All airport zoning regulations
adopted under the Airport
Zoning Act shall be reasonable and not impose any requirement
or restriction which is not reasonably necessary to effectuate the purposes
of the act. In determining what
regulations it may adopt, each political subdivision and joint airport zoning
board shall consider, among other things, the character of the flying operations
expected to be conducted at the airport, the nature of the terrain within
the airport hazard area, the character of the neighborhood, and the uses to which the property to be zoned
is put and adaptable. If an
airport layout plan has been submitted for approval to the Federal Aviation
Administration with a proposed instrument runway depicted thereon and such
airport layout plan is conditionally or unconditionally approved without such
proposed instrument runway, the political subdivision shall adopt or revise,
as necessary, airport zoning regulations to protect any approach zone for
a visual runway only.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
9
cases (
1 in the last 5 years), 1994–2024 · leading case:
Fales v. Norine, 644 N.W.2d 513 (Neb. 2002).
Fales v. Norine, 644 N.W.2d 513 (Neb. 2002).
· cites it 26× “§ 3-309 (Reissue 2001). That section allows a claimant to enforce a lost, stolen, or destroyed instrument if the person was in possession of the note when the loss occurred and the instrument was not voluntarily transferred or lawfully seized.”
Clarke v. First Nat. Bank of Omaha, 895 N.W.2d 284 (Neb. 2017).
“2 [2] Statutory interpretation presents a question of law.3 [3] Appellate courts independently review questions of law decided by a lower court.”
Walker v. Walker, 854 F. Supp. 1443 (D. Neb. 1994).
· cites it 3× “2d 249, 252 (1984) (under predecessor to section 3-309 the court held that one seeking enforcement of a lost promissory note must establish the right to recovery by clear and convincing evidence).”
State Ex Rel. Couns. for Dis. v. Frye, 771 N.W.2d 571 (Neb. 2009).
“Count II of the formal charges alleges that respondent's failure to respond to the Counsel for Discipline's inquiries was in violation of §§ 3-309(E) and 3-508.1 and Neb. Ct. R. § 3-303(B), and a violation of her oath of office as an attorney licensed to practice in the State of…”
State ex rel. Couns. for Dis. v. Nimmer, 300 Neb. 906 (Neb. 2018).
· cites it 2× “After reviewing these records, the Counsel for Discipline determined there were reasonable grounds for discipline, and thus reduced the SEC’s grievance to a complaint and forwarded it to the Committee on Inquiry of the Fourth Judicial District.3 Thereafter, the inquiry panel…”
State ex rel. Couns. for Dis. v. Campbell, 318 Neb. 23 (Neb. 2024).
“Because § 3-321 “does not provide for the appropriate pro- cedure in a reciprocal discipline case,” he alleges, it must be considered and construed together with §§ 3-309 and 3-310. Brief for respondent at 10.”
Clarke v. First Nat. Bank of Omaha, 296 Neb. 632 (Neb. 2017).
“2 [2] Statutory interpretation presents a question of law.3 [3] Appellate courts independently review questions of law decided by a lower court.”
— Neb. Rev. Stat. § 3-309(E) — 2 cases
State Ex Rel. Couns. for Dis. v. Frye, 771 N.W.2d 571 (Neb. 2009).
“Count II of the formal charges alleges that respondent's failure to respond to the Counsel for Discipline's inquiries was in violation of §§ 3-309(E) and 3-508.1 and Neb. Ct. R. § 3-303(B), and a violation of her oath of office as an attorney licensed to practice in the State of…”
— Neb. Rev. Stat. § 3-309(G) — 2 cases
State ex rel. Couns. for Dis. v. Nimmer, 300 Neb. 906 (Neb. 2018).
“After reviewing these records, the Counsel for Discipline determined there were reasonable grounds for discipline, and thus reduced the SEC’s grievance to a complaint and forwarded it to the Committee on Inquiry of the Fourth Judicial District.3 Thereafter, the inquiry panel…”
— Neb. Rev. Stat. § 3-309(H)(4) — 2 cases
State ex rel. Couns. for Dis. v. Nimmer, 300 Neb. 906 (Neb. 2018).
“After reviewing these records, the Counsel for Discipline determined there were reasonable grounds for discipline, and thus reduced the SEC’s grievance to a complaint and forwarded it to the Committee on Inquiry of the Fourth Judicial District.3 Thereafter, the inquiry panel…”
— Neb. Rev. Stat. § 3-309(a) — 2 cases
Fales v. Norine, 644 N.W.2d 513 (Neb. 2002).
“§ 3-309 (Reissue 2001). That section allows a claimant to enforce a lost, stolen, or destroyed instrument if the person was in possession of the note when the loss occurred and the instrument was not voluntarily transferred or lawfully seized.”
Walker v. Walker, 854 F. Supp. 1443 (D. Neb. 1994).
“2d 249, 252 (1984) (under predecessor to section 3-309 the court held that one seeking enforcement of a lost promissory note must establish the right to recovery by clear and convincing evidence).”
— Neb. Rev. Stat. § 3-309(b) — 1 case
Fales v. Norine, 644 N.W.2d 513 (Neb. 2002).
“§ 3-309 (Reissue 2001). That section allows a claimant to enforce a lost, stolen, or destroyed instrument if the person was in possession of the note when the loss occurred and the instrument was not voluntarily transferred or lawfully seized.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.