cites § 347.22 26×cited by 24 cases
- Where it cites § 347.22
- “Respondent Jill Engquist, as parent and natural guardian of the minor, Amber Engquist, commenced an action under Minn.Stat. § 347.22 (2010) for injuries Amber sustained as a result of a dog bite that occurred at the residence of appellants, Steven and Christina Loyas.”
- Later courts cite it for
- “our previous interpretation of a statute guides us in determining its meaning.” · 4 citing courts
cites § 347.22 36×cited by 13 cases
- Where it cites § 347.22
- “This case requires us to interpret the Minnesota dog owner’s liability statute, Minn.Stat. § 347.22 (2010). Respondent Gordon Helmer Anderson (Anderson) was injured during an attack on his dog, Tuffy, by a dog named Bruno, owned by respondent Neil Raymond Christopherson.”
- Later courts cite it for
- “requires that a harborer do more than exercise control over land upon which the dog resides.” · 1 citing court
cites § 347.22 15×cited by 69 cases
- Where it cites § 347.22
- “Plaintiffs subsequently initiated an action based upon the provisions of Minn.Stat. § 347.22 (1980). This statute states that: If a dog, without provocation, attacks or injures any person who is peaceably conducting himself in any place where he may lawfully be, the owner of the…”
- The case’s holding
- A statute imposing absolute strict liability for dog attacks precludes the reduction of damages based on the plaintiff's comparative negligence.
- Later courts cite it for
- “negligence per se is a form of ordinary negligence that results from violation of a statute.” · 6 citing courts
cites § 347.22 10×cited by 35 cases
- Where it cites § 347.22
- “Hyatt’s complaint alleged liability solely on the basis of Minn.Stat. § 347.22 (2004) (the dog bite statute), which holds a dog owner strictly liable for injuries caused by the dog so long as the dog was not provoked and the victim was acting peaceably in a place where she had a…”
- The case’s holding
- The word 'any' in a statute receives broad application regardless of whether the result seems reasonable, and an unambiguous statute is deemed absurd only in rare cases where plain meaning utterly confounds legislative purpose.
- Later courts cite it for
- “only in rare cases where the plain meaning utterly confounds a clear legislative purpose.” · 6 citing courts
cites § 347.22 29×cited by 11 cases
- Where it cites § 347.22
- “The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of respondents Preblich and Miller on all of appellants’ theories: Minn. Stat. § 347.22 ; common law scienter; common law negligence; and Ely City Ordinance § 515.”
- Later courts cite it for
- “there was no indication that the defendant had any reason to anticipate that personal injury would result to the plaintiff, or anyone else, if the dog left the house.” · 1 citing court
cites § 347.22 22×cited by 12 cases
- Where it cites § 347.22
- “The court of appeals ruled that a dog's nonhostile behavior which sets in motion a chain of events causing injury to a person some distance away comes within the statute and may impose liability on the dog owner. We disagree and reverse.”
- The case’s holding
- A dog owner is liable under the state statute only if the dog's behavior directly and immediately produces the injury to the person being attacked or injured.
- Later courts cite it for
- “a dog's affirmative but nonattacking behavior which injures a person who is immediately implicated by such nonhostile behavior.” · 3 citing courts
cites § 347.22 2×cited by 834 cases
- Where it cites § 347.22
- “351; Minn Stat Ann § 347.22; Mont Code Ann § 27-1-715; Neb Rev Stat § 54-601; NJ Stat Ann § 4:19-16).”
- The case’s holding
- An owner is liable for harm caused by a domestic animal only if the owner knows or should have known of the animal's vicious propensities.
- Later courts cite it for
- “an animal that behaves in a manner that would not necessarily be considered dangerous or ferocious, but nevertheless reflects a proclivity to act in a way that puts others at risk of harm, can be found to have vicious propensities-albeit only when such proclivity results in the injury giving rise to the lawsuit” · 33 citing courts
cites § 347.22 44×cited by 3 cases
Reversed by Lewellin Ex Rel. Heirs of Lewellin v. Huber (1991): the Supreme Court of Minnesota's own opinion in this case.
- Where it cites § 347.22
- “The Hubers argue that the trial court erred in applying Minn.Stat. § 347.22 (1988), imposing strict liability based on the following stipulated facts (in part material): * * * * * * 3.”
- Later courts cite it for
- “a genuine issue of material fact exists as to intervening negligence of the driver.” · 1 citing court
cites § 347.22 18×cited by 10 cases
- Where it cites § 347.22
- “In these consolidated appeals, appellants David and Kenneth Mueller challenge summary judgment, contending the district court erred in dismissing their absolute liability claim under Minn.Stat. § 347.22 (1992) (dog owner’s liability) for insufficient causation.”
- Later courts cite it for
- “second, ... the 'direct and immediate results of the dog's actions,' require both that the dog's conduct be focused on the injured party and that the injury be the direct and immediate result of that focus.” · 2 citing courts
cites § 347.22 8×cited by 12 cases
- Where it cites § 347.22
- “Hyatt sued appellant City of Anoka and its police department under the "dog bite" statute, Minn.Stat. § 347.22 (2002). The city moved for summary judgment, arguing that (1) the dog bite statute does not apply to police dogs; (2) it is entitled to either statutory or vicarious…”
- Later courts cite it for
- “while a municipal corporation such as the city has the authority to sue and be sued, its departments have not been given that specific authority.” · 3 citing courts
cites § 347.22 18×cited by 6 cases
- Where it cites § 347.22
- “* This is a consolidated appeal involving two actions for injuries caused by a dog under a strict liability theory pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 347.22 (1990). Appellants in both cases contend the statute does not apply where the dog did not physically contact the injured party.”
cites § 347.22 12×cited by 8 cases
- Where it cites § 347.22
- “Plaintiff sued on a theory of strict liability under Minn.Stat. § 347.22 (1980). The trial court denied her motion for a directed verdict.”
cites § 347.22 10×cited by 7 cases
- Where it cites § 347.22
- “Appellant sued respondent in negligence and under Minn.Stat. § 347.22 (1984) which creates a cause of action for dog attack victims.”
- Later courts cite it for
- “bailey permits a finding of provocation for a voluntary act but suggests that inadvertent acts are not a proper basis for finding provocation.” · 1 citing court
cites § 347.22 6×cited by 15 cases
Overruled by Anderson v. Christopherson on other grounds: 2 citing opinions limit it to other grounds.
- Where it cites § 347.22
- “The statute permits them to maintain an action, not only against the legal owners of the dog, but also against any other parties, “owners,” who have possession and control of the dog.”
- Later courts cite it for
- “any person harboring or keeping a dog.” · 2 citing courts
cites § 347.22 8×cited by 4 cases
Reversed by Hyatt v. Anoka Police Department (2005): the Supreme Court of Minnesota's own opinion in this case.
- Where it cites § 347.22
- “Hyatt sued appellants, the Anoka Police Department and the City of Anoka (collectively referred to as the city), under the "dog bite" statute, Minn.Stat. § 347.22 (2002). The city moved for summary judgment, arguing that (1) the dog bite statute, which imposes strict liability…”
- Later courts cite it for
- “the legislature does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution, or unreasonable.” · 1 citing court
cites § 347.22 8×cited by 3 cases
- Where it cites § 347.22
- “Appellant sued respondent for damages because of injuries she suffered from being bitten while grooming respondent’s dog, claiming strict liability under Minn.Stat. § 347.22 (2004), the dog-bite statute.”
cites § 347.22 2×cited by 21 cases
- Where it cites § 347.22
- “Our legislature has already imposed strict liability on dog owners for damages inflicted upon "poultry or domestic animal[s].”
- The case’s holding
- Without knowledge of an animal's dangerous propensities, an owner is liable in negligence only if an ordinary prudent person would have foreseen the injury and taken steps to prevent it.
- Later courts cite it for
- “the plaintiff must establish that as an ordinary, prudent person, the owner should have foreseen the event that caused the injury and taken steps to prevent the injury.” · 2 citing courts
cites § 347.22 4×cited by 21 cases
- Where it cites § 347.22
- “We have the following fundamental question: Does an action brought solely under § 347.22 (without any allegation of negligence in the complaint) survive the death of the defendant pursuant to | 573.”
- The case’s holding
- A personal-injury action founded solely on strict dog-owner liability, without negligence, does not survive the owner's death under the survival statute.
cites § 347.22 4×cited by 21 cases
- Where it cites § 347.22
- “95 might best be characterized as imposing strict liability essentially analogous to the liability imposed on a dog owner under § 347.22. Such statutes impose liability without regard to fault in the sense of any wrongful intent or negligent conduct.”
- The case’s holding
- A dram shop act action imposing strict liability for injuries from illegal liquor sales is tort-based, a distinct compensatory cause of action that does not survive the seller's death.
- Later courts cite it for
- “i guch business or activity can best bear the loss occasioned by a violation of law regulating the business or activity, even though the violation was unintentional or did not involve any deviation from the standard of due care.” · 1 citing court
cites § 347.22 12×cited by 1 case
- Where it cites § 347.22
- “Appellant challenges the district court’s decision granting summary judgment to *834 respondents and dismissing his claims alleging that respondents are liable pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 347.22. Because we conclude that the district court erred in its application of the statute,…”
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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.