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Subdivision 1.Interpretation and effect.
An action under sections 325D.49 to 325D.66, shall be forever barred unless commenced within four years of the date upon which the cause of action arose. No cause of action barred under existing law on June 8, 1971 shall be revived by sections 325D.49 to 325D.66. For the purpose of this section, a cause of action for a continuing violation is deemed to arise at any time during the period of the violation.
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Subd. 2.Government actions; suspension.
If any proceeding is commenced under sections 325D.49 to 325D.66, by the attorney general on behalf of the state of Minnesota, its departments or agencies, or its political subdivisions, the running of the statute of limitations in respect of every right of action arising under sections 325D.49 to 325D.66, and based in whole or in part on any matter complained of in the aforementioned proceeding shall be suspended during the pendency thereof and for one year thereafter. If the running of the statute of limitations is suspended, the action shall be forever barred unless commenced within the greater of either the period of suspension or four years after the date upon which the cause of action arose.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
7
cases, 1984–2019 · leading case:
State v. DeWitt, 389 N.W.2d 722 (Minn. 1986).
State v. DeWitt, 389 N.W.2d 722 (Minn. 1986).
· cites it 18× “Minn.Stat. § 325D.64. The commencement of criminal proceedings may be by indictment or by first appearance before the court.”
Am. Comput. Trust Leasing v. Jack Farrell Implement Co., 763 F. Supp. 1473 (D. Minnesota 1991).
· cites it 2× “§ 15 (b); Minn.Stat. § 325D.64. Boerboom entered into its agreement to purchase an ADP computer system on October 9, 1984 and did not begin its antitrust action until February 3, 1989, more than four years after the accrual of any antitrust cause of action.”
In re Nexium, 968 F. Supp. 2d 367 (D. Mass. 2013).
“Minn.Stat. § 325D.64(1) ("An action under [the Minnesota Antitrust Law of 1971], shall be forever barred unless commenced within four years of the date upon which the cause of action arose.”
In re Processed Egg Prods. Antitrust Litig., 931 F. Supp. 2d 654 (E.D. Pa. 2013).
“” Minn.Stat. § 325D.64(1). The parties agree that Minnesota courts have not interpreted this “continuing violation” language, but they differ as to whether the statute of limitations constricts the Plaintiffs’ claims in light of such language.”
Vasek v. Warren Grain & Seed Co., 353 N.W.2d 175 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
· cites it 2× “” Minn.Stat. § 325D.64, subd. 1. The Vaseks specifically plead that “Cargill’s said actions from 1973 through April 1977 constituted a violation of Section 325.”
State v. Rupp, 393 N.W.2d 496 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
· cites it 2× “The supreme court recently determined that all actions under the Minnesota Antitrust Law are governed by the four-year statute of limitations in Minn.Stat. § 325D.64 (1984). See State v.”
— Minn. Stat. § 325D.64(1) — 3 cases
In re Nexium, 968 F. Supp. 2d 367 (D. Mass. 2013).
“Minn.Stat. § 325D.64(1) ("An action under [the Minnesota Antitrust Law of 1971], shall be forever barred unless commenced within four years of the date upon which the cause of action arose.”
In re Processed Egg Prods. Antitrust Litig., 931 F. Supp. 2d 654 (E.D. Pa. 2013).
“” Minn.Stat. § 325D.64(1). The parties agree that Minnesota courts have not interpreted this “continuing violation” language, but they differ as to whether the statute of limitations constricts the Plaintiffs’ claims in light of such language.”
State v. DeWitt, 389 N.W.2d 722 (Minn. 1986).
“Minn.Stat. § 325D.64. The commencement of criminal proceedings may be by indictment or by first appearance before the court.”
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