143.903. Unexpected court or administrative hearing decision shall apply only after most recently ended tax period imposed by chapters 143 and 144 — unexpected, defined. — 1. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, an unexpected decision by or order of a court of competent jurisdiction or the administrative hearing commission shall only apply after the most recently ended tax period of the particular class of persons subject to such tax imposed by chapters 143 and 144 and any credit, refund or additional assessment shall be only for periods after the most recently ended tax period of such persons.
2. The provisions of this section shall apply only to final decisions by or orders of a court of competent jurisdiction or the administrative hearing commission which are rendered after October 1, 1990, and which are determined by the court or the administrative hearing commission rendering the decision, or subsequently by a lower court or the administrative hearing commission, to be unexpected. For the purposes of this section the term "unexpected" shall mean that a reasonable person would not have expected the decision or order based on prior law, previous policy or regulation of the department of revenue.
Notes of Decisions
St. Charles Cnty. v. Dir. of Revenue, 961 S.W.2d 44 (Mo. 1998).
· cites it 23× “UNEXPECTED DECISION The Director and the Local Taxing Authorities claim that no refunds are due on local use taxes paid prior to the decision in AIM III because AIM III was an “unexpected decision” under section 143.903, which states in pertinent part: 1.”
Sneary v. Dir. of Revenue, 865 S.W.2d 342 (Mo. 1993).
· cites it 15× “An Expected or Unexpected Decision Sneary contends in the alternative that, if the sales at issue constitute sales of tangible personal property subject to the sales tax, the result is unexpected under § 143.903, RSMo Supp.1993; therefore, the director cannot assess sales tax.”
Greenbriar Hills Country Club v. Dir. of Revenue, 47 S.W.3d 346 (Mo. 2001).
· cites it 4× “This unforeseen action on the part of the Director resulted in the AHC *357 determining that while the tax was assessable against Greenbriar it would not be held liable for it pursuant to section 143.903. [31] This decision could have been made prospectively by the Director…”
Lloyd v. Dir. of Revenue, 851 S.W.2d 519 (Mo. 1993).
· cites it 10× “1 provides that an unexpected decision requiring assessment of a tax shall only apply for periods after the most recently ended tax period.”
Laciny Bros., Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue, 869 S.W.2d 761 (Mo. 1994).
· cites it 4× “Because the decision of the AHC is “unexpected” pursuant to § 143.903, RSMo Supp.1992, the decision assessing additional taxes for labor is reversed.”
Myron Green Corp. v. Dir. of Revenue, 567 S.W.3d 161 (Mo. 2019).
“1(6); (2) the bank's sales tax exemption did not extend to individual employees; and (3) the commission's decision was not unexpected within the context of § 143.903. Myron Green contests each finding in its three points relied on.”
Brinson Appliance, Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue, 843 S.W.2d 350 (Mo. 1992).
· cites it 2× “The Director also asks this Court to find the decision as unexpected under § 143.903, RSMo Supp.1990, in order to limit application of this decision to the period “after the most recently ended tax period.”
Hornsby v. Dir. of Revenue, 865 S.W.2d 662 (Mo. 1993).
“The final contention is that the decision of the AHC was “unexpected” regarding assessment of tax and, therefore, collection should be prohibited pursuant to § 143.903. That statute defines “unexpected” to mean a result “that a reasonable person would not have expected .”
First Nat'l Bank of Callaway Cnty. v. Dir. of Revenue, 931 S.W.2d 471 (Mo. 1996).
· cites it 3× “Anticipating the possibility of an adverse ruling from this Court, FNB, citing § 143.903, RSMo 1994, contends that it should be awarded the refund if a reasonable person, relying either on prior law or previous policy or regulation of the Department of Revenue, would not have…”
Gutknecht v. Dir. of Revenue, 867 S.W.2d 709 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
· cites it 2× “Petitioner alternatively contends that if the sales at issue here constituted the sale of tangible personal property subject to the sales tax, such taxation was “unexpected” under § 143.903, RSMo Supp.1992. 4 We note that essentially the same argument petitioner raises in the…”
— Mo. Rev. Stat. § 143.903(1) — 1 case
Sneary v. Dir. of Revenue, 865 S.W.2d 342 (Mo. 1993).
“An Expected or Unexpected Decision Sneary contends in the alternative that, if the sales at issue constitute sales of tangible personal property subject to the sales tax, the result is unexpected under § 143.903, RSMo Supp.1993; therefore, the director cannot assess sales tax.”
— Mo. Rev. Stat. § 143.903(2) — 1 case
Sneary v. Dir. of Revenue, 865 S.W.2d 342 (Mo. 1993).
“An Expected or Unexpected Decision Sneary contends in the alternative that, if the sales at issue constitute sales of tangible personal property subject to the sales tax, the result is unexpected under § 143.903, RSMo Supp.1993; therefore, the director cannot assess sales tax.”
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