Notes of Decisions
Cited in
99
cases (
22 in the last 5 years), 1980–2026 · leading case:
State v. Hernandez, 2009 MT 341 (Mont. 2009).
State v. Hernandez, 2009 MT 341 (Mont. 2009).
· cites it 24× “Section 46-18-101, MCA. ¶ 14 A felony sentence necessarily involves consideration of a number of factors, most all of which are subjective.”
State v. English, 2006 MT 177 (Mont. 2006).
· cites it 13× “Thus, he contends that, pursuant to § 46-18-101(0, MCA, he was entitled to have the District Court consider alternatives to imprisonment.”
State v. Johnson, 1998 MT 289 (Mont. 1998).
· cites it 24× “Rather, Johnson argues that the death sentence in this case was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, and arbitrary factors because the District Court predicated its sentence upon Montana's correctional policy as set forth in § 46-18-101, MCA, and that that policy…”
State v. Gordon, 1999 MT 169 (Mont. 1999).
· cites it 16× “¶43 Montana’s correctional and sentencing policy is set forth at some length in § 46-18-101, MCA. That policy includes such considerations as punishing each offender commensurate with the nature and degree of harm caused by the offense and protecting the public by incarcerating…”
State v. Kirkbride, 2008 MT 178 (Mont. 2008).
· cites it 12× “Did the District Court err when it relied on a “need for retribution” as a factor in sentencing Kirkbride? Retribution is a component of punishment ¶11 Kirkbride correctly argued that retribution is not specifically among the sentencing policies articulated in § 46-18-101(2),…”
State v. Ferguson, 2005 MT 343 (Mont. 2005).
· cites it 5× “Section 46-18-101(2)(a), MCA. ¶122 However, we do not view the time limitation of § 46-18-116(1), MCA, as a mere technicality which may be observed at leisure.”
State v. Morris, 2010 MT 259 (Mont. 2010).
· cites it 12× “Section 46-18-101, MCA ¶16 Section 46-18-101, MCA, sets forth Montana’s correctional and sentencing policy. Specifically, § 46-18-101(3)(c), MCA, provides, “[sentencing practices must be neutral with respect to the offender’s race, gender, religion, national origin, or social or…”
State v. Legg, 2004 MT 26 (Mont. 2004).
· cites it 6× “Does Legg's fifty-year sentence violate statutory sentencing policy? ¶ 52 Legg claims that his fifty-year sentence, which is one-half the maximum allowed under law, violates public policy that sentences should be commensurate with the punishment imposed on other persons…”
State v. Betterman, 2015 MT 39 (Mont. 2015).
· cites it 5× “See § 46-18-101, MCA (sentencing policy is to “encourage and provide opportunities for the offender’s self-improvement to provide rehabilitation and reintegration of offenders back into the community”; to achieve this policy, sentencing is to be “certain, timely, consistent, and…”
State v. Robinson, 2009 MT 170 (Mont. 2009).
· cites it 6× “Notwithstanding the provisions of § 46-18-101(3)(a), MCA, (sentence and punishment is to be imposed in a timely fashion) and § 46-18-102(3), MCA, (sentence must be pronounced and judgment rendered within a reasonable time), Robinson and the State agreed that sentence would not…”
State v. Brownback, 2010 MT 96 (Mont. 2010).
· cites it 6× “¶27 The District Court required Brownback to pay restitution without considering his financial means.”
State v. Beach, 705 P.2d 94 (Mont. 1985).
· cites it 6× “In either case, defendant argues that this is violative of Article II, section 28 of the Montana Constitution, which requires that "laws for the punishment of crime shall be founded on the principles of prevention and reformation"; and section 46-18-101, MCA, which provides that…”
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-101(2) — 20 cases
State v. Kirkbride, 2008 MT 178 (Mont. 2008).
“Did the District Court err when it relied on a “need for retribution” as a factor in sentencing Kirkbride? Retribution is a component of punishment ¶11 Kirkbride correctly argued that retribution is not specifically among the sentencing policies articulated in § 46-18-101(2),…”
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-101(2)(a) — 7 cases
State v. Ferguson, 2005 MT 343 (Mont. 2005).
“Section 46-18-101(2)(a), MCA. ¶122 However, we do not view the time limitation of § 46-18-116(1), MCA, as a mere technicality which may be observed at leisure.”
State v. Gordon, 1999 MT 169 (Mont. 1999).
“¶43 Montana’s correctional and sentencing policy is set forth at some length in § 46-18-101, MCA. That policy includes such considerations as punishing each offender commensurate with the nature and degree of harm caused by the offense and protecting the public by incarcerating…”
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-101(2)(b) — 6 cases
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-101(2)(c) — 3 cases
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-101(2)(d) — 4 cases
State v. Hernandez, 2009 MT 341 (Mont. 2009).
“Section 46-18-101, MCA. ¶ 14 A felony sentence necessarily involves consideration of a number of factors, most all of which are subjective.”
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-101(2)(g) — 1 case
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-101(2)(h) — 1 case
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-101(3) — 16 cases
State v. Hernandez, 2009 MT 341 (Mont. 2009).
“Section 46-18-101, MCA. ¶ 14 A felony sentence necessarily involves consideration of a number of factors, most all of which are subjective.”
State v. Kirkbride, 2008 MT 178 (Mont. 2008).
“Did the District Court err when it relied on a “need for retribution” as a factor in sentencing Kirkbride? Retribution is a component of punishment ¶11 Kirkbride correctly argued that retribution is not specifically among the sentencing policies articulated in § 46-18-101(2),…”
State v. Johnson, 1998 MT 289 (Mont. 1998).
“Rather, Johnson argues that the death sentence in this case was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, and arbitrary factors because the District Court predicated its sentence upon Montana's correctional policy as set forth in § 46-18-101, MCA, and that that policy…”
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-101(3)(a) — 11 cases
State v. Robinson, 2009 MT 170 (Mont. 2009).
“Notwithstanding the provisions of § 46-18-101(3)(a), MCA, (sentence and punishment is to be imposed in a timely fashion) and § 46-18-102(3), MCA, (sentence must be pronounced and judgment rendered within a reasonable time), Robinson and the State agreed that sentence would not…”
State v. Betterman, 2015 MT 39 (Mont. 2015).
“See § 46-18-101, MCA (sentencing policy is to “encourage and provide opportunities for the offender’s self-improvement to provide rehabilitation and reintegration of offenders back into the community”; to achieve this policy, sentencing is to be “certain, timely, consistent, and…”
State v. Ferguson, 2005 MT 343 (Mont. 2005).
“Section 46-18-101(2)(a), MCA. ¶122 However, we do not view the time limitation of § 46-18-116(1), MCA, as a mere technicality which may be observed at leisure.”
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-101(3)(b) — 5 cases
State v. Legg, 2004 MT 26 (Mont. 2004).
“Does Legg's fifty-year sentence violate statutory sentencing policy? ¶ 52 Legg claims that his fifty-year sentence, which is one-half the maximum allowed under law, violates public policy that sentences should be commensurate with the punishment imposed on other persons…”
State v. English, 2006 MT 177 (Mont. 2006).
“Thus, he contends that, pursuant to § 46-18-101(0, MCA, he was entitled to have the District Court consider alternatives to imprisonment.”
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-101(3)(c) — 4 cases
State v. Morris, 2010 MT 259 (Mont. 2010).
“Section 46-18-101, MCA ¶16 Section 46-18-101, MCA, sets forth Montana’s correctional and sentencing policy. Specifically, § 46-18-101(3)(c), MCA, provides, “[sentencing practices must be neutral with respect to the offender’s race, gender, religion, national origin, or social or…”
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-101(3)(d) — 9 cases
State v. Gordon, 1999 MT 169 (Mont. 1999).
“¶43 Montana’s correctional and sentencing policy is set forth at some length in § 46-18-101, MCA. That policy includes such considerations as punishing each offender commensurate with the nature and degree of harm caused by the offense and protecting the public by incarcerating…”
State v. Kirkbride, 2008 MT 178 (Mont. 2008).
“Did the District Court err when it relied on a “need for retribution” as a factor in sentencing Kirkbride? Retribution is a component of punishment ¶11 Kirkbride correctly argued that retribution is not specifically among the sentencing policies articulated in § 46-18-101(2),…”
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-101(3)(e) — 1 case
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-101(3)(f) — 2 cases
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-101(3)(h) — 2 cases
State v. Brownback, 2010 MT 96 (Mont. 2010).
“¶27 The District Court required Brownback to pay restitution without considering his financial means.”
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-101(4) — 1 case
— Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-101(f) — 1 case
State v. English, 2006 MT 177 (Mont. 2006).
“Thus, he contends that, pursuant to § 46-18-101(0, MCA, he was entitled to have the District Court consider alternatives to imprisonment.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.