(1)(a) No person, by any means and without privilege to do so, shall knowingly solicit, coax, entice, or lure or attempt to solicit, coax, entice, or lure any child under the age of fourteen years to enter into any vehicle, whether or not the person knows the age of the child.
(b) No person, by any means and without privilege to do so, shall solicit, coax, entice, or lure or attempt to solicit, coax, entice, or lure any child under the age of fourteen years to enter into any place with the intent to seclude the child from his or her parent, guardian, or other legal custodian or the general public, whether or not the person knows the age of the child. For purposes of this subdivision, seclude means to take, remove, hide, secrete, conceal, isolate, or otherwise unlawfully separate.
(2) It is an affirmative defense to a charge under this section that:
(a) The person had the express or implied permission of the parent, guardian, or other legal custodian of the child in undertaking the activity;
(b)(i) The person is a law enforcement officer, emergency services provider as defined in section 71-507, firefighter, or other person who regularly provides emergency services, is the operator of a bookmobile or other such vehicle operated by the state or a political subdivision and used for informing, educating, organizing, or transporting children, is a paid employee of, or a volunteer for, a nonprofit or religious organization which provides activities for children, or is an employee or agent of or a volunteer acting under the direction of any board of education and (ii) the person listed in subdivision (2)(b)(i) of this section was, at the time the person undertook the activity, acting within the scope of his or her lawful duties in that capacity; or
(c) The person undertook the activity in response to a bona fide emergency situation or the person undertook the activity in response to a reasonable belief that it was necessary to preserve the health, safety, or welfare of the child.
(3) Any person who violates this section commits criminal child enticement and is guilty of a Class IIIA felony. If such person has previously been convicted of (a) criminal child enticement under this section, (b) sexual assault of a child in the first degree under section 28-319.01, (c) sexual assault of a child in the second or third degree under section 28-320.01, (d) child enticement by means of an electronic communication device under section 28-320.02, or (e) assault under section 28-308, 28-309, or 28-310, kidnapping under section 28-313, or false imprisonment under section 28-314 or 28-315 when the victim was under eighteen years of age when such person violates this section, such person is guilty of a Class IIA felony.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
13
cases (
4 in the last 5 years), 1983–2025 · leading case:
State v. Kipple, 968 N.W.2d 613 (Neb. 2022).
State v. Kipple, 968 N.W.2d 613 (Neb. 2022).
· cites it 18× “5 [2] Whether a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel can be determined on direct appeal presents a question of law, which turns upon the sufficiency of the record to address the claim without an evidentiary hearing or whether the claim rests solely on the…”
Hopkins v. Hopkins, 883 N.W.2d 363 (Neb. 2016).
· cites it 2× “Under § 43-2933(1)(a), that presumption exists if the SORA offense (1) would make access to the child contrary to his or her best interests; (2) was committed against a minor; or (3) was a crime under “section 28-311, 28-319.01, 28-320, 28-320.”
State v. Hamilton, 340 N.W.2d 397 (Neb. 1983).
· cites it 5× “1982), and seeks to have this court determine that Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-311 (Reissue 1979) is constitutional.”
In re Interest of Siebert, 390 N.W.2d 522 (Neb. 1986).
· cites it 3× “2d 397 (1983), declared Neb.Rev. Stat. § 28-311(1)(a) (Reissue 1985) to be such.”
Doe v. Nebraska, 734 F. Supp. 2d 882 (D. Neb. 2010).
· cites it 2× “01; (h) Criminal child enticement pursuant to section 28-311; (i) Child enticement by means of an electronic communication device pursuant to section 28-320.”
State v. Godek, 981 N.W.2d 810 (Neb. 2022).
· cites it 2× “An actor violates the Model Penal Code when he or she threatens to commit any crime of violence, with the intent to terrorize another, regardless of what the outcome of the act will be or of how the victim receives the threat.”
State v. Schmailzl, 502 N.W.2d 463 (Neb. 1993).
· cites it 2× “However, in Hamilton , we noted that the terroristic threats statute significantly departed from § 211.”
Doe v. Nebraska, 898 F. Supp. 2d 1086 (D. Neb. 2012).
· cites it 2× “01; (h) Criminal child enticement pursuant to section 28-311; (i) Child enticement by means of an electronic communication device pursuant to section 28-320.”
State v. Mayo, 464 N.W.2d 798 (Neb. 1991).
· cites it 2× “Section 28-311 -01(1)(a) was found to be constitutional by the court.”
State v. Fisher, 343 N.W.2d 772 (Neb. 1984).
· cites it 3× “He was charged with and convicted of violating Neb. Rev. Stat. §28-311 (Reissue 1979), which reads: “(1) A person commits terroristic threats if: “(a) He threatens to commit any crime likely to result in death or serious physical injury to another person or likely to result in…”
In re Interest of Danajah G., 870 N.W.2d 432 (Neb. Ct. App. 2015).
· cites it 2× “)(a) No person shall be granted custody of, or unsu- pervised parenting time, visitation, or other access with, a child if the person is required to be registered as a sex offender under [SORA] for an offense that would make it contrary to the best interests of the child for…”
State v. Gozo, No. A-23-219 (Neb. Ct. App. Oct. 3, 2023).
· cites it 2× “01 (2) (Reissue 2016), and one count of child enticement-first offense, a Class IIIA felony, pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-311 (Reissue 2016). The complaint also alleged that the current offense was an aggravated offense under Neb.”
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-311(1): 1 case
State v. Kipple, 968 N.W.2d 613 (Neb. 2022).
“5 [2] Whether a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel can be determined on direct appeal presents a question of law, which turns upon the sufficiency of the record to address the claim without an evidentiary hearing or whether the claim rests solely on the…”
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-311(1)(a): 1 case
In re Interest of Siebert, 390 N.W.2d 522 (Neb. 1986).
“2d 397 (1983), declared Neb.Rev. Stat. § 28-311(1)(a) (Reissue 1985) to be such.”
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-311(1)(b): 1 case
State v. Kipple, 968 N.W.2d 613 (Neb. 2022).
“5 [2] Whether a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel can be determined on direct appeal presents a question of law, which turns upon the sufficiency of the record to address the claim without an evidentiary hearing or whether the claim rests solely on the…”
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-311(2): 1 case
State v. Kipple, 968 N.W.2d 613 (Neb. 2022).
“5 [2] Whether a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel can be determined on direct appeal presents a question of law, which turns upon the sufficiency of the record to address the claim without an evidentiary hearing or whether the claim rests solely on the…”
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-311(2)(a): 1 case
State v. Kipple, 968 N.W.2d 613 (Neb. 2022).
“5 [2] Whether a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel can be determined on direct appeal presents a question of law, which turns upon the sufficiency of the record to address the claim without an evidentiary hearing or whether the claim rests solely on the…”
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-311(2)(b): 1 case
State v. Kipple, 968 N.W.2d 613 (Neb. 2022).
“5 [2] Whether a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel can be determined on direct appeal presents a question of law, which turns upon the sufficiency of the record to address the claim without an evidentiary hearing or whether the claim rests solely on the…”
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