Nebraska Revised Statutes
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-701 (2026)
Terms, defined
✓ current as of July 2026
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For purposes of sections 76-701 to 76-726:
(1) Condemner means any legal entity that by law has been granted the right to exercise the power of eminent domain and includes the state and any governmental or political subdivision thereof;
(2) Condemnee means any person, partnership, limited liability company, corporation, or association owning or having an encumbrance on any interest in property that is sought to be acquired by a condemner or in possession of or occupying any such property;
(3) Property means any such interest in real or personal property as the condemner is empowered by law to acquire for public use; and
(4) County judge means the county judge of the county where condemnation proceedings provided by such sections are had.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 21
cases, 1953–2017 · leading case: Simon v. City of Omaha, 677 N.W.2d 129 (Neb. 2004).
Simon v. City of Omaha, 677 N.W.2d 129 (Neb. 2004). “§§ 1983 and 1988 (2000); (2) the Nebraska eminent domain statutes, see Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-701 et seq. (Reissue 2003); and (3) the common fund doctrine.”
Hike v. State, 297 Neb. 212 (Neb. 2017). “’”33 Accordingly, we considered which of two general statutes of limitations should govern inverse condemnation actions.”
In Re 2007 Admin. of Appropriations, 768 N.W.2d 420 (Neb. 2009). “See, generally, Neb.Rev.Stat. §§ 76-701 to 76-726 (Reissue 2003 & Cum.”
Wooden v. Cnty. of Douglas, 751 N.W.2d 151 (Neb. 2008). “[13] Neb.Rev.Stat. §§ 76-701 to 76-726 (Reissue 2003 & Cum.”
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Chaulk, 631 N.W.2d 131 (Neb. 2001). “The district court concluded that although BNSF possessed the requisite statutory authority to condemn property under Nebraska’s eminent domain statutes, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-701 et seq. (Reissue 1996 & Supp.”
Krambeck v. City of Gretna, 254 N.W.2d 691 (Neb. 1977). “The eminent domain statutes, sections 76-701 et seq., R. R. S. 1943, do not provide a special statute of limitations.”
Rose v. City of Lincoln, 449 N.W.2d 522 (Neb. 1989). “See Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 76-701 et seq. (Reissue 1986).”
Parriott v. Drainage Dist. No. 6 of Peru, 410 N.W.2d 97 (Neb. 1987). “When private property has been damaged for public use, alleged as in the case at bar, the property owners are entitled to seek damages in a number of ways.”
Jensen v. Omaha Pub. Power Dist., 66 N.W.2d 591 (Neb. 1954). “These proceedings were brought in accordance with sections 76-701 to 76-724, R. S. Supp., 1953.”
Slusarski v. Cnty. of Platte, 416 N.W.2d 213 (Neb. 1987). “We observed that when a political subdivision with the power of eminent domain damages property for a public use, the property owner may seek damages in an action for tort, in an action for inverse condemnation under the provisions of Neb.”
Danish Vennerforning & Old Peoples Home v. State, 290 N.W.2d 791 (Neb. 1980). “The State maintains that the property owner is not entitled to interest because the action was not brought pursuant to the eminent domain statutes, sections 76-701 to 76-725, R. R. S. 1943.”
Blanchard v. City of Ralston, 549 N.W.2d 652 (Neb. Ct. App. 1996). “Blanchard alleged that the actions of the city constituted a taking entitling her to damages under the theory of inverse condemnation pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-701 et seq. (Reissue 1990) and Neb.”
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