CORRECTIONS CODE OF 1953
Act 232 of 1953
791.240a Parole; revocation; violation; right to fact-finding hearing; time and location of hearing; parolee determined to be indigent; appointment of attorney; notice; rights at hearing; postponement; notice to director if hearing not conducted within certain time period; insufficient evidence; reinstatement to parole status; finding of parole violation; revocation of parole; noncompliance with order to make restitution; "violent felony" defined.
Sec. 40a.
(1) After a prisoner is released on parole, the prisoner's parole order is subject to revocation at the discretion of the parole board for cause as provided in this section.
(2) If a paroled prisoner who is required to register pursuant to the sex offenders registration act, 1994 PA 295, MCL 28.721 to 28.736, willfully violates that act, the parole board shall revoke the parole. If a prisoner convicted of violating or conspiring to violate section 7401(2)(a)(i) or (ii) or 7403(2)(a)(i) or (ii) of the public health code, 1978 PA 368, MCL 333.7401 and 333.7403, is released on parole and violates or conspires to violate article 7 of the public health code, 1978 PA 368, MCL 333.7101 to 333.7545, and that violation or conspiracy to violate is punishable by imprisonment for 4 or more years, or commits a violent felony during his or her release on parole, parole shall be revoked.
(3) Within 45 days after a paroled prisoner has been returned or is available for return to a state correctional facility under accusation of a parole violation other than conviction for a felony or misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment under the laws of this state, the United States, or any other state or territory of the United States, the prisoner is entitled to a fact-finding hearing on the charges before 1 member of the parole board or an attorney hearings officer designated by the chairperson of the parole board. The fact-finding hearing shall be conducted only after the accused parolee has had a reasonable amount of time to prepare a defense. The fact-finding hearing may be held at a state correctional facility or at or near the location of the alleged violation.
(4) If, before a fact-finding hearing begins, the accused parolee alleges that he or she is indigent and requests that an attorney be appointed to represent him or her, the parole board member or attorney hearings officer who will conduct the hearing shall determine whether the accused parolee is indigent. If the accused parolee is determined to be indigent, the parole board member or hearings officer shall cause the appointment of an attorney to represent the accused parolee at the fact-finding hearing. The cost of the appointed attorney shall be paid from the department's general operating budget.
(5) An accused parolee shall be given written notice of the charges against him or her and the time, place, and purpose of the fact-finding hearing. At the fact-finding hearing, the accused parolee may be represented by a retained attorney or an attorney appointed under subsection (4) and is entitled to the following rights:
(a) Full disclosure of the evidence against him or her.
(b) To testify and present relevant witnesses and documentary evidence.
(c) To confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses unless the person conducting the fact-finding hearing finds on the record that a witness is subject to risk of harm if his or her identity is revealed.
(d) To present other relevant evidence in mitigation of the charges.
(6) A fact-finding hearing may be postponed for cause beyond the 45-day time limit on the written request of the parolee, the parolee's attorney, or, if a postponement of the preliminary parole violation hearing required under section 39a has been granted beyond the 10-day time limit, by the parole board.
(7) The director or a deputy director designated by the director shall be notified in writing if the preliminary parole violation hearing is not conducted within the 10-day time limit, and the hearing shall be conducted as soon as possible. The director or a deputy director designated by the director shall be notified in writing if the fact-finding hearing is not conducted within the 45-day time limit, and the hearing shall be conducted as soon as possible. A parolee held in custody shall not be released pending disposition of either hearing.
(8) If the evidence presented is insufficient to support the allegation that a parole violation occurred, the parolee shall be reinstated to parole status.
(9) If the parole board member or hearings officer conducting the fact-finding hearing determines from a preponderance of the evidence that a parole violation has occurred, the parole board member or hearings officer shall present the relevant facts to the parole board and make a recommendation as to the disposition of the charges.
(10) If a preponderance of the evidence supports the allegation that a parole violation occurred, the parole board may revoke parole, and the parolee shall be provided with a written statement of the findings of fact and the reasons for the determination within 60 days after the paroled prisoner has been returned or is available for return to a state correctional facility.
(11) A parolee who is ordered to make restitution under the William Van Regenmorter crime victim's rights act, 1985 PA 87, MCL 780.751 to 780.834, or the code of criminal procedure, 1927 PA 175, MCL 760.1 to 777.69, or to pay an assessment ordered under section 5 of 1989 PA 196, MCL 780.905, as a condition of parole may have his or her parole revoked by the parole board if the parolee fails to comply with the order and if the parolee has not made a good faith effort to comply with the order. In determining whether to revoke parole, the parole board shall consider the parolee's employment status, earning ability, and financial resources, the willfulness of the parolee's failure to comply with the order, and any other special circumstances that may have a bearing on the parolee's ability to comply with the order.
(12) As used in this section, "violent felony" means that term as defined in section 36.
History: Add. 1968, Act 192, Eff. Nov. 15, 1968 ;-- Am. 1982, Act 314, Imd. Eff. Oct. 15, 1982 ;-- Am. 1985, Act 85, Eff. July 10, 1985 ;-- Am. 1993, Act 346, Eff. May 1, 1994 ;-- Am. 2006, Act 315, Imd. Eff. July 20, 2006 ;-- Am. 2006, Act 316, Imd. Eff. July 20, 2006 ;-- Am. 2006, Act 532, Imd. Eff. Dec. 29, 2006
PopularName Notes:
Department of Corrections Act
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
51
cases (
6 in the last 5 years), 1969–2024 · leading case:
Jones v. Dep't of Corr., 664 N.W.2d 717 (Mich. 2003).
Jones v. Dep't of Corr., 664 N.W.2d 717 (Mich. 2003).
· cites it 76× “MCL 791.240a provides in pertinent part: (1) Within 45 days after a paroled prisoner has been returned or is available for return to a state correctional facility under accusation of a parole violation other than conviction for a felony or misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment…”
People v. Idziak, 773 N.W.2d 616 (Mich. 2009).
· cites it 18× “MCL 791.240a. None of these statutorily defined functions of the Parole Board includes a requirement that the Parole Board make an "affirmative determination of how long the defendant must serve on [his first] sentence.”
Witzke v. Withrow, 702 F. Supp. 1338 (W.D. Mich. 1988).
· cites it 36× “Witzke’s original complaint alleged that Mich.Comp.Laws § 791.240a is unconstitutional, in that it denies parole violators in Witzke’s circumstances their due-process right to a hearing on the issue of mitigation before revocation of their parole.”
Hinton v. Parole Bd., 383 N.W.2d 626 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986).
· cites it 16× “In this appeal as of right we are asked to decide when a parolee is "available for return to a state penal institution under accusation of a violation of parole" within the meaning of MCL 791.240a(1); MSA 28.2310(1)(1), as amended by 1982 PA 314 , § 1.”
People v. Clark, 888 N.W.2d 309 (Mich. Ct. App. 2016).
· cites it 2× “Until a prisoner is discharged from parole, the Parole Board may rescind parole for cause if a parole violation has been proven by a preponderance of the evidence, MCL 791.240a, and may amend an existing order of parole, MCL 791.”
People v. Elliott, 833 N.W.2d 284 (Mich. 2013).
· cites it 2× “239a(1) (“Within 10 days after an arrest for an alleged violation of parole, the parolee shall be entitled to a preliminary hearing to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that the conditions of parole have been violated or a fact- finding hearing held pursuant…”
Wayne Cnty. Prosecutor v. Dep't of Corr., 548 N.W.2d 900 (Mich. 1996).
· cites it 4× “In this Court, there is nary a word other than reference to the department's confession of error. [33] This is, of course, dependent on a finding that the parole discharge decision is reviewable in any court.”
In Re Wayne Cnty. Prosecutor, 591 N.W.2d 359 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999).
· cites it 4× “2309(1)(1), and is entitled to a fact-finding hearing before a member of the Parole Board or a hearing officer within forty-five days of return to prison. MCL 791.”
In re Parole of Hill, 827 N.W.2d 407 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012).
· cites it 2× “238; MCL 791.240a. *412 B. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO APPOINTED COUNSEL 1.”
People v. Jackson, 769 N.W.2d 630 (Mich. 2009).
“While the Legislature has provided for an ability-to-pay assessment before revoking a prisoner’s parole on the basis of a failure to pay restitution and state costs, MCL 791.240a(ll), it has not enacted any similar provisions relevant to a parolee’s obligation to pay the fees of…”
Morales v. Michigan Parole Bd., 676 N.W.2d 221 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004).
“In Jones, supra, our Supreme Court held that the proper remedy for the failure of the Department of Correction to hold a timely fact-finding hearing on a charge of parole violation as required by statute, MCL 791.240a(l), is a complaint for an order of mandamus.”
People v. Holder, 767 N.W.2d 423 (Mich. 2009).
“14 MCL 791.240a. See also MCL 791.241. 15 MCL 791.”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 791.240a(1) — 10 cases
Jones v. Dep't of Corr., 664 N.W.2d 717 (Mich. 2003).
“MCL 791.240a provides in pertinent part: (1) Within 45 days after a paroled prisoner has been returned or is available for return to a state correctional facility under accusation of a parole violation other than conviction for a felony or misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment…”
Hinton v. Parole Bd., 383 N.W.2d 626 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986).
“In this appeal as of right we are asked to decide when a parolee is "available for return to a state penal institution under accusation of a violation of parole" within the meaning of MCL 791.240a(1); MSA 28.2310(1)(1), as amended by 1982 PA 314 , § 1.”
People v. Idziak, 773 N.W.2d 616 (Mich. 2009).
“MCL 791.240a. None of these statutorily defined functions of the Parole Board includes a requirement that the Parole Board make an "affirmative determination of how long the defendant must serve on [his first] sentence.”
Witzke v. Withrow, 702 F. Supp. 1338 (W.D. Mich. 1988).
“Witzke’s original complaint alleged that Mich.Comp.Laws § 791.240a is unconstitutional, in that it denies parole violators in Witzke’s circumstances their due-process right to a hearing on the issue of mitigation before revocation of their parole.”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 791.240a(10) — 2 cases
People v. Idziak, 773 N.W.2d 616 (Mich. 2009).
“MCL 791.240a. None of these statutorily defined functions of the Parole Board includes a requirement that the Parole Board make an "affirmative determination of how long the defendant must serve on [his first] sentence.”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 791.240a(12) — 1 case
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 791.240a(2) — 4 cases
Jones v. Dep't of Corr., 664 N.W.2d 717 (Mich. 2003).
“MCL 791.240a provides in pertinent part: (1) Within 45 days after a paroled prisoner has been returned or is available for return to a state correctional facility under accusation of a parole violation other than conviction for a felony or misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment…”
In Re Wayne Cnty. Prosecutor, 591 N.W.2d 359 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999).
“2309(1)(1), and is entitled to a fact-finding hearing before a member of the Parole Board or a hearing officer within forty-five days of return to prison. MCL 791.”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 791.240a(2)(d) — 2 cases
Jones v. Dep't of Corr., 664 N.W.2d 717 (Mich. 2003).
“MCL 791.240a provides in pertinent part: (1) Within 45 days after a paroled prisoner has been returned or is available for return to a state correctional facility under accusation of a parole violation other than conviction for a felony or misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment…”
Witzke v. Withrow, 702 F. Supp. 1338 (W.D. Mich. 1988).
“Witzke’s original complaint alleged that Mich.Comp.Laws § 791.240a is unconstitutional, in that it denies parole violators in Witzke’s circumstances their due-process right to a hearing on the issue of mitigation before revocation of their parole.”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 791.240a(3) — 6 cases
People v. Idziak, 773 N.W.2d 616 (Mich. 2009).
“MCL 791.240a. None of these statutorily defined functions of the Parole Board includes a requirement that the Parole Board make an "affirmative determination of how long the defendant must serve on [his first] sentence.”
Hinton v. Parole Bd., 383 N.W.2d 626 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986).
“In this appeal as of right we are asked to decide when a parolee is "available for return to a state penal institution under accusation of a violation of parole" within the meaning of MCL 791.240a(1); MSA 28.2310(1)(1), as amended by 1982 PA 314 , § 1.”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 791.240a(5) — 2 cases
In Re Wayne Cnty. Prosecutor, 591 N.W.2d 359 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999).
“2309(1)(1), and is entitled to a fact-finding hearing before a member of the Parole Board or a hearing officer within forty-five days of return to prison. MCL 791.”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 791.240a(6) — 5 cases
Jones v. Dep't of Corr., 664 N.W.2d 717 (Mich. 2003).
“MCL 791.240a provides in pertinent part: (1) Within 45 days after a paroled prisoner has been returned or is available for return to a state correctional facility under accusation of a parole violation other than conviction for a felony or misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment…”
Wayne Cnty. Prosecutor v. Dep't of Corr., 548 N.W.2d 900 (Mich. 1996).
“In this Court, there is nary a word other than reference to the department's confession of error. [33] This is, of course, dependent on a finding that the parole discharge decision is reviewable in any court.”
Witzke v. Withrow, 702 F. Supp. 1338 (W.D. Mich. 1988).
“Witzke’s original complaint alleged that Mich.Comp.Laws § 791.240a is unconstitutional, in that it denies parole violators in Witzke’s circumstances their due-process right to a hearing on the issue of mitigation before revocation of their parole.”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 791.240a(8) — 3 cases
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 791.240a(l) — 9 cases
Jones v. Dep't of Corr., 664 N.W.2d 717 (Mich. 2003).
“MCL 791.240a provides in pertinent part: (1) Within 45 days after a paroled prisoner has been returned or is available for return to a state correctional facility under accusation of a parole violation other than conviction for a felony or misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment…”
Witzke v. Withrow, 702 F. Supp. 1338 (W.D. Mich. 1988).
“Witzke’s original complaint alleged that Mich.Comp.Laws § 791.240a is unconstitutional, in that it denies parole violators in Witzke’s circumstances their due-process right to a hearing on the issue of mitigation before revocation of their parole.”
People v. Idziak, 773 N.W.2d 616 (Mich. 2009).
“MCL 791.240a. None of these statutorily defined functions of the Parole Board includes a requirement that the Parole Board make an "affirmative determination of how long the defendant must serve on [his first] sentence.”
Morales v. Michigan Parole Bd., 676 N.W.2d 221 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004).
“In Jones, supra, our Supreme Court held that the proper remedy for the failure of the Department of Correction to hold a timely fact-finding hearing on a charge of parole violation as required by statute, MCL 791.240a(l), is a complaint for an order of mandamus.”
In Re Wayne Cnty. Prosecutor, 591 N.W.2d 359 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999).
“2309(1)(1), and is entitled to a fact-finding hearing before a member of the Parole Board or a hearing officer within forty-five days of return to prison. MCL 791.”
— Mich. Comp. Laws § 791.240a(ll) — 1 case
People v. Jackson, 769 N.W.2d 630 (Mich. 2009).
“While the Legislature has provided for an ability-to-pay assessment before revoking a prisoner’s parole on the basis of a failure to pay restitution and state costs, MCL 791.240a(ll), it has not enacted any similar provisions relevant to a parolee’s obligation to pay the fees of…”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.