(a) Eavesdropping or surveillance not otherwise prohibited by law by a peace officer of this state or of the federal government, or the officer's agent, while in the performance of the officer's duties.
(b) Hearing a communication transmitted by common carrier facilities by an employee of a communications common carrier when acting in the course of his or her employment.
(c) The recording by a public utility of telephone communications to it requesting service or registering a complaint by a customer, if a record of the communications is required for legitimate business purposes and the agents, servants, and employees of the public utility are aware of the practice or surveillance by an employee safeguarding property owned by, or in custody of, his or her employer on his or her employer's property.
(d) The routine monitoring, including recording, by employees of the department of corrections of telephone communications on telephones available for use by prisoners in state correctional facilities, if the monitoring is conducted in the manner prescribed by section 70 of Act No. 232 of the Public Acts of 1953, being section 791.270 of the Michigan Compiled Laws, and rules promulgated under that section.
History: Add. 1966, Act 319, Eff. Mar. 10, 1967 ;-- Am. 1993, Act 227, Eff. Nov. 22, 1993
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
11
cases (
1 in the last 5 years), 1970–2023 · leading case:
People v. Collins, 475 N.W.2d 684 (Mich. 1991).
People v. Collins, 475 N.W.2d 684 (Mich. 1991).
· cites it 2× “807(3) makes it a felony to "wilfully" use "any device to eavesdrop" upon a private conversation without the consent of all participants.”
People v. Stone, 621 N.W.2d 702 (Mich. 2001).
“MCL 750.539g(a); MSA 28.807(7)(a). Because of these differences, we do not rely on Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, and do not incorporate it into our statute.”
People v. Mattison, 182 N.W.2d 604 (Mich. Ct. App. 1970).
· cites it 2× “” However, MCLA § 750.539g (Stat Ann 1970 Cum Supp § 28.”
In Re Leon Jenkins, 465 N.W.2d 317 (Mich. 1991).
“The federal agents who obtained the recordings in this case were acting within the scope of their authority under federal law, and federal and state law enforcement officials otherwise acting within their lawful authority are exempt from that statute.”
Williams v. Williams, 581 N.W.2d 777 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998).
“If the Legislature had intended the result argued by defendants, then it could have included such an exception in MCL 750.539g; MSA 28.807(7), the provision in the Michigan eavesdropping statute in which the Legislature delineated exceptions to the prohibition against…”
People v. Livingston, 236 N.W.2d 63 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975).
“According to the explicit language of MCLA 750.539g (a); MSA 28.807(7)(a), the act does not prohibit the activity here in issue if the surveillance was "not otherwise prohibited by law”, i.”
Dickerson v. Raphael, 564 N.W.2d 85 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997).
“In re Jenkins, 437 Mich 15, 27, n 12 ; 465 NW2d 317 (1991); MCL 750.539g(a); MSA 28.807(7)(a). The circuit court therefore erred in relying on Fourth Amendment *193 cases to craft its definition of “private discourse.”
People v. Stone, 593 N.W.2d 680 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999).
· cites it 2× “However, the trial court erred in relying on the concept of a "reasonable expectation of privacy." The concept of a "reasonable expectation of privacy," which arose in the context of the Fourth Amendment, is not applicable here, where the statutes at issue focus on conduct…”
Williams v. Williams, 603 N.W.2d 114 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999).
“Moreover, we remain convinced that the delicate question posed in this case and the effect that its resolution may have both on how family law is practiced and the relationship between the child and each of the parents, is more appropriately commended to the legislative branch.”
Keith Edward Gardiner v. Sian Hengeveld (Mich. Ct. App. 2023).
“Police Detective Jackie Calhoun was able to monitor the telephone call between the victim and plaintiff because of one-party consent under MCL 750.539g. However, the detective then allegedly allowed the victim’s husband, DD, to be in the room during the call to support the…”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.539g(a) — 5 cases
People v. Collins, 475 N.W.2d 684 (Mich. 1991).
“807(3) makes it a felony to "wilfully" use "any device to eavesdrop" upon a private conversation without the consent of all participants.”
People v. Stone, 621 N.W.2d 702 (Mich. 2001).
“MCL 750.539g(a); MSA 28.807(7)(a). Because of these differences, we do not rely on Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, and do not incorporate it into our statute.”
In Re Leon Jenkins, 465 N.W.2d 317 (Mich. 1991).
“The federal agents who obtained the recordings in this case were acting within the scope of their authority under federal law, and federal and state law enforcement officials otherwise acting within their lawful authority are exempt from that statute.”
Dickerson v. Raphael, 564 N.W.2d 85 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997).
“In re Jenkins, 437 Mich 15, 27, n 12 ; 465 NW2d 317 (1991); MCL 750.539g(a); MSA 28.807(7)(a). The circuit court therefore erred in relying on Fourth Amendment *193 cases to craft its definition of “private discourse.”
People v. Stone, 593 N.W.2d 680 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999).
“However, the trial court erred in relying on the concept of a "reasonable expectation of privacy." The concept of a "reasonable expectation of privacy," which arose in the context of the Fourth Amendment, is not applicable here, where the statutes at issue focus on conduct…”
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