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Neb. Rev. Stat.Chapter 39

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-669.07 (2026)

Transferred to section 60-6,196

Edition and currency
text as last checked Oct. 2026 (this copy records no edition or section history). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTtext as last checked Oct. 2026 (this copy records no edition or section history) cited 1974–2017 235citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 235 opinions since 1974. The most litigated part is subsection (3) (21 cases).

39-669.07.

Transferred to section 60-6,196.

The 20 cases that cite Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-669.07 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENState v. Michalski, 377 N.W.2d 510 (Neb. 1985).
cites § 39-669.07 33×subsections: (3) 8×cited by 45 cases
Where it cites § 39-669.07
“At issue in this case is the constitutionality of one of those statutes, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-669.07 (Reissue 1984).”
The case’s holding
Permanent revocation of a driver's license for repeat drunk driving offenses does not violate equal protection, due process, or the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
Later courts cite it for
“we have no difficulty concluding ... that drunk driving is a serious offense” · 1 citing court
2
GREENState v. Sundling, 538 N.W.2d 749 (Neb. 1995).
cites § 39-669.07 22×cited by 66 cases
Where it cites § 39-669.07
“§ 60-6 ,196 (Reissue 1993), claims that his two prior DUI convictions prosecuted under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-669.07 (Cum. Supps. 1990 & 1992) cannot be used to enhance the penalty for a DUI conviction under § 60-6,196.”
Later courts cite it for
“the simultaneous repeal and reenactment of substantially the same statutory, provisions is ordinarily construed to be an affirmation or continuation of the original provisions rather than a true repeal” · 1 citing court
3
GREENState v. Kubik, 456 N.W.2d 487 (Neb. 1990).
cites § 39-669.07 23×subsections: (2) 2×cited by 47 cases
Where it cites § 39-669.07
“Kubik, was convicted of driving under the influence of alcoholic liquor, third offense, in violation of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-669.07 (Supp. 1987).”
The case’s holding
Substantial delay between driving and testing may render breath alcohol results nonprobative of impairment, but the timing of the test generally affects the weight of evidence rather than admissibility.
Later courts cite it for
“in some cases, the delay may be so substantial as to render the test results non-probative of the accused's impairment or breath alcohol level while driving.” · 2 citing courts
4
YELLOWState v. Chapman, 287 N.W.2d 697 (Neb. 1980).
cites § 39-669.07 24×subsections: (3) 2×cited by 27 cases
Disapproved by State v. Abejide to a limited extent: 1 citing opinion limits it ("to the extent").
Where it cites § 39-669.07
“His position is that the Legislature has established a proportionate penalty for the operation of a motor vehicle by a person who is under the influence of alcoholic liquor, third offense.”
The case’s holding
Misdemeanor offenses that rise to felony status solely through repetition do not constitute felonies for the purpose of habitual criminal sentencing enhancement.
Later courts cite it for
“offenses which are felonies because the defendant has been previously convicted of the same crime do not constitute 'felonies' within the meaning of prior felonies that enhance penalties under the habitual criminal statute.” · 4 citing courts
5
GREENState v. Nelson, 759 N.W.2d 260 (Neb. 2009).
cites § 39-669.07 13×subsections: (2)(c) 7×cited by 36 cases
Where it cites § 39-669.07
“Nelson points to the provision of § 39-669.07 that the driver shall not drive for a period of 15 years "from the date ordered by the court and [the court] shall order that the operator's license .”
6
GREENState v. Golgert, 395 N.W.2d 520 (Neb. 1986).
cites § 39-669.07 15×cited by 71 cases
Where it cites § 39-669.07
“Golgert with violation of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-669.07 (Reissue 1984), which provides in part: It shall be unlawful for any person to operate or be in the actual physical control of any motor vehicle while under the influence of alcoholic liquor or of any drug or when that person…”
7
GREENState v. Havorka, 355 N.W.2d 343 (Neb. 1984).
cites § 39-669.07 16×subsections: (2) 6× (1) 2×cited by 38 cases
Where it cites § 39-669.07
“1982), raises the question of whether a trial court, when placing an individual on probation for second offense drunk driving pursuant to the provisions of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-669.07 (2) (Cum. Supp.”
8
GREENState v. Hoffman, 416 N.W.2d 231 (Neb. 1987).
cites § 39-669.07 14×cited by 50 cases
Where it cites § 39-669.07
“§ 28-306 (1) and (3) (Reissue 1985), a Class IV felony; and drunk driving, a violation of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-669.07 (Reissue 1984) and a misdemeanor.”
The case’s holding
The double jeopardy clause prohibits cumulative punishment for a greater offense and its lesser-included offense arising from the same act.
Later courts cite it for
“when an element of a crime involves existence of a defendant's mental process or other state of mind of an accused, such elements involve a question of fact and may be proved by circumstantial evidence.” · 11 citing courts
9
GREENState v. Wiltshire, 491 N.W.2d 324 (Neb. 1992).
cites § 39-669.07 11×subsections: (3) 6× (2)(b)cited by 79 cases
Where it cites § 39-669.07
“Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 39-669.07 (2)(c) and 39-669.”
The case’s holding
A defendant convicted of third-offense DWI is constitutionally entitled to a jury trial, and a prior conviction lacking a valid Boykin waiver is invalid and may be challenged in a separate proceeding.
Later courts cite it for
“petition for relief in a separate proceeding.” · 2 citing courts
10
GREENState v. Reichstein, 447 N.W.2d 635 (Neb. 1989).
cites § 39-669.07 18×subsections: (3) 2×cited by 26 cases
Where it cites § 39-669.07
“This is an appeal from the defendant-appellant’s conviction under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-669.07 (c) (Supp. 1987) of driving while his license was revoked pursuant to multiple convictions of driving while under the influence of alcohol.”
11
GREENState v. Ziemba, 346 N.W.2d 208 (Neb. 1984).
cites § 39-669.07 9×subsections: (3) 3×cited by 99 cases
Where it cites § 39-669.07
“” The district court further found that the defendant “was never advised of his right to present mitigating facts or object to the validity of the prior convictions” as required by Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-669.07 (Cum. Supp. 1982).”
The case’s holding
A checklist or docket entry by an authorized officer establishing a knowing and voluntary waiver of rights is sufficient to sustain a valid guilty plea.
Later courts cite it for
“the trial court is required to advise the defendant that he has a right to review the record of the prior conviction, bring mitigating facts to the attention of the court prior to sentencing, and object to the validity of the prior conviction as provided in 39-669.07.” · 2 citing courts
12
GREENState v. Tingle, 477 N.W.2d 544 (Neb. 1991).
cites § 39-669.07 10×subsections: (3) 2×cited by 58 cases
Where it cites § 39-669.07
“" Tingle was charged with DWI, second offense, a Class W misdemeanor under § 39-669.07. Her motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of her arrest was overruled.”
The case’s holding
A police officer of a second-class city lacks the authority to make a warrantless misdemeanor arrest outside their geographical jurisdiction absent specific statutory authorization.
13
GREENState v. Lynch, 394 N.W.2d 651 (Neb. 1986).
cites § 39-669.07 9×subsections: (3) 6×cited by 67 cases
Where it cites § 39-669.07
“It is true that under present state law, one convicted of second offense driving while intoxicated under the provisions of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-669.07 (2) (Cum. Supp.”
The case’s holding
A sentencing judge may properly base the rejection of probation on a defendant's presentence statements because probation is a sentence rather than a quasi-contract.
Later courts cite it for
“probation is a sentence and not part of a quasi-contract wherein the court offers something which the defendant is free to accept or reject.” · 2 citing courts
14
GREENState v. Burling, 400 N.W.2d 872 (Neb. 1987).
cites § 39-669.07 9×cited by 64 cases
Where it cites § 39-669.07
“Burling, was convicted of failing to stop at a clearly marked stop sign and of driving while under the influence of alcohol, first offense, in violation of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-669.07 (Reissue 1984).”
The case’s holding
The legislature cannot dictate the weight of evidence or declare it conclusive because determining probative value is a judicial function.
Later courts cite it for
“the legislature may not declare the weight to be given to evidence or what evidence shall be conclusive proof of an issue of fact ... whether evidence is of probative value is a legal question, and the legislature cannot impair judicial analysis and resolution of such question.” · 5 citing courts
15
GREENState v. Dake, 529 N.W.2d 46 (Neb. 1995).
cites § 39-669.07 9×subsections: (1) (1)(a) (1)(b)cited by 60 cases
Where it cites § 39-669.07
“Dake, was charged with violating then Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-669.07 (Cum. Supp. 1992) by driving while under the influence of alcoholic liquor or while *580 having an excessive concentration of alcohol in his blood, breath, or urine.”
The case’s holding
Police may not hamper a motorist's efforts to obtain independent chemical testing, but they have no duty to transport the motorist or otherwise assist beyond allowing telephone calls to secure the test.
Later courts cite it for
“while ... the police cannot hamper a motorist's efforts to obtain independent testing, they are under no duty to assist in obtaining such testing beyond allowing telephone calls to secure the test.” · 4 citing courts
16
GREENState v. Oliver, 434 N.W.2d 293 (Neb. 1989).
cites § 39-669.07 10×subsections: (3) 2×cited by 45 cases
Where it cites § 39-669.07
“With respect to the defendant's last assignment of error, the minimum sentence under Neb.Rev.Stat. § 39-669.07 (Cum. Supp.1986) for driving while under the influence of alcoholic liquor, third offense, if the defendant is not placed on probation, is imprisonment in the county…”
The case’s holding
To prove a prior conviction for enhancement purposes, the state need only show that the defendant had or waived counsel at the time of the prior conviction.
Later courts cite it for
“to prove a prior conviction for enhancement purposes, the state need only show that at the time of the prior conviction the defendant had, or waived, counsel.” · 5 citing courts
17
GREENState v. Donaldson, 452 N.W.2d 531 (Neb. 1990).
cites § 39-669.07 31×subsections: (4) 9× (2) 2×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 39-669.07
“Defendant was charged with violating subsection (1) or (4) of Neb.Rev.Stat. § 39-669.07 (Supp.1987). Section 39-669.”
18
GREENState v. Woodfork, 478 N.W.2d 248 (Neb. 1991).
cites § 39-669.07 12×subsections: (1) 2× (5) 2×cited by 22 cases
Where it cites § 39-669.07
“According to the complaint, the State intends to prove that Woodfork did "unlawfully operate a motor vehicle upon the streets and highways in said city, county, and state while his operator's license had been suspended, or revoked pursuant to Section 39-669.07 for life or for a…”
The case’s holding
A later prosecution is barred by double jeopardy only if the State must prove conduct constituting an offense already prosecuted to establish an essential element of the new charge.
19
GREENState v. Young, 530 N.W.2d 269 (Neb. Ct. App. 1995).
cites § 39-669.07 11×subsections: (1)(a) 2× (1)(c)cited by 26 cases
Where it cites § 39-669.07
“Young appeals his conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol in violation of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-669.07 (Cum. Supp. 1992).”
The case’s holding
Collateral estoppel does not require a criminal court to treat an administrative agency's license revocation determination as binding on the issues in the criminal case.
20
GREENState v. Crane, 480 N.W.2d 401 (Neb. 1992).
cites § 39-669.07 12×cited by 21 cases
Where it cites § 39-669.07
“Crane, committed the crimes of second-offense driving while under the influence of alcoholic liquor, in violation of Neb.Rev.Stat. § 39-669.07 (Reissue 1988); driving left of center, in violation of Neb.”
Later courts cite it for
“nebraska procedure lacks a method to judicially process a boykin or irish claim as an inquiry into the constitutional validity of a prior plea-based conviction used for enhancement of penalty and, hence, fails due process.” · 1 citing court

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
197419952017

One bar per year. Tallest: 24 cases in 1986. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Neb.207Neb. Ct. App.22D. Neb.2Haw. App.1SCOTUS1S.D.1Wash.1
By subsection
(1)7 cases
State v. Havorka, 355 N.W.2d 343 (Neb. 1984).“1982), raises the question of whether a trial court, when placing an individual on probation for second offense drunk driving pursuant to the provisions of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-669.07 (2) (Cum. Supp.”
State v. Woodfork, 478 N.W.2d 248 (Neb. 1991).“According to the complaint, the State intends to prove that Woodfork did "unlawfully operate a motor vehicle upon the streets and highways in said city, county, and state while his operator's license had been suspended, or revoked pursuant to Section 39-669.07 for life or for a…”
State v. Dake, 529 N.W.2d 46 (Neb. 1995).“Dake, was charged with violating then Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-669.07 (Cum. Supp. 1992) by driving while under the influence of alcoholic liquor or while *580 having an excessive concentration of alcohol in his blood, breath, or urine.”
Gausman v. Dep't of Motor Vehs., 522 N.W.2d 417 (Neb. 1994).
Dannehl v. Dep't of Motor Vehs., 529 N.W.2d 100 (Neb. Ct. App. 1995).
Showing the top 5 of 7. More in the list view →
(1)(a)5 cases
State v. Young, 530 N.W.2d 269 (Neb. Ct. App. 1995).“Young appeals his conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol in violation of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-669.07 (Cum. Supp. 1992).”
State v. Dake, 529 N.W.2d 46 (Neb. 1995).
State v. Rodgers, 509 N.W.2d 668 (Neb. Ct. App. 1993).
State v. Smith, 537 N.W.2d 539 (Neb. Ct. App. 1995).
State v. Nelson, 509 N.W.2d 232 (Neb. Ct. App. 1993).
(1)(b)1 case
State v. Dake, 529 N.W.2d 46 (Neb. 1995).
(1)(c)2 cases
State v. Young, 530 N.W.2d 269 (Neb. Ct. App. 1995).
State v. Rodgers, 509 N.W.2d 668 (Neb. Ct. App. 1993).
(2)10 cases
State v. Schulz, 378 N.W.2d 165 (Neb. 1985).
State v. Havorka, 355 N.W.2d 343 (Neb. 1984).
State v. Kubik, 456 N.W.2d 487 (Neb. 1990).“Kubik, was convicted of driving under the influence of alcoholic liquor, third offense, in violation of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-669.07 (Supp. 1987).”
State v. Young, 544 N.W.2d 808 (Neb. 1996).
Berumen v. Casady, 515 N.W.2d 816 (Neb. 1994).
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(2)(b)1 case
State v. Wiltshire, 491 N.W.2d 324 (Neb. 1992).“Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 39-669.07 (2)(c) and 39-669.”
(2)(c)5 cases
State v. Nelson, 759 N.W.2d 260 (Neb. 2009).“Nelson points to the provision of § 39-669.07 that the driver shall not drive for a period of 15 years "from the date ordered by the court and [the court] shall order that the operator's license .”
State v. Reimers, 496 N.W.2d 518 (Neb. 1993).
State v. Towler, 481 N.W.2d 151 (Neb. 1992).
State v. Seaman, 468 N.W.2d 121 (Neb. 1991).
State v. Flores, 767 N.W.2d 512 (Neb. Ct. App. 2009).
(3)21 cases
State v. Michalski, 377 N.W.2d 510 (Neb. 1985).“At issue in this case is the constitutionality of one of those statutes, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-669.07 (Reissue 1984).”
State v. Wiltshire, 491 N.W.2d 324 (Neb. 1992).
State v. Lynch, 394 N.W.2d 651 (Neb. 1986).“It is true that under present state law, one convicted of second offense driving while intoxicated under the provisions of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-669.07 (2) (Cum. Supp.”
State v. Ziemba, 346 N.W.2d 208 (Neb. 1984).“” The district court further found that the defendant “was never advised of his right to present mitigating facts or object to the validity of the prior convictions” as required by Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-669.07 (Cum. Supp. 1982).”
State v. Miller, 412 N.W.2d 849 (Neb. 1987).
Showing the top 5 of 21. More in the list view →
(4)2 cases
State v. Donaldson, 452 N.W.2d 531 (Neb. 1990).“Defendant was charged with violating subsection (1) or (4) of Neb.Rev.Stat. § 39-669.07 (Supp.1987). Section 39-669.”
Kalisek v. Abramson, 599 N.W.2d 834 (Neb. 1999).
(4)(c)2 cases
State v. Gerdes, 446 N.W.2d 224 (Neb. 1989).
State v. Snodgrass, 430 N.W.2d 55 (Neb. 1988).
(5)3 cases
State v. Woodfork, 478 N.W.2d 248 (Neb. 1991).
State v. Jones, 510 N.W.2d 404 (Neb. Ct. App. 1993).
State v. Lovejoy, 484 N.W.2d 451 (Neb. 1992).
(6)1 case
State v. Flores, 767 N.W.2d 512 (Neb. Ct. App. 2009).

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Enactment and amendments

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Versions

Edition shown: text as last checked Oct. 2026 (this copy records no edition or section history). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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