Missouri Revised Statutes

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.420 (2026)

When not to apply to corporations

✓ current as of May 2026
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  516.420.  When not to apply to corporations. — None of the provisions of sections 516.380 to 516.420 shall apply to suits against moneyed corporations or against the directors or stockholders thereof, to recover any penalty or forfeiture imposed, or to enforce any liability created by the act of incorporation or any other law; but all such suits shall be brought within six years after the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts upon which such penalty or forfeiture attached, or by which such liability was created.

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(RSMo 1939 § 3790)

Prior revisions: 1929 § 3400; 1919 § 3745; 1909 § 4953

(2006) Six-year limitations period applied to mortgage finance company as a "moneyed corporation" under section.  Schwartz v. Bann-Cor Mortgage, 197 S.W.3d 168 (Mo.App.W.D.).

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 10 cases (2 in the last 5 years), 1998–2025 · leading case: Schwartz v. Bann-Cor Mortg., 197 S.W.3d 168 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006).
Schwartz v. Bann-Cor Mortg., 197 S.W.3d 168 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006). · cites it 50× “The issues in this appeal include the question of whether the six-year limitations period of Section 516.420, RSMo, 2000 applies to claims brought under the Second Mortgage Loan Act against Bann-Cor, a company engaged in the business of making second mortgage loans.”
Glen v. Fairway Indep. Mortg. Corp., 265 F.R.D. 474 (E.D. Mo. 2010). · cites it 13× “” Yet the only “reasons” given are that plaintiffs believe that Missouri’s six-year statute of limitations for claims against “moneyed corporations,” Mo.Rev.Stat. § 516.420, applies to their class claim, and that their claim should relate back to the filing of their first…”
Div. of Labor Standards, Dep't of Labor & Indus. Relations v. Walton Constr. Mgmt. Co., 984 S.W.2d 152 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998). · cites it 19× “The State responded claiming that the six year statute of limitations of section 516.420 was applicable in this ease.”
Jerry Washington v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 747 F.3d 955 (8th Cir. 2014). · cites it 3× “The Washing-tons appeal, invoking the six-year statute of limitations of § 516.420 RSMo or, alternatively, the application of the “continuing or repeated wrong” exception.”
Fielder v. Credit Acceptance Corp., 19 F. Supp. 2d 966 (W.D. Mo. 1998). · cites it 4× “section 516.420. The case of Nolan v. Kolar, 629 S.”
Wong v. Bann-Cor Mortg., 878 F. Supp. 2d 989 (W.D. Mo. 2012). · cites it 6× “we agree with Borrowers that Borrowers’ claims against the assignee defendants are not foreclosed by [§ 516.420 RSMo.]”)). In other words, plaintiffs argue that their claims all defendants, regardless of when they were named in a complaint, should be deemed timely just because…”
Wong v. Mortg., 918 F. Supp. 2d 941 (W.D. Mo. 2013). · cites it 7× “§ 516.420 applied to the MSMLA claims. Schwartz v.”
Jenkins & Assocs., Inc. v. Quick Elec., Inc., 971 S.W.2d 867 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998). “However, the trial court also found that the State’s claims in this ease were time-barred by § 516.420. Due to the State’s inability to pursue any claims against Jenkins or Quick for violation of § 290.”
Sonderegger v. Specialized Loan Servicing LLC (E.D. Mo. 2022). · cites it 3× “2018) (finding that MSMLA claims are subject to the six-year limitations period in Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.420 rather than the three-year limitations period in Mo.”
Jeffrey Cox, et al. vs. The Bank of New York Mellon (Mo. Ct. App. 2025). · cites it 2× “The circuit court granted the motion to dismiss based on the statute of limitations defense, but it did not address BNYM’s alternative ground for dismissal, i.e., lack of personal jurisdiction.”
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