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Missouri Revised Statutes

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 287.067 (2026)

Occupational disease defined

✓ current as of May 2026
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  287.067.  Occupational disease defined — repetitive motion, loss of hearing, radiation injury, communicable disease, others — posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). — 1.  In this chapter the term "occupational disease" is hereby defined to mean, unless a different meaning is clearly indicated by the context, an identifiable disease arising with or without human fault out of and in the course of the employment.  Ordinary diseases of life to which the general public is exposed outside of the employment shall not be compensable, except where the diseases follow as an incident of an occupational disease as defined in this section.  The disease need not to have been foreseen or expected but after its contraction it must appear to have had its origin in a risk connected with the employment and to have flowed from that source as a rational consequence.

  2.  An injury or death by occupational disease is compensable only if the occupational exposure was the prevailing factor in causing both the resulting medical condition and disability.  The "prevailing factor" is defined to be the primary factor, in relation to any other factor, causing both the resulting medical condition and disability.  Ordinary, gradual deterioration, or progressive degeneration of the body caused by aging or by the normal activities of day-to-day living shall not be compensable.

  3.  An injury due to repetitive motion is recognized as an occupational disease for purposes of this chapter.  An occupational disease due to repetitive motion is compensable only if the occupational exposure was the prevailing factor in causing both the resulting medical condition and disability.  The "prevailing factor" is defined to be the primary factor, in relation to any other factor, causing both the resulting medical condition and disability.  Ordinary, gradual deterioration, or progressive degeneration of the body caused by aging or by the normal activities of day-to-day living shall not be compensable.

  4.  "Loss of hearing due to industrial noise" is recognized as an occupational disease for purposes of this chapter and is hereby defined to be a loss of hearing in one or both ears due to prolonged exposure to harmful noise in employment.  "Harmful noise" means sound capable of producing occupational deafness.

  5.  "Radiation disability" is recognized as an occupational disease for purposes of this chapter and is hereby defined to be that disability due to radioactive properties or substances or to Roentgen rays (X-rays) or exposure to ionizing radiation caused by any process involving the use of or direct contact with radium or radioactive properties or substances or the use of or direct exposure to Roentgen rays (X-rays) or ionizing radiation.

  6.  Disease of the lungs or respiratory tract, hypotension, hypertension, or disease of the heart or cardiovascular system, including carcinoma, may be recognized as occupational diseases for the purposes of this chapter and are defined to be disability due to exposure to smoke, gases, carcinogens, inadequate oxygen, of paid firefighters of a paid fire department or paid police officers of a paid police department certified under chapter 590 if a direct causal relationship is established, or psychological stress of firefighters of a paid fire department or paid peace officers of a police department who are certified under chapter 590 if a direct causal relationship is established.

  7.  Any employee who is exposed to and contracts any contagious or communicable disease arising out of and in the course of his or her employment shall be eligible for benefits under this chapter as an occupational disease.

  8.  With regard to occupational disease due to repetitive motion, if the exposure to the repetitive motion which is found to be the cause of the injury is for a period of less than three months and the evidence demonstrates that the exposure to the repetitive motion with the immediate prior employer was the prevailing factor in causing the injury, the prior employer shall be liable for such occupational disease.

  9.  (1)  (a)  Posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), as described in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Health Disorders, Fifth Edition, published by the American Psychiatric Association, (DSM-5) is recognized as a compensable occupational disease for purposes of this chapter when diagnosed in a first responder, as that term is defined under section 67.145.

  (b)  Benefits payable to a first responder under this section shall not require a physical injury to the first responder, and are not subject to any preexisting PTSD.

  (c)  Benefits payable to a first responder under this section are compensable only if demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that PTSD has resulted from the course and scope of employment, and the first responder is examined and diagnosed with PTSD by an authorized treating physician, due to the first responder experiencing one of the following qualifying events:

  a.  Seeing for oneself a deceased minor;

  b.  Witnessing directly the death of a minor;

  c.  Witnessing directly the injury to a minor who subsequently died prior to or upon arrival at a hospital emergency department, participating in the physical treatment of, or manually transporting, an injured minor who subsequently died prior to or upon arrival at a hospital emergency department;

  d.  Seeing for oneself a person who has suffered serious physical injury of a nature that shocks the conscience;

  e.  Witnessing directly a death, including suicide, due to serious physical injury; or homicide, including murder, mass killings, manslaughter, self-defense, misadventure, and negligence;

  f.  Witnessing directly an injury that results in death, if the person suffered serious physical injury that shocks the conscience;

  g.  Participating in the physical treatment of an injury, including attempted suicide, or manually transporting an injured person who suffered serious physical injury, if the injured person subsequently died prior to or upon arrival at a hospital emergency department; or

  h.  Involvement in an event that caused or may have caused serious injury or harm to the first responder or had the potential to cause the death of the first responder, whether accidental or by an intentional act of another individual.

  (2)  The time for notice of injury or death in cases of compensable PTSD under this section is measured from exposure to one of the qualifying stressors listed in the DSM-5 criteria, or the diagnosis of the disorder, whichever is later.  Any claim for compensation for such injury shall be properly noticed within fifty-two weeks after the qualifying exposure, or the diagnosis of the disorder, whichever is later.

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(L. 1959 S.B. 167 § 287.201, A.L. 1980 H.B. 1396, A.L. 1983 H.B. 243 & 260, A.L. 1987 H.B. 564, A.L. 1993 S.B. 251, A.L. 2005 S.B. 1 & 130, A.L. 2013 H.B. 404 & 614  merged with S.B. 1, A.L. 2023 S.B. 24 merged with S.B. 186)

(1972) Whether a disease is occupational is not to be determined by whether the disease is literally peculiar to an occupation, but whether there is a recognizable link between the disease and some distinctive feature of the claimant's job which is common to all jobs of that sort.  Collins v. Neevel Luggage Manufacturing Company (A.), 481 S.W.2d 548.

(1972) A disease is "occupational" if there is a recognizable link between the disease and a distinctive feature of the claimant's job which is common to all jobs of that sort.  Gaddis v. Rudy Patrick Seed Division (Mo.), 485 S.W.2d 636.

(1987) Doctor's testimony and other evidence that dust in workplace was predominant cause of claimant's pneumonia and lack of evidence that pneumonia was preexisting condition of nonoccupational origin or caused by factors unrelated to work supported finding that claimant suffered from occupational disease as defined in this section.  Sheehan v. Springfield Seed and Floral, 733 S.W.2d 795 (Mo. App.).

(1997) "Substantial contributing factor" means that factor which is the more responsible of the two contributing factors.  Mayfield v. Brown Shoe Co., 941 S.W.2d 31 (Mo.App. S.D.).

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 73 cases (6 in the last 5 years), 1967–2025 · leading case: State Ex Rel. KCP & L Greater Missouri Operations Co. v. Cook, 353 S.W.3d 14 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011).
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State Ex Rel. KCP & L Greater Missouri Operations Co. v. Cook, 353 S.W.3d 14 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011). · cites it 18× “This definition of "occupational disease" did not refer to or require an accident for compensability.”
Terry Lankford, Emp., Carol Lankford, Widow, claimant/dependent/respondent v. Newton Cnty., Emp./appellant, & Treasurer of Missouri as Custodian of Second Injury Fund, Additional Party., 517 S.W.3d 577 (Mo. Ct. App. 2017). · cites it 22× “In KCP & L, the Western District scrutinized the amendments to section 287.067, which define the standards for compensability of occupational disease.”
Peters v. Treasurer of Missouri, 404 S.W.3d 322 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012). · cites it 16× “Mo.Rev.Stat. § 287.067; Treasurer *325 of State v.”
Vickers v. Missouri Dep't of Pub. Saf., 283 S.W.3d 287 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009). · cites it 16× “Section 287.067 2 provides that occupational diseases are compensable under the Missouri Workers’ Compensation Act.”
Amesquita v. Gilster-Mary Lee Corp., 408 S.W.3d 293 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013). · cites it 8× “The Western District also carefully scrutinized the amendments to Section 287.067, which define the standards for compensa-bility of occupational disease.”
Milton Young v. Boone Elec. Coop., 462 S.W.3d 783 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015). · cites it 6× “, injuries caused by occupational diseases acquired over time, including injuries that result from the repetitive routine performance of work, which are addressed separately in Section 287.067. Amesquita v. Gilster-Mary Lee Corp.”
Lawson v. Ford Motor Co., 217 S.W.3d 345 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007). · cites it 5× “In particular, portions of section 287.067 and 287.020 were rewritten.”
Mantia v. Missouri Dep't of Transp., 529 S.W.3d 804 (Mo. 2017). · cites it 2× “10 provides, "The ability of a firefighter to receive benefits for psychological stress under section 287.067 shall not be di« . minished, by the provisions of subsections 8 and 9 of this section.”
George v. City of St. Louis, 162 S.W.3d 26 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005). · cites it 6× “The ability of a firefighter to receive benefits from psychological stress under Section 287.067 shall not be diminished by the provisions of subsections 8 and 9 of this section.”
Wynn v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 654 S.W.2d 87 (Mo. 1983). · cites it 4× “Section 287.067 (Cum.Supp.1981); See also Collins v.”
Endicott v. Display Tech., Inc., 77 S.W.3d 612 (Mo. 2002). · cites it 3× “An employee shall be conclusively deemed to have been exposed to the hazards of an occupational disease when for any length of time, however short, he is employed in an occupation or process in which the hazard of the disease exists, subject to the provisions relating to…”
Passe v. City of St. Louis, 741 S.W.2d 109 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987). · cites it 16× “067(4) RSMo 1986 do not apply to this case and (2) claimant did not prove decedent’s condition was an occupational disease under Section 287.067(1) RSMo 1986. Respondent concedes that Section 287.”
Show all 73 citing cases →
— Mo. Rev. Stat. § 287.067(1) — 4 cases
Passe v. City of St. Louis, 741 S.W.2d 109 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987). “067(4) RSMo 1986 do not apply to this case and (2) claimant did not prove decedent’s condition was an occupational disease under Section 287.067(1) RSMo 1986. Respondent concedes that Section 287.”
Smith v. Donco Constr., 182 S.W.3d 693 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006).
Estes v. Noranda Aluminum, Inc., 574 S.W.2d 34 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
Gaddis v. Rudy Patrick Seed Div., 485 S.W.2d 636 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972).
— Mo. Rev. Stat. § 287.067(4) — 1 case
Passe v. City of St. Louis, 741 S.W.2d 109 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987). “067(4) RSMo 1986 do not apply to this case and (2) claimant did not prove decedent’s condition was an occupational disease under Section 287.067(1) RSMo 1986. Respondent concedes that Section 287.”
— Mo. Rev. Stat. § 287.067(7) — 3 cases
Crabill v. Hannicon, 963 S.W.2d 440 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
Walker v. Klaric Masonry, Inc., 937 S.W.2d 219 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996).
Hartfield v. Ferro Magnetics, 155 S.W.3d 783 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005).
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