Montana Code Annotated

Mont. Code Ann. § 45-1-102 (2026)

General Purposes And Principles Of Construction

✓ current as of May 2026
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TITLE 45. CRIMES

CHAPTER 1. GENERAL PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS

Part 1. Construction and Applicability

General Purposes And Principles Of Construction

45-1-102. General purposes and principles of construction. (1) The general purposes of the provisions governing the definition of offenses are:

(a) to forbid and prevent conduct that unjustifiably and inexcusably inflicts or threatens harm to individual or public interests;

(b) to safeguard conduct that is without fault from condemnation as criminal;

(c) to give fair warning of the nature of the conduct declared to constitute an offense;

(d) to differentiate on reasonable grounds between serious and minor offenses.

(2) The rule of the common law that penal statutes are to be strictly construed has no application to this code. All its provisions are to be construed according to the fair import of their terms with a view to effect its object and to promote justice.

History: En. 94-1-102 by Sec. 1, Ch. 513, L. 1973; R.C.M. 1947, 94-1-102.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 16 cases (2 in the last 5 years), 1983–2025 · leading case: State v. Turner, 864 P.2d 235 (Mont. 1993).
State v. Turner, 864 P.2d 235 (Mont. 1993). · cites it 20× “Section 45-1-102(2), MCA, provides: The rule of the common law that penal statutes are to be strictly construed has no application to this code.”
State v. Liefert, 2002 MT 48 (Mont. 2002). · cites it 14× “; § 45-1-102(1)(c), MCA. Montana law specifically states that the common law rule that penal statutes are to be strictly construed has no application to the Montana criminal law code.”
State v. Stevens, 2002 MT 181 (Mont. 2002). · cites it 4× “¶ 78 Applying § 45-1-102(1), MCA, which, for purposes of penal statutes, sets aside the common law rule that statutes are to be strictly construed and requires penal provisions to be construed according to the fair import of their terms with a view to effect its object and to…”
State v. Wakeford, 1998 MT 16 (Mont. 1998). · cites it 4× “¶12 On June 27, 1995, Wakeford was charged by information in the Eighth Judicial District Court, Cascade County, with violations of: (1) § 45-1-102(1), MCA (1993), felony criminal possession of dangerous drugs; and (2) § 45-10-103, MCAQ993), misdemeanor possession of drug…”
State v. Tower, 881 P.2d 1317 (Mont. 1994). · cites it 5× “" Section 45-1-102(c), MCA. This statement of purpose was adopted from an Illinois statute, as part of the 1973 general revision of criminal law in Montana.”
State v. Haser, 2001 MT 6 (Mont. 2001). · cites it 2× “Although we must construe the provisions of a penal statute “according to the import of their terms with a view to effect its object and to promote justice” (see § 45-1-102(2), MCA), the Legislature has provided specific definitions of the specific conditions that render a…”
State v. Gollehon, 864 P.2d 249 (Mont. 1993). · cites it 2× “Further, the State contends that § 45-1-102(2), MCA, dictates that all penal provisions be construed according to the fair import of their terms with a view to effect its object and to promote justice.”
State v. D. Schultz, 2025 MT 142 (Mont. 2025). · cites it 6× “Section 45-1-102(2), MCA. See, e.g., Ming v.”
State v. Palmer, 673 P.2d 1234 (Mont. 1983). · cites it 2× “Section 45-1-102(2) requires provisions of the criminal code “to be construed according to the fair import of their terms with a view to effect [the object of the code] .”
City of Missoula v. Paffhausen, 2012 MT 265 (Mont. 2012). · cites it 2× “Section 45-1-102(1)(b), MCA, provides that one of the general purposes of the provisions governing the definition of offenses is to “safeguard conduct that is without fault from condemnation as criminal.”
State v. Sherer, 2002 MT 337 (Mont. 2002). · cites it 2× “Accordingly, we conclude that the statute defining aggravated assault and the statutes defining cause, act and conduct, pursuant to § 45-1-102(l)(c), MCA, give fair warning that the nature of Sherer’s conduct constituted the offense of aggravated assault if his conduct resulted…”
Stewart v. State, 2015 MT 135N (Mont. 2015). · cites it 3× “Neither the term “gratify” nor the term “regularly resides” have acquired some particular or technical meaning. The fact that Stewart’s trial and appellate counsel did not object to the use of these terms does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.”
— Mont. Code Ann. § 45-1-102(1) — 2 cases
State v. Stevens, 2002 MT 181 (Mont. 2002). “¶ 78 Applying § 45-1-102(1), MCA, which, for purposes of penal statutes, sets aside the common law rule that statutes are to be strictly construed and requires penal provisions to be construed according to the fair import of their terms with a view to effect its object and to…”
State v. Wakeford, 1998 MT 16 (Mont. 1998). “¶12 On June 27, 1995, Wakeford was charged by information in the Eighth Judicial District Court, Cascade County, with violations of: (1) § 45-1-102(1), MCA (1993), felony criminal possession of dangerous drugs; and (2) § 45-10-103, MCAQ993), misdemeanor possession of drug…”
— Mont. Code Ann. § 45-1-102(1)(b) — 1 case
City of Missoula v. Paffhausen, 2012 MT 265 (Mont. 2012). “Section 45-1-102(1)(b), MCA, provides that one of the general purposes of the provisions governing the definition of offenses is to “safeguard conduct that is without fault from condemnation as criminal.”
— Mont. Code Ann. § 45-1-102(1)(c) — 1 case
State v. Liefert, 2002 MT 48 (Mont. 2002). “; § 45-1-102(1)(c), MCA. Montana law specifically states that the common law rule that penal statutes are to be strictly construed has no application to the Montana criminal law code.”
— Mont. Code Ann. § 45-1-102(2) — 9 cases
State v. Turner, 864 P.2d 235 (Mont. 1993). “Section 45-1-102(2), MCA, provides: The rule of the common law that penal statutes are to be strictly construed has no application to this code.”
State v. Liefert, 2002 MT 48 (Mont. 2002). “; § 45-1-102(1)(c), MCA. Montana law specifically states that the common law rule that penal statutes are to be strictly construed has no application to the Montana criminal law code.”
State v. Haser, 2001 MT 6 (Mont. 2001). “Although we must construe the provisions of a penal statute “according to the import of their terms with a view to effect its object and to promote justice” (see § 45-1-102(2), MCA), the Legislature has provided specific definitions of the specific conditions that render a…”
State v. Gollehon, 864 P.2d 249 (Mont. 1993). “Further, the State contends that § 45-1-102(2), MCA, dictates that all penal provisions be construed according to the fair import of their terms with a view to effect its object and to promote justice.”
State v. D. Schultz, 2025 MT 142 (Mont. 2025). “Section 45-1-102(2), MCA. See, e.g., Ming v.”
— Mont. Code Ann. § 45-1-102(c) — 2 cases
State v. Tower, 881 P.2d 1317 (Mont. 1994). “" Section 45-1-102(c), MCA. This statement of purpose was adopted from an Illinois statute, as part of the 1973 general revision of criminal law in Montana.”
State v. D. Wood, 2024 MT 318 (Mont. 2024).
— Mont. Code Ann. § 45-1-102(l)(c) — 1 case
State v. Sherer, 2002 MT 337 (Mont. 2002). “Accordingly, we conclude that the statute defining aggravated assault and the statutes defining cause, act and conduct, pursuant to § 45-1-102(l)(c), MCA, give fair warning that the nature of Sherer’s conduct constituted the offense of aggravated assault if his conduct resulted…”
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