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Minnesota Statutes

Minn. Stat. § 1.02 (2026)

Jurisdiction Over Waters

✓ current as of May 2026
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Courts and officers having jurisdiction in a county bordering upon Big Stone Lake, Lake Traverse, Bois de Sioux River, or the Red River of the North, have jurisdiction in civil and criminal cases upon those waters concurrently with the courts and officers of other states bordering on them, to the extent any of them forms a common boundary between this state and any other state.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 20 cases (2 in the last 5 years), 1956–2026 · leading case: PTL, LLC v. Chisago Cnty. Bd. of Commissioners, 656 N.W.2d 567 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003).
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PTL, LLC v. Chisago Cnty. Bd. of Commissioners, 656 N.W.2d 567 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003). · cites it 20× “The board later adopted Heemsbergen’s findings and conclusions and denied approval of the preliminary plat by a 3-2 vote, reasoning that the proposed development (1) was incompatible with existing land uses, in violation of section 1.02(1) of the Chisago County Subdivision…”
Heimerl v. Tech Elec. of Minnesota, Inc., 9 F. Supp. 3d 1002 (D. Minnesota 2014). · cites it 13× “1), Ohman understood that the Inside Agreement’s termination provisions in § 1.02 did not expressly refer to giving notice to NECA.”
Minnesota Pipe & Equip. Co. v. Ameron Int'l Corp., 938 F. Supp. 2d 862 (D. Minnesota 2013). · cites it 6× “) Section 1.02 of the SUDAS is entitled “Alternate *868 Processes, Equipment, or Materials.”
Darrel Schmitz v. United States Steel Corp., 852 N.W.2d 669 (Minn. 2014). · cites it 4× “” 1 Larson & Larson, supra, § 1.02. The separation of workers’ compensation from common law concepts, including the rights, remedies, and defenses that would be found in tort law, is essential to ensuring that the workers’ compensation system functions properly.”
City of Golden Valley v. Wiebesick, 899 N.W.2d 152 (Minn. 2017). · cites it 2× “1, § 1.02, subd. 13; ch. 6, § 6.29, subd. 16 (2015).”
Tynan v. Kstp, Inc., 77 N.W.2d 200 (Minn. 1956). · cites it 4× “01 of Article I — for termination or changes under section 1.02. After providing that either party desiring change or termination must notify the other in writing at least 60 days prior to the annual expiration date, it states that, when the notice for changes only is given, the…”
Johnson v. Paynesville Farmers Union Coop. Oil Co., 817 N.W.2d 693 (Minn. 2012). “In Minnesota, a trespass is committed where a plaintiff has the “right of possession” to the land at issue and there is a “wrongful and unlawful entry upon such possession by defendant.”
In re Petters Co., 499 B.R. 342 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2013). “See Kathy Bazoian Phelps and Steven Rhodes, The Ponzi Book: A Legal Resource for Unraveling Ponzi Schemes (2012), § 1.02, pp. 1-3 to 1-5. As a result, where the pleading lies in avoidance litigation brought to redress an alleged Ponzi scheme, the fact averments necessary to make…”
In re Petters Co., 494 B.R. 413 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2013). “A recently-published handbook has a succinct observation on one of those tensions: The black and white rules of decision that the law imposes to determine litigation winners and losers become challenging to apply in a Ponzi scheme case where allegations of bad faith can be made…”
In re Petters Co., 506 B.R. 784 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2013). “As non-technical jargon, "clawback” denotes the conduct of mass litigation by a trustee, receiver, or other fiduciary for a failed (often fraudulent) enterprise, in which the recapture of monies paid out to third parties before the failure is sought toward a more equalized…”
Berreman v. West Publ'g Co., 615 N.W.2d 362 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000). “As initially written, the MBCA allowed a buy-out remedy only to shareholders in a closely-held corporation, but a 1994 amendment to the MBCA allows a buy-out remedy for shareholders of all corporations that are not publicly held.”
Piper Jaffray Companies v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 38 F. Supp. 2d 771 (D. Minnesota 1999). “Thus, any liability faced by Piper as a corporate entity under rule 10b-5 requires a demonstration that at least one agent of the corporation-an insured officer or director or an uninsured employee — pos *780 sessed the requisite scienter.”
Show all 20 citing cases →
— Minn. Stat. § 1.02(1) — 1 case
PTL, LLC v. Chisago Cnty. Bd. of Commissioners, 656 N.W.2d 567 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003). “The board later adopted Heemsbergen’s findings and conclusions and denied approval of the preliminary plat by a 3-2 vote, reasoning that the proposed development (1) was incompatible with existing land uses, in violation of section 1.02(1) of the Chisago County Subdivision…”
— Minn. Stat. § 1.02(1)(c) — 1 case
State of Minnesota v. Todd Jeremy Thompson (Minn. Ct. App. 2026).
— Minn. Stat. § 1.02(A) — 1 case
Minnesota Pipe & Equip. Co. v. Ameron Int'l Corp., 938 F. Supp. 2d 862 (D. Minnesota 2013). “) Section 1.02 of the SUDAS is entitled “Alternate *868 Processes, Equipment, or Materials.”
— Minn. Stat. § 1.02(C) — 1 case
PTL, LLC v. Chisago Cnty. Bd. of Commissioners, 656 N.W.2d 567 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003). “The board later adopted Heemsbergen’s findings and conclusions and denied approval of the preliminary plat by a 3-2 vote, reasoning that the proposed development (1) was incompatible with existing land uses, in violation of section 1.02(1) of the Chisago County Subdivision…”
— Minn. Stat. § 1.02(J) — 1 case
PTL, LLC v. Chisago Cnty. Bd. of Commissioners, 656 N.W.2d 567 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003). “The board later adopted Heemsbergen’s findings and conclusions and denied approval of the preliminary plat by a 3-2 vote, reasoning that the proposed development (1) was incompatible with existing land uses, in violation of section 1.02(1) of the Chisago County Subdivision…”
— Minn. Stat. § 1.02(a) — 2 cases
Heimerl v. Tech Elec. of Minnesota, Inc., 9 F. Supp. 3d 1002 (D. Minnesota 2014). “1), Ohman understood that the Inside Agreement’s termination provisions in § 1.02 did not expressly refer to giving notice to NECA.”
Ruzicka v. Conde Nast Publications, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 303 (D. Minnesota 1992).
— Minn. Stat. § 1.02(d) — 1 case
Heimerl v. Tech Elec. of Minnesota, Inc., 9 F. Supp. 3d 1002 (D. Minnesota 2014). “1), Ohman understood that the Inside Agreement’s termination provisions in § 1.02 did not expressly refer to giving notice to NECA.”
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