358.250. Nature of a partner's right in specific partnership property. — 1. A partner is co-owner with his partners of specific partnership property holding as a tenant in partnership.
2. The incidents of this tenancy are such that:
(1) A partner, subject to the provisions of this law and to any agreement between the partners, has an equal right with his partners to possess specific partnership property for partnership purposes; but he has no right to possess such property for any other purpose without the consent of his partners.
(2) A partner's right in specific partnership property is not assignable except in connection with the assignment of rights of all the partners in the same property.
(3) A partner's right in specific partnership property is not subject to attachment or execution, except on a claim against the partnership. When partnership property is attached for a partnership debt the partners, or any of them, or the representatives of a deceased partner, cannot claim any right under the homestead or exemption laws.
(4) On the death of a partner his right in specific partnership property vests in the surviving partner or partners, except where the deceased was the last surviving partner, when his right in such property vests in his legal representative. Such surviving partner or partners, or the legal representative of the last surviving partner, has no right to possess the partnership property for any but a partnership purpose.
(5) A partner's right in specific partnership property is not subject to dower, curtesy, or allowances to widows, heirs, or next of kin.
Notes of Decisions
Marriage of Wills v. Wills, 750 S.W.2d 567 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
· cites it 13× “78 paid into court under the garnishment was “from a partnership account,”; (4) that “partnership property is not subject to garnishment for the individual debts of a partner under Section 358.250.(2)(3),”; and (5) “said funds are not property held in a form of joint interest…”
Sumners v. Sumners, 701 S.W.2d 720 (Mo. 1985).
· cites it 2× “By contrast, since the husband’s interest in the partnership consisted of pro rata ownership of specific property rather than a pro rata interest in an entity which in turn owned property, § 358.250, RSMo 1978, any partnership assets acquired after the marriage would be…”
Sarasohn & Co. v. Prestige Hotels Corp., 945 S.W.2d 13 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
· cites it 2× “§ 358.250(2) RSMo 1994. Ibur Group had no power to assign its cause of action on the adjustment contract to AI-Colorado without Sarasohn & Company joining in the assignment.”
Veatch v. Black, 250 S.W.2d 501 (Mo. 1952).
· cites it 2× “Veatch had been closely associated for over a quarter of a century in a highly technical engineering business and it was reasonable that each desired the other to wind up the partnership business and to be free from interference by the representatives of the other.”
Deutsch v. Wolff, 7 S.W.3d 460 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999).
· cites it 3× “Section 358.250 RSMo 1994; Anchor Centre Partners, Ltd.”
Hallmark v. Haenni, 904 S.W.2d 31 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995).
· cites it 3× “Section 358.250 RSMo 1986. Thus, the existence of a partnership impacts whether the funds are attachable.”
Hilke v. Bank of Washington, 251 S.W.2d 963 (Mo. Ct. App. 1952).
· cites it 2× “If, on the other hand, the funds were in fact partnership funds, they were not subject to garnishment for the individual debts of Hilke, Section 358.250, subd. 2(3) RSMo 1949, V.”
Lazare v. Hoffman, 444 S.W.2d 446 (Mo. 1969).
“” See § 358.250. Neither is it essential to determine whether pursuant to § 474.”
Hogan v. Krohn, 318 S.W.2d 163 (Mo. 1958).
“Nevertheless, in the protection of the parties from repeated litigation, and to the end of finally disposing of this already protracted litigation, we shall reverse the trial court’s order of dismissal as to those plaintiffs, surviving partners, and direct their reinstatement as…”
Gary v. Politte, 878 S.W.2d 849 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994).
· cites it 2× “The Buyers allege the garnishment was against “specific partnership property in the possession of the garnishee, and § 358.250 RSMo 1986 prohibits execution against specific partnership property .”
Turken Plumbing Co. v. Bundy, 459 S.W.2d 529 (Mo. Ct. App. 1970).
· cites it 3× “The only authorities cited by appellants are Sections 358.250 and 525.450, RSMo 1969, V.”
— Mo. Rev. Stat. § 358.250(2) — 1 case
Sarasohn & Co. v. Prestige Hotels Corp., 945 S.W.2d 13 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
“§ 358.250(2) RSMo 1994. Ibur Group had no power to assign its cause of action on the adjustment contract to AI-Colorado without Sarasohn & Company joining in the assignment.”
— Mo. Rev. Stat. § 358.250(4) — 2 cases
Veatch v. Black, 250 S.W.2d 501 (Mo. 1952).
“Veatch had been closely associated for over a quarter of a century in a highly technical engineering business and it was reasonable that each desired the other to wind up the partnership business and to be free from interference by the representatives of the other.”
Hogan v. Krohn, 318 S.W.2d 163 (Mo. 1958).
“Nevertheless, in the protection of the parties from repeated litigation, and to the end of finally disposing of this already protracted litigation, we shall reverse the trial court’s order of dismissal as to those plaintiffs, surviving partners, and direct their reinstatement as…”
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