Mont. Code Ann. » TITLE 27. CIVIL LIABILITY, REMEDIES, AND LIMITATIONS · CHAPTER 1. AVAILABILITY OF REMEDIES -- LIABILITY · Part 7. Liability
Montana Code Annotated

Mont. Code Ann. § 27-1-710 (2026)

Civil Liability For Injuries Involving Alcohol Consumption

✓ current as of May 2026
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  1. MCA Contents
  2. TITLE 27
  3. CHAPTER 1
  4. Part 7
  5. 27-1-710 Civil liability for injuries involving alcohol consumption

TITLE 27. CIVIL LIABILITY, REMEDIES, AND LIMITATIONS

CHAPTER 1. AVAILABILITY OF REMEDIES -- LIABILITY

Part 7. Liability

Civil Liability For Injuries Involving Alcohol Consumption

27-1-710. Civil liability for injuries involving alcohol consumption. (1) The purpose of this section is to set statutory criteria governing the civil liability of a person or entity that furnishes an alcoholic beverage for injury or damage arising from an event involving the person who consumed the beverage.

(2) Except as provided in this section, a person or entity that furnishes alcoholic beverages may not be found civilly liable under any other statute, theory of recovery, or common law claim for injury or damages arising from an event involving the person who was served or who consumed the beverage.

(3) A person or entity furnishing an alcoholic beverage may not be found civilly liable for injury or damage arising from an event involving the consumer wholly or partially on the basis of a licensing status under Title 16 or a provision or violation of a provision of Title 16.

(4) Furnishing a person with an alcoholic beverage is not a cause of, or grounds for finding the furnishing person or entity liable for, injury or damage wholly or partly arising from an event involving the person who consumed the beverage unless:

(a) the consumer was under the legal drinking age and the furnishing person knew that the consumer was underage or did not make a reasonable attempt to determine the consumer's age;

(b) the consumer was visibly intoxicated when furnished the alcoholic beverage; or

(c) the furnishing person forced or coerced the consumption or told the consumer that the beverage contained no alcohol.

(5) In determining the cause of injuries or damages inflicted on another by the consumer of an alcoholic beverage, in addition to other admissible evidence, a jury or trier of fact shall consider:

(a) the consumption of the alcoholic beverage;

(b) the actions of the consumer;

(c) the negligence of the person allegedly harmed by the consumer;

(d) the visible and audible intoxication indicators actually observed by the person furnishing the alcoholic beverage to the consumer, including but not limited to bloodshot eyes, loud and boisterous behavior, fighting behavior, stumbling, and slurred speech; and

(e) independent intervening cause or multiple causes.

(6) Because a furnishing person or entity can perceive only visual or audible indicators of intoxication, when determining liability under subsection (4)(b), a jury or trier of fact may not consider:

(a) a hypothetical blood alcohol level in any way to impute that the server observed visibly intoxicated behavior of the consumer prior to service;

(b) an actual blood alcohol level in any way to impute that the server observed visibly intoxicated behavior of the consumer prior to service;

(c) the signs of visible intoxication displayed by the consumer after the furnishing of the alcoholic beverage;

(d) the conduct of the furnishing person or entity after the furnishing of the alcoholic beverage; or

(e) whether the furnishing person or entity holds special events, alcohol specials, happy hours, or similar events or activities.

(7) A civil action may not be brought pursuant to subsection (4) by:

(a) a passenger over 18 years of age in the consumer's car or by the passenger's estate, legal guardian, or dependent; or

(b) the consumer or by the consumer's estate, legal guardian, or dependent unless:

(i) the consumer was under the legal age and the furnishing person knew or should have known that the consumer was underage; or

(ii) the furnishing person forced or coerced the consumption or told the consumer that the beverage contained no alcohol while knowing that it did contain alcohol.

(8) A civil action may not be commenced under this section against a person or entity who furnished alcohol to the consumer unless the person bringing the civil action provides notice of an intent to file the action to the person or entity who furnished the alcohol by certified mail within 180 days from the date of sale or service. The civil action must be commenced pursuant to this section within 2 years after the sale or service.

(9) Notice made pursuant to subsection (8) must include the date, time, and circumstances of the event involving the consumer along with the alleged visual or audible indicators of visible intoxication observed by the furnishing party prior to service to the consumer. The person providing the notice must have a reasonable basis in law and fact that an exception described in subsections (4)(a) through (4)(c) has occurred before sending the notice.

(10) In any civil action brought pursuant to this section, the total liability for noneconomic damages for all claimants may not exceed $250,000 for each event.

(11) In any civil action brought pursuant to this section, the total liability for punitive damages may not exceed $250,000. Service to a visibly intoxicated consumer is not enough to assess punitive damages against the person or entity furnishing the alcoholic beverage to the consumer. Conduct must be shown that meets the criteria in 27-1-221.

(12) Evidence of intentional or criminal activity by a person causing injury in connection with any event or injury commenced pursuant to this part is admissible in any action brought pursuant to this section.

History: En. Sec. 1, Ch. 1, Sp. L. March 1986; amd. Sec. 2, Ch. 448, L. 1989; amd. Sec. 1, Ch. 489, L. 2003; amd. Sec. 1, Ch. 321, L. 2023.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 13 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1989–2021 · leading case: Rohlfs v. Klemenhagen, LLC, 2009 MT 440 (Mont. 2009).
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Rohlfs v. Klemenhagen, LLC, 2009 MT 440 (Mont. 2009). · cites it 206× “Section 27-1-710(1), MCA. In 2003, the Fifty-eighth Legislature enacted subsection (6) of the statute, adding the 180-day notice requirement the Rohlfs now attack.”
Cusenbary v. Mortensen, 1999 MT 221 (Mont. 1999). · cites it 29× “Cusenbary alleges that Mortensen violated § 27-1-710, MCA, the dram shop act, when he furnished alcoholic beverages to a person who is "visibly intoxicated.”
Zempel v. Liberty, 2006 MT 220 (Mont. 2006). · cites it 11× “1 Zempel claimed that TTC had violated § 27-1-710, MCA. However, he alleged no facts that would constitute a “violation” of this statute.”
Babcock v. Casey's, 2021 MT 215 (Mont. 2021). · cites it 42× “On May 18, 2017, through counsel, Babcock served Casey’s with written notice pursuant to § 27-1-710, MCA (commonly known as the Montana Dram Shop Act) of his intent to sue 2 for damages resulting from the Windauer assault at the bar in January.”
Meech v. Hillhaven West, Inc., 776 P.2d 488 (Mont. 1989). · cites it 4× “ause of action for alienation of affection (§ 27-1-601, MCA), abolition of a cause for breach of promise to marry (§ 27-1-602, MCA), protection for certain persons against a cause of action for libel (§ 27-1-804, MCA), liability limitations for those rendering emergency care at…”
Essex Ins. v. Jaycie, Inc., 2004 MT 278 (Mont. 2004). · cites it 4× “The suit was founded on a theory of negligence with alleged violations of the Dram Shop Act, § 27-1-710, MCA, for serving alcohol to obviously intoxicated patrons and for failure to care for those intoxicated patrons.”
Smith v. Sewell, 858 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. 1993). · cites it 2× “053 (1988); Mont.Code Ann. § 27-1-710 (1991); N.H.Rev.”
Filip v. Jordan, 2008 MT 234 (Mont. 2008). · cites it 23× “¶2 The single issue on appeal is whether the District Court erred in concluding that Filip’s “Dram Shop Act” claim, brought under § 27-1-710, MCA (1999) 1 , is governed by a two-year statute of limitations.”
Harrington v. Crystal Bar, Inc., 2013 MT 209 (Mont. 2013). · cites it 9× “The Crystal Bar responds that the District Court correctly granted summary judgment because it is uncontested that Howard was of legal drinking age, was not visibly intoxicated, and was not served at the Crystal Bar.”
Tobias v. Sports Club, Inc., 474 S.E.2d 450 (S.C. Ct. App. 1996). · cites it 2× “053 (Vernon 1988); Mont.Code Ann. § 27-1-710 (1995); N.H.Rev.”
Moran v. Foodmaker, Inc., 594 A.2d 587 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991). “801 (West 1990); Montana, Mont.Code Ann. § 27-1-710 (1989); New Jersey, N.”
In re Boushee, 430 P.3d 97 (Mont. 2018). · cites it 3× “Section 27-1-710(7), MCA. ¶ 12 To reach the $194,136.”
Show all 13 citing cases →
— Mont. Code Ann. § 27-1-710(1) — 4 cases
Rohlfs v. Klemenhagen, LLC, 2009 MT 440 (Mont. 2009). “Section 27-1-710(1), MCA. In 2003, the Fifty-eighth Legislature enacted subsection (6) of the statute, adding the 180-day notice requirement the Rohlfs now attack.”
Zempel v. Liberty, 2006 MT 220 (Mont. 2006). “1 Zempel claimed that TTC had violated § 27-1-710, MCA. However, he alleged no facts that would constitute a “violation” of this statute.”
Babcock v. Casey's, 2021 MT 215 (Mont. 2021). “On May 18, 2017, through counsel, Babcock served Casey’s with written notice pursuant to § 27-1-710, MCA (commonly known as the Montana Dram Shop Act) of his intent to sue 2 for damages resulting from the Windauer assault at the bar in January.”
Harrington v. Crystal Bar, Inc., 2013 MT 209 (Mont. 2013). “The Crystal Bar responds that the District Court correctly granted summary judgment because it is uncontested that Howard was of legal drinking age, was not visibly intoxicated, and was not served at the Crystal Bar.”
— Mont. Code Ann. § 27-1-710(2) — 2 cases
Zempel v. Liberty, 2006 MT 220 (Mont. 2006). “1 Zempel claimed that TTC had violated § 27-1-710, MCA. However, he alleged no facts that would constitute a “violation” of this statute.”
Babcock v. Casey's, 2021 MT 215 (Mont. 2021). “On May 18, 2017, through counsel, Babcock served Casey’s with written notice pursuant to § 27-1-710, MCA (commonly known as the Montana Dram Shop Act) of his intent to sue 2 for damages resulting from the Windauer assault at the bar in January.”
— Mont. Code Ann. § 27-1-710(3) — 3 cases
Rohlfs v. Klemenhagen, LLC, 2009 MT 440 (Mont. 2009). “Section 27-1-710(1), MCA. In 2003, the Fifty-eighth Legislature enacted subsection (6) of the statute, adding the 180-day notice requirement the Rohlfs now attack.”
Babcock v. Casey's, 2021 MT 215 (Mont. 2021). “On May 18, 2017, through counsel, Babcock served Casey’s with written notice pursuant to § 27-1-710, MCA (commonly known as the Montana Dram Shop Act) of his intent to sue 2 for damages resulting from the Windauer assault at the bar in January.”
Harrington v. Crystal Bar, Inc., 2013 MT 209 (Mont. 2013). “The Crystal Bar responds that the District Court correctly granted summary judgment because it is uncontested that Howard was of legal drinking age, was not visibly intoxicated, and was not served at the Crystal Bar.”
— Mont. Code Ann. § 27-1-710(3)(a) — 1 case
Babcock v. Casey's, 2021 MT 215 (Mont. 2021). “On May 18, 2017, through counsel, Babcock served Casey’s with written notice pursuant to § 27-1-710, MCA (commonly known as the Montana Dram Shop Act) of his intent to sue 2 for damages resulting from the Windauer assault at the bar in January.”
— Mont. Code Ann. § 27-1-710(3)(b) — 2 cases
Rohlfs v. Klemenhagen, LLC, 2009 MT 440 (Mont. 2009). “Section 27-1-710(1), MCA. In 2003, the Fifty-eighth Legislature enacted subsection (6) of the statute, adding the 180-day notice requirement the Rohlfs now attack.”
Cusenbary v. Mortensen, 1999 MT 221 (Mont. 1999). “Cusenbary alleges that Mortensen violated § 27-1-710, MCA, the dram shop act, when he furnished alcoholic beverages to a person who is "visibly intoxicated.”
— Mont. Code Ann. § 27-1-710(4) — 2 cases
Rohlfs v. Klemenhagen, LLC, 2009 MT 440 (Mont. 2009). “Section 27-1-710(1), MCA. In 2003, the Fifty-eighth Legislature enacted subsection (6) of the statute, adding the 180-day notice requirement the Rohlfs now attack.”
Babcock v. Casey's, 2021 MT 215 (Mont. 2021). “On May 18, 2017, through counsel, Babcock served Casey’s with written notice pursuant to § 27-1-710, MCA (commonly known as the Montana Dram Shop Act) of his intent to sue 2 for damages resulting from the Windauer assault at the bar in January.”
— Mont. Code Ann. § 27-1-710(5) — 1 case
Babcock v. Casey's, 2021 MT 215 (Mont. 2021). “On May 18, 2017, through counsel, Babcock served Casey’s with written notice pursuant to § 27-1-710, MCA (commonly known as the Montana Dram Shop Act) of his intent to sue 2 for damages resulting from the Windauer assault at the bar in January.”
— Mont. Code Ann. § 27-1-710(6) — 2 cases
Rohlfs v. Klemenhagen, LLC, 2009 MT 440 (Mont. 2009). “Section 27-1-710(1), MCA. In 2003, the Fifty-eighth Legislature enacted subsection (6) of the statute, adding the 180-day notice requirement the Rohlfs now attack.”
Babcock v. Casey's, 2021 MT 215 (Mont. 2021). “On May 18, 2017, through counsel, Babcock served Casey’s with written notice pursuant to § 27-1-710, MCA (commonly known as the Montana Dram Shop Act) of his intent to sue 2 for damages resulting from the Windauer assault at the bar in January.”
— Mont. Code Ann. § 27-1-710(7) — 2 cases
Babcock v. Casey's, 2021 MT 215 (Mont. 2021). “On May 18, 2017, through counsel, Babcock served Casey’s with written notice pursuant to § 27-1-710, MCA (commonly known as the Montana Dram Shop Act) of his intent to sue 2 for damages resulting from the Windauer assault at the bar in January.”
In re Boushee, 430 P.3d 97 (Mont. 2018). “Section 27-1-710(7), MCA. ¶ 12 To reach the $194,136.”
— Mont. Code Ann. § 27-1-710(9) — 1 case
Rohlfs v. Klemenhagen, LLC, 2009 MT 440 (Mont. 2009). “Section 27-1-710(1), MCA. In 2003, the Fifty-eighth Legislature enacted subsection (6) of the statute, adding the 180-day notice requirement the Rohlfs now attack.”
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