39-71-104. Repealed. Sec. 68, Ch. 464, L. 1987.
Montana Code Annotated
Mont. Code Ann. § 39-71-104 (2026)
Repealed
✓ current as of May 2026
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TITLE 39. LABOR
CHAPTER 71. WORKERS' COMPENSATION
Part 1. General Provisions
Repealed
History: En. Sec. 24, Ch. 96, L. 1915; re-en. Sec. 2964, R.C.M. 1921; re-en. Sec. 2964, R.C.M. 1935; R.C.M. 1947, 92-838.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 49
cases, 1979–2008 · leading case: Wight v. Hughes Livestock Co., Inc., 664 P.2d 303 (Mont. 1983).
Wight v. Hughes Livestock Co., Inc., 664 P.2d 303 (Mont. 1983). “Section 39-71-104, MCA. The concern of the legislature, the spirit of the Workers' Compensation law are one and the same: that the cost of repairing a worker's injuries or replacing his lost earning capacity shall be the burden of industry, and not that of the injured worker.”
Wassberg v. Anaconda Copper Co., 697 P.2d 909 (Mont. 1985). “Section 39-71-104, MCA; Bowerman v. Employment Security Commission (Mont.”
Shupert v. Anaconda Aluminum Co., 696 P.2d 436 (Mont. 1985). “Schimpff clearly established that the claimant met his burden to prove that his present symptoms are related to the original injury.”
Cordier v. Stetson-Ross, Inc., 604 P.2d 86 (Mont. 1979). “1947, now section 39-71-414, MCA provides that if the injured worker sues a third party for his injuries, as here, the employer is subrogated either for the full amount of benefits or an amount up to 50 percent of the compensation benefits paid to the employee out of any…”
Thompson v. Cigna, 2000 MT 306 (Mont. 2000). “Furthermore, while Thompson is correct in arguing that the statutes in effect in 1981 that pertain to his claim should be liberally construed in his favor, § 39-71-104, MCA (repealed 1987), that does not entitle us to read into the Workers' Compensation Act terms that are not…”
Courser v. Darby Sch. Dist. No. 1, 692 P.2d 417 (Mont. 1984). “Had the employer remained neutral and merely notified the claimant that the decision to seek further training was his alone to make but that without such training he could not be considered for advancement a different result might occur.”
McClanathan v. Smith, 606 P.2d 507 (Mont. 1980). “Respondent submits that the legislature, in adopting the statute, intended to incorporate all of the relevant subchapters of the Social Security Act into the statute and merely referred to section 301 for purposes of convenience since it was the beginning subchapter of the Act.…”
Great W. Sugar Co. v. Dist. Court for the Thirteenth Jud. Dist., 610 P.2d 717 (Mont. 1980). “” Even with the requirement of section 39-71-104, MCA, that the Workers’ Compensation Act be liberally construed, no part of Mandolidis would allow us to transmute negligence into deliberate or intentional harm.”
Hardgrove v. Transp. Ins., 2004 MT 340 (Mont. 2004). “Specifically, under both § 39-71-104, MCA (1983) (the WCA) and § 39-72-104, MCA (1983) (the ODA), the courts were directed to liberally construe any parts or sections of the Acts when interpreting them.”
Buckentin v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 878 P.2d 262 (Mont. 1994). “Buckentin’s injury occurred in 1992 and the applicable statute in effect at that time, § 39-71-105, MCA, stated that “Title 39, chapters 71 and 72, must be considered according to their terms and not liberally in favor of any party.”
Sedlack v. Bigfork Convalescent Ctr., 749 P.2d 1085 (Mont. 1988). “Section 39-71-104, MCA (1983) provided for a liberal interpretation of the Workers' Compensation Act.”
Hunter v. Gibson Prods. of Billings Heights, Inc., 730 P.2d 1139 (Mont. 1986). “However, liberal construction of the statute, as mandated by § 39-71-104, MCA, results in the conclusion claimant is entitled to an award of permanent partial benefits upon reaching the age of 65.”
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