Every deed acknowledged or proved, and certified by any of the officers named in sections 76-217, 76-219, 76-220, 76-226 and 76-227, and authorized to take acknowledgments, including the certificate specified in section 76-242, whenever such certificate is required by law, may be read in evidence without further proof, and shall be entitled to be recorded. The record of a deed duly recorded, or a transcript thereof duly certified, may also be read in evidence with the like force and effect as the original deed, whenever by the party's oath or otherwise the original is known to be lost, or not belonging to the party wishing to use the same, nor within his control. Neither the certificate of the acknowledgment or the proof of any deed, nor the record or transcript of the record of such deed, shall be conclusive, but may be rebutted, and the force and effect thereof may be contested by any party affected thereby. If the party contesting the proof of a deed shall make it appear that such proof was taken upon the oath of an interested or incompetent witness, neither such deed nor the record thereof shall be received in evidence until established by other competent proof.
Notes of Decisions
Penn Mut. Life Ins. v. Katz, 297 N.W. 899 (Neb. 1941).
· cites it 6× “Section 76-235, Comp. St. 1929, provides: “In the absence of stipulations to the contrary, the mortgagor of real estate retains the legal title and right of possession thereof.”
Hoff v. Ajlouny, 703 N.W.2d 645 (Neb. Ct. App. 2005).
· cites it 4× “Ajlouny’s argument relies on Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-235 (Reissue 2003), which states: Every deed acknowledged or proved, and certified by any of the officers named in sections 76-217, 76-219, 76-220, 76-226 and 76-227, and authorized to take acknowledg ments, including the…”
Nat'l Bank of Com. Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. Rhodes, 295 N.W.2d 711 (Neb. 1980).
· cites it 3× “The origin of the second page is not shown in the record but it is clear that it was originally the lower portion of some other document, the top portion having been removed.”
Pierce v. Fontenelle, 55 N.W.2d 658 (Neb. 1952).
· cites it 2× “Whaley, supra, and section 76-235, R. R. S. 1943, there was ample competent evidence that the instrument, in form a warranty deed and admissible in evidence, was executed and delivered to grantee for valuable consideration.”
Hanika v. Rawley, 368 N.W.2d 32 (Neb. 1985).
· cites it 2× “Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-235 (Reissue 1981). That issue was not decided by the trial court and will not be considered by us as it is unnecessary to our resolution of the dispute.”
Hanks v. Nw. State Bank, 9 N.W.2d 175 (Neb. 1943).
· cites it 2× “1929, provides in part as follows: “Every deed conveying real estate, which, by any other' instrument in writing, shall appear to have been intended only as security *211 in the nature of a mortgage, though it be an absolute conveyance in terms, shall be considered as a…”
In Re Schoenleber, 13 F. Supp. 375 (D. Neb. 1936).
“1929, § 76-235; Orr v. Broad, 52 Neb. 490 , 72 N.”
Nat'l Bank of Com. Trust v. Rhodes, 295 N.W.2d 711 (Neb. 1980).
· cites it 3× “The origin of the second page is not shown in the record but it is clear that it was originally the lower portion of some other document, the top portion having been removed.”
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