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Minn. Stat.Chapter 15. State Agencies in General

Minn. Stat. § 15.99 (2026)

Time Deadline For Agency Action

Edition and currency
text as last checked Sept. 2026 (this copy records no edition or section history). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTtext as last checked Sept. 2026 (this copy records no edition or section history) cited 1998–2026 42citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 42 opinions since 1998, 3 of them in the last five years.

Subdivision 1.Definitions.

(a) For purposes of this section, the following terms shall have the meanings given.

(b) "Agency" means a department, agency, board, commission, or other group in the executive branch of state government; a statutory or home rule charter city, county, town, or school district; any metropolitan agency or regional entity; and any other political subdivision of the state.

(c) "Request" means a written application related to zoning, septic systems, watershed district review, soil and water conservation district review, or the expansion of the metropolitan urban service area, for a permit, license, or other governmental approval of an action. A request must be submitted in writing to the agency on an application form provided by the agency, if one exists. The agency may reject as incomplete a request not on a form of the agency if the request does not include information required by the agency. A request not on a form of the agency must clearly identify on the first page the specific permit, license, or other governmental approval being sought. No request shall be deemed made if not in compliance with this paragraph.

(d) "Applicant" means a person submitting a request under this section. An applicant may designate a person to act on the applicant's behalf regarding a request under this section and any action taken by or notice given to the applicant's designee related to the request shall be deemed taken by or given to the applicant.

Subd. 2.Deadline for response.

(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, section 462.358, subdivision 3b, or 473.175, or chapter 505, and notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, an agency must approve or deny within 60 days a written request relating to zoning, septic systems, watershed district review, soil and water conservation district review, or expansion of the metropolitan urban service area for a permit, license, or other governmental approval of an action. Failure of an agency to deny a request within 60 days is approval of the request. If an agency denies the request, it must state in writing the reasons for the denial at the time that it denies the request.

(b) When a vote on a resolution or properly made motion to approve a request fails for any reason, the failure shall constitute a denial of the request provided that those voting against the motion state on the record the reasons why they oppose the request. A denial of a request because of a failure to approve a resolution or motion does not preclude an immediate submission of a same or similar request.

(c) Except as provided in paragraph (b), if an agency, other than a multimember governing body, denies the request, it must state in writing the reasons for the denial at the time that it denies the request. If a multimember governing body denies a request, it must state the reasons for denial on the record and provide the applicant in writing a statement of the reasons for the denial. If the written statement is not adopted at the same time as the denial, it must be adopted at the next meeting following the denial of the request but before the expiration of the time allowed for making a decision under this section. The written statement must be consistent with the reasons stated in the record at the time of the denial. The written statement must be provided to the applicant upon adoption.

Subd. 3.Application; extensions.

(a) The time limit in subdivision 2 begins upon the agency's receipt of a written request containing all information required by law or by a previously adopted rule, ordinance, or policy of the agency, including the applicable application fee. If an agency receives a written request that does not contain all required information, the 60-day limit starts over only if the agency sends written notice within 15 business days of receipt of the request telling the requester what information is missing.

(b) If a request relating to zoning, septic systems, watershed district review, soil and water conservation district review, or expansion of the metropolitan urban service area requires the approval of more than one state agency in the executive branch, the 60-day period in subdivision 2 begins to run for all executive branch agencies on the day a request containing all required information is received by one state agency. The agency receiving the request must forward copies to other state agencies whose approval is required.

(c) An agency response, including an approval with conditions, meets the 60-day time limit if the agency can document that the response was sent within 60 days of receipt of the written request. Failure to satisfy the conditions, if any, may be a basis to revoke or rescind the approval by the agency and will not give rise to a claim that the 60-day limit was not met.

(d) The time limit in subdivision 2 is extended if a state statute, federal law, or court order requires a process to occur before the agency acts on the request, and the time periods prescribed in the state statute, federal law, or court order make it impossible to act on the request within 60 days. In cases described in this paragraph, the deadline is extended to 60 days after completion of the last process required in the applicable statute, law, or order. Final approval of an agency receiving a request is not considered a process for purposes of this paragraph.

(e) The time limit in subdivision 2 is extended if: (1) a request submitted to a state agency requires prior approval of a federal agency; or (2) an application submitted to a city, county, town, school district, metropolitan or regional entity, or other political subdivision requires prior approval of a state or federal agency. In cases described in this paragraph, the deadline for agency action is extended to 60 days after the required prior approval is granted.

(f) An agency may extend the time limit in subdivision 2 before the end of the initial 60-day period by providing written notice of the extension to the applicant. The notification must state the reasons for the extension and its anticipated length, which may not exceed 60 days unless approved by the applicant.

(g) An applicant may by written notice to the agency request an extension of the time limit under this section.

The 20 cases that cite Minn. Stat. § 15.99 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENHans Hagen Homes, Inc. v. City of Minnetrista, 728 N.W.2d 536 (Minn. 2007).
cites § 15.99 84×cited by 47 cases
Where it cites § 15.99
“This appeal presents the question of whether a city's failure to timely provide to an applicant a written statement of the reasons for the denial of a request regarding zoning, as required by subdivision 2(c) of Minn.Stat. § 15.99 (2004), triggers the automatic approval penalty…”
The case’s holding
A statutory requirement that lacks a specified consequence for noncompliance is directory rather than mandatory.
Later courts cite it for
“a statute may contain a requirement but provide no consequence for noncompliance, in which case we regard the statute as directory, not mandatory.” · 2 citing courts
2
GREENAm. Tower, L.P. v. City of Grant, 636 N.W.2d 309 (Minn. 2001).
cites § 15.99 50×cited by 121 cases
Where it cites § 15.99
“We must decide whether appellant, City of Grant (City), complied with the requirements contained in Minn.Stat. § 15.99 (2000) in denying respondent’s request for a conditional use permit (CUP) more than 60 days after receiving respondent’s written request.”
The case’s holding
A municipality fails to comply with statutory deadlines if it provides notice of a deadline extension before receiving a written request from the applicant.
Later courts cite it for
“is clearly discernible from plain and unambiguous language, statutory construction is neither necessary nor permitted and courts apply the statute's plain meaning.” · 21 citing courts
3
GREENBreza v. City of Minnetrista, 725 N.W.2d 106 (Minn. 2006).
cites § 15.99 79×cited by 19 cases
Where it cites § 15.99
“” 3 Breza responded to the city and cited Minn.Stat. § 15.99 (2000). 4 Breza main *109 tained that section 15.”
Later courts cite it for
“when a decision on a writ of mandamus is based solely on a legal determination, we review that decision de novo.” · 5 citing courts
4
GREEN500, LLC v. City of Minneapolis, 837 N.W.2d 287 (Minn. 2013).
cites § 15.99 50×cited by 39 cases
Where it cites § 15.99
“The question presented in this case is whether an application to a heritage-preservation commission for a certificate of appropriateness is a “written request relating to zoning” under Minn.Stat. § 15.99, subd. 2(a) (2012). If so, then the respondent, City of Minneapolis (“the…”
The case’s holding
An application for a certificate of appropriateness to a heritage-preservation commission is a written request relating to zoning subject to the sixty-day statutory deadline.
Later courts cite it for
“a statute is ambiguous only if it is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.” · 6 citing courts
5
GREENMoreno v. City of Minneapolis, 676 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004).
cites § 15.99 78×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 15.99
“Although not named in the original complaint, the MIA intervened and argued, by way of cross-claim against the city and counterclaim against Smith and Moreno, that its zoning application was automatically approved by operation of Minn.Stat. § 15.99 (2002). In conjunction with…”
6
cites § 15.99 92×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 15.99
“We are asked in this consolidated appeal to determine (1) whether the 60-day rule set out in Minn.Stat. § 15.99 (2006) applies to subdivision applications, and (2) if so, whether the appellants Kanabec County Board of Commissioners, Kanabec County Planning Commission, and…”
7
GREENN. States Power Co. v. City of Mendota Heights, 646 N.W.2d 919 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002).
cites § 15.99 69×cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 15.99
“, d/b/a Xcel Energy (Xcel) brought this mandamus petition and declaratory judgment complaint against respondent City of Mendota Heights to compel the city to approve its application for a conditional use permit (CUP) under the automatic approval provisions of Minn.Stat. § 15.99…”
Later courts cite it for
“while automatic approval of a permit application is an extraordinary remedy, minnesota appellate courts have shown no reluctance to grant this remedy and enforce the provisions of section 15.99if a city has failed to satisfy its clear requirements.” · 1 citing court
8
GREENJohnson v. Cook Cnty., 786 N.W.2d 291 (Minn. 2010).
cites § 15.99 47×cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 15.99
“Johnson responded that his 2001 rezoning request was automatically approved because the County failed to state in writing the reasons for the denial of his request as required by Minn.Stat. § 15.99, subd. 2 (2000). The district court granted the County’s motion for summary…”
Later courts cite it for
“we may not add words to a statute that the legislature has not supplied.” · 5 citing courts
9
REDHans Hagen Homes, Inc. v. City of Minnetrista, 713 N.W.2d 916 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006).
cites § 15.99 71×cited by 6 cases
Reversed by Hans Hagen Homes, Inc. v. City of Minnetrista (2007): the Supreme Court of Minnesota's own opinion in this case.
Where it cites § 15.99
“The city appeals, and, because we conclude that the district court properly construed the requirements of section 15.”
10
GREENAm. Tower, L.P. v. City of Grant, 621 N.W.2d 37 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000).
cites § 15.99 104×cited by 3 cases
Where it cites § 15.99
“On November 2, 1999, American Tower informed the city that it considered the application approved because the city had not made a decision within 60 days, as required by Minn.Stat. § 15.99, subd. 2 (1998). On the same day, after being told of American Tower's position, the city…”
11
GREENAdvantage Capital Mgmt. v. City of Northfield, 664 N.W.2d 421 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003).
cites § 15.99 38×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 15.99
“This is a consolidated appeal from a series of orders in an action seeking a writ of mandamus directing the city to issue a building permit and requesting damages for failure to grant or deny the permit within the time limits prescribed by Minn. Stat. § 15.99 , subd. 2 (2002).…”
Later courts cite it for
“a written request relating to zoning1 is a request to conduct a specific use of land within the framework of the regulatory structure relating to zoning or, in other words, a zoning application.” · 2 citing courts
12
GREENYeh v. Cnty. of Cass, 696 N.W.2d 115 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005).
cites § 15.99 27×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 15.99
“Minn.Stat. § 15.99 (2002) 1 ; (6) appellant-developer’s completion of substantial construction before the revocation of the permits gave it a vested interest in the construction; and (7) the district court erred in dismissing appellant-deveL oper’s cross-claim against the county.”
13
GREENMotokazie! Inc. v. Rice Cnty., 824 N.W.2d 341 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012).
cites § 15.99 50×cited by 3 cases
Where it cites § 15.99
“1, dictates that a simple majority approves such amendment and (2) the zoning amendment was automatically approved under Minn.Stat. § 15.99, subd. 2(a), because it was not approved or denied within 60 days.”
14
GREENConcept Props., LLP v. City of Minnetrista, 694 N.W.2d 804 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005).
cites § 15.99 33×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 15.99
“Finally, appellant argues that the City failed to comply with Minn.Stat. § 15.99 (2002), thereby warranting automatic approval of appellant’s rezoning application.”
15
GREENDemolition Landfill Servs., LLC v. City of Duluth, 609 N.W.2d 278 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000).
cites § 15.99 20×cited by 22 cases
Where it cites § 15.99
“Appellant asserts that the city was required to issue the permit pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 15.99, subd. 2 (1998), because the city failed to approve or deny the permit application within the statutory time period.”
Later courts cite it for
“absent a denial within the statutory time limit and simultaneous, written reasons for the denial, the permit application was deemed approved.” · 2 citing courts
16
GREENHarstad v. City of Woodbury, 902 N.W.2d 64 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017).
cites § 15.99 28×cited by 3 cases
Where it cites § 15.99
“By notice of related appeal, respondent/cross-appellant developer challenges the district court’s determinations that its temporary regulatory-takings claim is moot, and that its subdivision application was not approved by operation of law under Minn. Stat. §§ 15.99 , subd.…”
17
GREENManco of Fairmont, Inc. v. Town Bd. of Rock Dell Twp., 583 N.W.2d 293 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998).
cites § 15.99 24×cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 15.99
“* The district court denied appellant’s petitions for mandamus because it concluded that respondent had complied with Minn.Stat. § 15.99. FACTS On September 2, 1997, appellant Manco of Fairmont applied for a conditional use permit (CUP) from respondent Town Board of Rock Dell…”
Later courts cite it for
“expresses the consequences of a failure to comply with its provisions.” · 2 citing courts
18
GREENVeit Co. v. Lake Cnty., 707 N.W.2d 725 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006).
cites § 15.99 26×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 15.99
“ISSUE Was relators’ CUP application approved by operation of law because the planning commission failed to comply with the requirements in Minn.Stat. § 15.99, subd. 2(c) (Supp.2003)? ANALYSIS Because the planning commission determined facts about the nature and effects of…”
19
GREENGun Lake Ass'n v. Cnty. of Aitkin, 612 N.W.2d 177 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000).
cites § 15.99 24×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 15.99
“Because the county board’s decision to deny the portion of the appeal challenging the grant of the CUP is consistent with Minn.Stat. § 15.99, subd. 2 (1998), and because relators have not shown that the process used to create the conditions was defective, we affirm.”
20
GREENIn re Hubbard, 778 N.W.2d 313 (Minn. 2010).
cites § 15.99 8×cited by 22 cases
Where it cites § 15.99
“The court of appeals reversed the agency's decision, concluding that the variance was deemed granted by operation of the "60-day rule" of Minn.Stat. § 15.99 (2008). In re Denial of Certification of Hubbard Variance, Nos.”

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
199820122026

One bar per year. Tallest: 5 cases in 2005. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Minn. Ct. App.27Minn.98th Cir.3D. Minn.3
By subsection

Courts have not cited this section by subsection, so its cases are not split up here. The Leading cases tab lists the cases that cite it most heavily.

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Enactment and amendments

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Versions

Edition shown: text as last checked Sept. 2026 (this copy records no edition or section history). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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