(1) Whenever it is charged in writing under oath or affirmation by or on behalf of a person or persons claiming to be aggrieved and such charge sets forth the facts upon which it is based that an employer, employment agency, or labor organization has engaged in an unlawful employment practice, the commission staff shall furnish such employer, employment agency, or labor organization with a copy of such charge within ten days, including a statement of the date, place, and circumstances of the alleged unlawful employment practice. Prior to initiating any investigation, the commission staff shall screen a charge pursuant to an established, clearly defined prescreening procedure to determine subject matter jurisdiction to handle such charge. Any charge without sufficient subject matter jurisdiction shall not be investigated and notice of such prescreening determination shall be promptly conveyed by the executive director to the person claiming to be aggrieved. When a charge is determined to be within the subject matter jurisdiction of the commission, the commission staff shall make an investigation of such charge, but such charge shall not be made public by the commission. If the executive director determines after such investigation that there is not reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true, the executive director shall dismiss the charge and promptly notify the person claiming to be aggrieved and the respondent of his or her action. If the executive director determines after such investigation that there is reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true, the commission shall endeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful employment practice and settle any claim by informal methods of conference, conciliation, persuasion, mediation, or arbitration. The settlement efforts shall be scheduled and completed within thirty days of the probable cause finding. Nothing said or done during and as a part of such endeavors may be made public by the commission without the written consent of the parties or used as evidence in a subsequent proceeding. Any officer or employee of the commission who makes public in any manner whatever any information in violation of this subsection shall be guilty of a Class III misdemeanor except as provided in subdivision (3) of section 48-1117.
(2) A written charge of violation of the Nebraska Fair Employment Practice Act shall be filed within three hundred days after the occurrence of the alleged unlawful employment practice and notice of the charge, including a statement of the date, place, and circumstances of the alleged unlawful employment practice, shall be served upon the person against whom such charge is made within ten days thereafter.
(3) A respondent shall be required to file with the commission a written response to the written charge of violation within thirty days after service upon the respondent. Failure to file a written response within thirty days, except for good cause shown, shall result in a mandatory reasonable cause finding against the respondent by the executive director. Failure by any complainant to cooperate with the commission, its investigators, or staff, except for good cause shown, shall result in dismissal of the complaint by the executive director.
(4) In connection with any investigation of a charge filed under this section, the commission or its authorized agents may, at any time after a charge is filed, issue or cause to be served interrogatories and shall have at all reasonable times access to, for the purposes of examination, and the right to copy any evidence or records of any person being investigated or proceeded against that relate to unlawful employment practices covered by the act and are relevant to the charge under investigation. The commission may seek preparation of and judicial enforcement of any legal process or interrogatories through the office of the Attorney General.
Notes of Decisions
Adkins v. Burlington N. Santa Fe R.R., 615 N.W.2d 469 (Neb. 2000).
· cites it 25× “The district court reasoned: Section 48-1118 is on its face the more specific statute, with a special statute of limitations for employment discrimination claims.”
Wendeln v. the Beatrice Manor, Inc., 712 N.W.2d 226 (Neb. 2006).
· cites it 5× “On April 5, 2004, Beatrice Manor, pursuant to leave granted by the court, filed an amended answer alleging for the first time that Wendeln’s claims were barred by the 300-day statute of limitations period set forth in § 48-1118(2). The court granted a motion by Wendeln to…”
Hassler v. Alegent Health, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1108 (D. Neb. 2002).
· cites it 6× “) Under section 48-1118(1), if the executive director of the NEOC “determines after .”
Sidak v. Pinnacle Telemarketing Ltd., 182 F. Supp. 2d 873 (D. Neb. 2002).
· cites it 4× “, a dismissal based upon a finding “that there is not reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true,” see Neb.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 48-1118(1) (Michie 1995)), will bar suit.”
DeBose v. State, 672 N.W.2d 426 (Neb. 2003).
“On September 17, 2001, the appellants filed a “Plaintiff[s’] Motion for New Trial and Reconsideration.”
Reyes v. Pharma Chemie, Inc., 890 F. Supp. 2d 1147 (D. Neb. 2012).
· cites it 2× “Neb.Rev.Stat. § 48-1118(1). When PCI actually received notice of Cortez's charge is not clear, but the timing is relevant to Reyes' retaliation claim.”
Zalkins Peerless Wip. v. NEB. EQUAL. OPP. COM'N, 348 N.W.2d 846 (Neb. 1984).
“Upon the filing of an individual complaint of discrimination with the Commission, the Commission is required by § 48-1118(1) to furnish such employer, employment agency, or labor organization with a copy of such charge within ten days .”
Leiting v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 117 F. Supp. 2d 950 (D. Neb. 2000).
· cites it 2× “The Nebraska Supreme Court has recently ruled that the applicable statute of limitations for bringing suit on FEPA claims pursuant to § 20-148 is “three hundred days after the occurrence of the alleged unlawful employment practice,” as provided in Neb.Rev.Stat. § 48-1118. See…”
Metcalf v. Omaha Steel Castings Co., 476 F. Supp. 870 (D. Neb. 1979).
· cites it 2× “Omaha Public School District, supra. In that case, the defendant argued that the appropriate statute of limitations for a § 1981 action is the NFEA period within which a claim must be brought before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.”
Williams v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 366 N.W.2d 132 (Neb. 1985).
· cites it 2× “§§ 48-1101 to 48-1125 (Reissue 1984), specifically § 48-1118. Following a hearing before the Nebraska Equal Opportunity Commission (NEOC) that the employer was not guilty of any employment discrimination, the plaintiff appealed to the district court, which affirmed the action of…”
— Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-1118(1) — 6 cases
Hassler v. Alegent Health, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1108 (D. Neb. 2002).
“) Under section 48-1118(1), if the executive director of the NEOC “determines after .”
Reyes v. Pharma Chemie, Inc., 890 F. Supp. 2d 1147 (D. Neb. 2012).
“Neb.Rev.Stat. § 48-1118(1). When PCI actually received notice of Cortez's charge is not clear, but the timing is relevant to Reyes' retaliation claim.”
Zalkins Peerless Wip. v. NEB. EQUAL. OPP. COM'N, 348 N.W.2d 846 (Neb. 1984).
“Upon the filing of an individual complaint of discrimination with the Commission, the Commission is required by § 48-1118(1) to furnish such employer, employment agency, or labor organization with a copy of such charge within ten days .”
Sidak v. Pinnacle Telemarketing Ltd., 182 F. Supp. 2d 873 (D. Neb. 2002).
“, a dismissal based upon a finding “that there is not reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true,” see Neb.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 48-1118(1) (Michie 1995)), will bar suit.”
Adkins v. Burlington N. Santa Fe R.R., 615 N.W.2d 469 (Neb. 2000).
“The district court reasoned: Section 48-1118 is on its face the more specific statute, with a special statute of limitations for employment discrimination claims.”
— Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-1118(2) — 8 cases
Adkins v. Burlington N. Santa Fe R.R., 615 N.W.2d 469 (Neb. 2000).
“The district court reasoned: Section 48-1118 is on its face the more specific statute, with a special statute of limitations for employment discrimination claims.”
Wendeln v. the Beatrice Manor, Inc., 712 N.W.2d 226 (Neb. 2006).
“On April 5, 2004, Beatrice Manor, pursuant to leave granted by the court, filed an amended answer alleging for the first time that Wendeln’s claims were barred by the 300-day statute of limitations period set forth in § 48-1118(2). The court granted a motion by Wendeln to…”
Hassler v. Alegent Health, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1108 (D. Neb. 2002).
“) Under section 48-1118(1), if the executive director of the NEOC “determines after .”
DeBose v. State, 672 N.W.2d 426 (Neb. 2003).
“On September 17, 2001, the appellants filed a “Plaintiff[s’] Motion for New Trial and Reconsideration.”
Sidak v. Pinnacle Telemarketing Ltd., 182 F. Supp. 2d 873 (D. Neb. 2002).
“, a dismissal based upon a finding “that there is not reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true,” see Neb.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 48-1118(1) (Michie 1995)), will bar suit.”
— Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-1118(3) — 2 cases
Adkins v. Burlington N. Santa Fe R.R., 615 N.W.2d 469 (Neb. 2000).
“The district court reasoned: Section 48-1118 is on its face the more specific statute, with a special statute of limitations for employment discrimination claims.”
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