408.035. Unlimited interest, when allowed. — Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law to the contrary, it is lawful for the parties to agree in writing to any rate of interest, fees, and other terms and conditions in connection with any:
(1) Loan to a corporation, general partnership, limited partnership or limited liability company;
(2) Extension of credit primarily for agricultural, business, or commercial purposes;
(3) Real estate loan, other than residential real estate loans; or
(4) Loan of five thousand dollars or more secured solely by certificates of stock, bonds, bills of exchange, certificates of deposit, warehouse receipts, or bills of lading pledged as collateral for the repayment of such loans.
Notes of Decisions
Killion v. Bank Midwest, N.A., 886 S.W.2d 29 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994).
· cites it 41× “Nonetheless, the Bank argues that the interest charged pursuant to the contingent interest provision of the note in question here was permissible under section 408.035, RSMo 1986. The Bank seems to be arguing that 4 C.”
Killion v. Bank Midwest, N.A., 987 S.W.2d 801 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
· cites it 8× “The Bank argued that § 408.035, RSMo Cum.Supp.1992, applied. Section 408.”
State ex rel. Crist v. Nationwide Fin. Corp. of Missouri, 588 S.W.2d 8 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979).
· cites it 13× “Does the phrase “real estate loan” as used in § 408.035 1 of the Missouri Usury Statutes denote a loan for any purpose secured by real estate? Such is the core issue into which we must delve to reach a denouement in this quo warranto action instituted by relator Commissioner of…”
Garrett v. Citizens Sav. Ass'n, 636 S.W.2d 104 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
· cites it 5× “060, RSMo 1969 and § 408.035, RSMo 1978 this court should “pierce the corporate veil” and “not tolerate an individual trying to obtain a lower interest rate by fabricating an individual loan when in fact the loan is being made for a corporate, commercial enterprise.”
Affiliated Acceptance Corp. v. Boggs, 917 S.W.2d 652 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996).
· cites it 3× “” Section 408.035, RSMo 1986, allows parties to agree in writing to any rate of interest or fees in connection with any loan to a corporation, business loan of $5000 or more, real estate loan or loan of $5000 or more secured by stock, bonds, bills of exchange, certificates of…”
Est. of Bruce v. Bruce, 767 S.W.2d 598 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
· cites it 3× “Section 408.035 RSMo 1978. Bruce, Jr. claimed the agreement constituted a business loan.”
U.S. Life Title Ins. Co. v. Brents, 676 S.W.2d 839 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
· cites it 2× “1982), it was held that a statute (§ 408.035, RSMo 1978), which removed a certain kind of loan (“a business loan of $5,000 or more”) from the interest rate limitation of § 408.”
Wilner v. O'donnell, 637 S.W.2d 757 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
· cites it 2× “The trial court rejected defendant Stine’s arguments that this transaction was a “business loan” or a “real estate loan” but found it to be a “residential real estate loan” under § 408.035 RSMo Supp. 1975. Thus, the maximum lawful rate of interest was found to be 10% per year…”
Pac. Carlton Dev. Corp. v. Barber, 95 S.W.3d 159 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003).
· cites it 2× “Section 408.035 provides: “Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law to the contrary, it is lawful for the parties to agree in writing to any rate of interest, fees, and other terms and conditions in connection with any: .”
Gus T. Handge & Son Painting Co. v. First Bank & Trust Co., 756 S.W.2d 652 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
· cites it 5× “Corporate maker’s theory is the note is not a sufficient writing to demonstrate an agreement to a different rate, as provided under § 408.035, RSMo 1986, in that the note does not expressly state the rate of interest nor can the rate be calculated from the face of the note.”
— Mo. Rev. Stat. § 408.035(2) — 1 case
— Mo. Rev. Stat. § 408.035(3) — 3 cases
Killion v. Bank Midwest, N.A., 886 S.W.2d 29 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994).
“Nonetheless, the Bank argues that the interest charged pursuant to the contingent interest provision of the note in question here was permissible under section 408.035, RSMo 1986. The Bank seems to be arguing that 4 C.”
State ex rel. Crist v. Nationwide Fin. Corp. of Missouri, 588 S.W.2d 8 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979).
“Does the phrase “real estate loan” as used in § 408.035 1 of the Missouri Usury Statutes denote a loan for any purpose secured by real estate? Such is the core issue into which we must delve to reach a denouement in this quo warranto action instituted by relator Commissioner of…”
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