No employer or prospective employer may require as a condition of employment or as a condition for continued employment that a person submit to a truth and deception examination unless such employment involves public law enforcement. This shall not be construed to prohibit such employer from asking an employee or applicant to submit to a truth and deception examination if:
(1) No questions are asked during the truth and deception examination concerning the examinee's sexual practices, labor union, political or religious affiliations, or marital relationships;
(2) The examinee is given written and oral notice that the examination is voluntary and that the examinee may discontinue the examination at any time;
(3) The employer or prospective employer has the employee or applicant sign a form stating that the examination is being taken voluntarily;
(4) Questions that are asked prospective employees are job related;
(5) Prospective employees are not preselected for a truth and deception examination in a discriminatory manner;
(6) An employee is only requested to submit to a truth and deception examination if such examination concerns itself with a specific investigation;
(7) The results of a truth and deception examination are not the sole determinant in the termination of employment; and
(8) All questions that are asked during a truth and deception examination and the responses of the examinee are kept on file by the employer for a period of one year.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
9
cases, 1981–2007 · leading case:
White v. State, 540 N.W.2d 354 (Neb. 1995).
White v. State, 540 N.W.2d 354 (Neb. 1995).
· cites it 22× “State law, specifically, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 81-1932 (Reissue 1994), outlaws mandatory polygraph tests in employment situations, but an exception is made for those involved in public law enforcement.”
Trosper v. Bag 'N Save, 734 N.W.2d 704 (Neb. 2007).
· cites it 8× “Baker's Supermarkets, [39] where we held that an employee's demotion did not violate Neb. Rev. Stat. § 81-1932 (Reissue 1999).”
Ambroz v. Cornhusker Square Ltd., 416 N.W.2d 510 (Neb. 1987).
· cites it 10× “The question presented in this case is whether an employee, whose contract of employment is a hiring at will, has a cause of action against his employer who terminates the employment in violation of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 81-1932 (Reissue 1981) because the employee refused to submit…”
Schriner v. Meginnis Ford Co., 421 N.W.2d 755 (Neb. 1988).
· cites it 4× “Section 81-1932 of the act provides, among other things, that, with an exception not relevant to the facts in Ambroz , no employer may require as a condition of continued employment that a person submit to a truth and deception examination.”
Collins v. Baker's Supermarkets, Inc., 389 N.W.2d 774 (Neb. 1986).
· cites it 7× “The remaining cause of action alleged that Collins was wrongfully discharged by Baker’s after taking a lie detector test, in violation of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 81-1932 (7) (Reissue 1981), in that Collins was required to work for a lesser salary as a store clerk rather than at his…”
Malone v. Am. Bus. Info., 634 N.W.2d 788 (Neb. 2001).
· cites it 2× “Although we recognized the general rule that in the absence of contractual or statutory restrictions, an employer could discharge an at-will employee for any reason without incurring liability, we determined that an exception to the rule was created by Neb. Rev. Stat. § 81-1932…”
Ramirez v. City of Omaha, 538 F. Supp. 7 (D. Neb. 1981).
“§ 81-1932 (Cum.Supp.1980). 12 . Plaintiffs originally alleged that the individual defendants were also accountable under Title VII.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.