(1) An action for the recovery of the title or possession of lands, tenements, or hereditaments, or for the foreclosure of mortgages or the foreclosure of deeds of trust as mortgages thereon, can only be brought within ten years after the cause of action accrues. No limitation shall apply to the time within which any county, city, town, village, other municipal corporation, public power and irrigation district, public power district, public irrigation district organized under Chapter 70, article 6, irrigation district organized under Chapter 46, article 1, or natural resources district may begin an action for the recovery of the title or possession of any public road, street, or alley, other public or political subdivision grounds or lands, or city or town lots.
(2) For the purposes of this section as relates only to the rights and interests of subsequent purchasers and encumbrancers for value:
(a) The cause of action for foreclosure of the mortgage or foreclosure of the deed of trust as a mortgage accrues on the last date of maturity of the debt or other obligation secured by the mortgage or deed of trust as the date is stated in or is ascertainable from the filed record of the mortgage or deed of trust or the filed record of an extension of the mortgage or deed of trust;
(b) If no date of maturity is stated or is ascertainable from the filed mortgage or deed of trust or the filed extension, the cause of action for foreclosure of the mortgage or foreclosure of the deed of trust as a mortgage accrues no later than thirty years after the date of the mortgage or deed of trust; or
(c) If the mortgage creditor files an affidavit to the effect that the mortgage or deed of trust is unpaid and is still a valid lien, the affidavit is filed before the cause of action is barred under this section, and the affidavit is filed for record in the office of the register of deeds, the cause of action is not barred until ten years after the date the affidavit is filed. The period of ten years shall not be extended by nonresidence, legal disability, partial payment, acknowledgment of debt, or promise to pay.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
62
cases (
4 in the last 5 years), 1945–2024 · leading case:
Hike v. State, 297 Neb. 212 (Neb. 2017).
Hike v. State, 297 Neb. 212 (Neb. 2017).
· cites it 15× “Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-202 (Reissue 2016) is not a special statute of limitations, but only a general statute of limitations.”
Strode v. City of Ashland, 886 N.W.2d 293 (Neb. 2016).
· cites it 3× “2d 808, 817 (1993) (citing Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-202 (Reissue 1989)).”
Krambeck v. City of Gretna, 254 N.W.2d 691 (Neb. 1977).
· cites it 8× “The plaintiffs contend that the applicable statute of limitations is the 10-year period found in section 25-202, R. R. S. 1943, and that it was error for the District Court to sustain the defendant’s demurrer.”
Blankenau v. Landess, 626 N.W.2d 588 (Neb. 2001).
· cites it 3× “Because Blankenau’s action was an action for the recovery of possession of real estate, the 10-year statute of limitations provided in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-202 (Reissue 1995) applies in the case at bar.”
Olsen v. Olsen, 657 N.W.2d 1 (Neb. 2003).
· cites it 7× “Harold notes that Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-202 (Reissue 1989) provides in part, “An action for the recovery of the title or possession of lands, tenements, or hereditaments, or for the foreclosure of mortgages thereon, can only be brought within ten years after the cause of action…”
PSB Credit Servs., Inc. v. Rich, 558 N.W.2d 295 (Neb. 1997).
· cites it 5× “PSB timely appealed, arguing that the court incorrectly sustained appellees’ demurrer and failed to properly apply the 10-year statute of limitations set out in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-202 (Reissue 1995). The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s dismissal of the petition.”
Beckner v. Urban, 309 Neb. 677 (Neb. 2021).
· cites it 13× “1 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-202 (Reissue 2016). - 680 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 309 Nebraska Reports BECKNER v.”
Brown v. Jacobsen Land & Cattle Co., 302 Neb. 538 (Neb. 2019).
· cites it 2× “, adverse possession under a claim of ownership. Because of the Browns' failure to prove that their possession of the disputed land was under a claim of ownership, we need not consider other elements of their adverse possession claim or the equitable defenses raised by the State.”
Brtek v. Cihal, 515 N.W.2d 628 (Neb. 1994).
· cites it 2× “Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-202 (Reissue 1989) provides in part: “An action for the recovery of the title or possession of lands, tenements or hereditaments, or for the foreclosure of mortgages thereon, can only be brought within ten years after the cause of action shall have…”
Vanice v. Oehm, 526 N.W.2d 648 (Neb. 1995).
· cites it 4× “§ 25-202 (Reissue 1989): An action for the recovery of the title or possession of lands, tenements or hereditaments, or for the foreclosure of mortgages thereon, can only be brought within ten years after the cause of action shall have accrued .”
Alexanderson v. Wessman, 64 N.W.2d 306 (Neb. 1954).
· cites it 5× “The relevant statute, section 25-202, R. R. S. 1943, contains this: “An action for * * * the foreclosure of mortgages thereon (lands, tenements, or hereditaments), can only be brought within ten years after the cause of action shall have accrued * * A mortgage on real estate…”
Wait v. Cornette, 612 N.W.2d 905 (Neb. 2000).
· cites it 2× “At that time, Minnie repudiated the resulting trust by transferring the home place to Edward because she was no longer holding the home place for her life with the intention of transferring it to her children upon her death.”
— Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-202(1) — 2 cases
Beckner v. Urban, 309 Neb. 677 (Neb. 2021).
“1 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-202 (Reissue 2016). - 680 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 309 Nebraska Reports BECKNER v.”
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