Nebraska Revised Statutes
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-251 (2026)
Deed intended as mortgage; recording; effect
✓ current as of July 2026
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Every deed conveying real estate, which, by any other instrument in writing, shall appear to have been intended only as a security in the nature of a mortgage, though it be an absolute conveyance in terms, shall be considered as a mortgage. The person for whose benefit such deed shall be made shall not derive any advantage from the recording thereof, unless every writing operating as a defeasance, or explaining its effect as a mortgage, or conditional deed, is also recorded therewith and at the same time.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 9
cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1956–2022 · leading case: Humphrey v. Smith, 974 N.W.2d 293 (Neb. 2022).
Humphrey v. Smith, 974 N.W.2d 293 (Neb. 2022). “§ 76-251 (Reissue 2018) states in part that “[e]very deed conveying real estate, which, by any other instrument in writing, shall appear to have been intended only as a security in the nature of a mortgage, though it be an absolute convey- ance in terms, shall be considered as a…”
Campbell v. Ohio Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 74 N.W.2d 546 (Neb. 1956). “Section 76-251, R. R. S. 1943, provides: “Every deed conveying real estate, which, by any other instrument in writing, shall appear to have been intended only as a security in the nature of a mortgage, though it be an absolute conveyance in terms, shall be considered as a…”
Blair Co. v. Am. Sav. Co., 169 N.W.2d 292 (Neb. 1969). “The plaintiff suggests section 76-251, R. R. S. 1943, which provides as follows, as a section in conflict with the Nebraska Trust Deeds Act: “Every deed conveying real estate, which, by any other instrument in writing, shall appear to have been intended only as a security in the…”
Koehn v. Koehn, 81 N.W.2d 900 (Neb. 1957). “Section 76-251, R. R. S. 1943, provides: “Every deed conveying real estate, which, by any other instrument in writing, shall appear to have been intended only as a security in the nature of a mortgage, though it be an absolute conveyance in terms, shall be considered as a…”
Mackiewicz v. J.J. & Assocs., 514 N.W.2d 613 (Neb. 1994). “We reasoned that because the evidence showed that the papers were intended by the parties to be, and were in fact, parts of the same transaction, the mortgage must, in legal effect, be regarded as having been executed and delivered simultaneously with the deed of purchase.”
Ehlers v. Vinal, 253 F. Supp. 58 (D. Neb. 1966). “Section 76-251 of the Nebraska Revised Statutes, 1943, provides: “Deed intended as mortgage; recording; effect.”
Travelers Ins. v. Nelson, 546 N.W.2d 333 (Neb. Ct. App. 1996). “In answering the question of whether a trust deed is treated like a mortgage, we first quote Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-251 (Reissue 1990), which provides: Every deed conveying real estate, which, by any other instrument in writing, shall appear to have been intended only as a…”
Mackiewicz v. Jj & Assocs., 514 N.W.2d 613 (Neb. 1994). “We reasoned that because the evidence showed that the papers were intended by the parties to be, and were in fact, parts of the same transaction, the mortgage must, in legal effect, be regarded as having been executed and delivered simultaneously with the deed of purchase.”
Prop. Ventures, LLC (Bankr. D. Neb. 2020). “§ 76-251 (construing deeds intended only as security as a mortgage); Id § 30- 2209(27) (“Mortgage means any conveyance, agreement, or arrangement in which property is used as security.”
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