NRS
201.300 Pandering and sex trafficking: Definitions; penalties;
exception.
1. A person who without physical force or
the immediate threat of physical force, induces an adult to unlawfully become a
prostitute or to continue to engage in prostitution, or to enter any place
within this State in which prostitution is practiced, encouraged or allowed for
the purpose of sexual conduct or prostitution is guilty of pandering which is a
category C felony and shall be punished as provided in NRS 193.130. This subsection does not apply
to the customer of a prostitute.
2. A person:
(a) Is guilty of sex trafficking if the person:
(1) Induces, causes, recruits, harbors,
transports, provides, obtains or maintains a child to engage in prostitution,
or to enter any place within this State in which prostitution is practiced,
encouraged or allowed for the purpose of sexual conduct or prostitution;
(2) Induces, recruits, harbors,
transports, provides, obtains or maintains a person by any means, knowing, or
in reckless disregard of the fact, that threats, violence, force, intimidation,
fraud, duress or coercion will be used to cause the person to engage in
prostitution, or to enter any place within this State in which prostitution is
practiced, encouraged or allowed for the purpose of sexual conduct or
prostitution;
(3) By threats, violence, force,
intimidation, fraud, duress, coercion, by any device or scheme, or by abuse of
any position of confidence or authority, or having legal charge, takes, places,
harbors, induces, causes, compels or procures a person to engage in prostitution,
or to enter any place within this State in which prostitution is practiced,
encouraged or allowed for the purpose of sexual conduct or prostitution;
(4) Takes or detains a person with the
intent to compel the person by force, violence, threats or duress to marry him
or her or any other person; or
(5) Receives anything of value with the
specific intent of facilitating a violation of this paragraph.
(b) Who is found guilty of sex trafficking:
(1) An adult is guilty of a category B
felony and shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for a minimum
term of not less than 3 years and a maximum term of not more than 10 years, and
may be further punished by a fine of not more than $10,000.
(2) A child:
(I) If the child is less than 14
years of age when the offense is committed, is guilty of a category A felony
and shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life with the possibility
of parole, with eligibility for parole beginning when a minimum of 15 years has
been served, and may be further punished by a fine of not more than $20,000.
(II) If the child is at least 14
years of age but less than 16 years of age when the offense is committed, is
guilty of a category A felony and shall be punished by imprisonment in the
state prison for life with the possibility of parole, with eligibility for
parole beginning when a minimum of 10 years has been served, and may be further
punished by a fine of not more than $10,000.
(III) If the child is at least 16
years of age but less than 18 years of age when the offense is committed, is
guilty of a category A felony and shall be punished by imprisonment in the
state prison for life with the possibility of parole, with eligibility for
parole beginning when a minimum of 5 years has been served, and may be further
punished by a fine of not more than $10,000.
3. A court shall not grant probation to or
suspend the sentence of a person convicted of sex trafficking a child pursuant to
subsection 2.
4. Consent of a victim of pandering or sex
trafficking to an act of prostitution is not a defense to a prosecution for any
of the acts prohibited by this section.
5. In a prosecution for sex trafficking a
child pursuant to subsection 2, it is not a defense that the defendant did not
have knowledge of the victim’s age, nor is reasonable mistake of age a valid
defense to a prosecution conducted pursuant to subsection 2.
[1:233:1913; 1919 RL p. 3379; NCL § 10537]—(NRS A 1959,
7; 1967,
477; 1977,
1054; 1979,
1430; 1995,
1201; 1997,
295; 2013,
2430; 2019,
796)
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
24
cases (
8 in the last 5 years), 1970–2025 · leading case:
Ford v. State, 262 P.3d 1123 (Nev. 2011).
Ford v. State, 262 P.3d 1123 (Nev. 2011).
· cites it 53× “After this court reversed a pandering conviction under NRS 201.300, holding that one police officer could not corroborate another’s testimony, Sheriff v.”
Shults v. State, 616 P.2d 388 (Nev. 1980).
“We have recently held that, in a pandering prosecution under NRS 201.300, “[witnesses whose testimony requires corroboration may not corroborate each other.”
Princess Sea Indus. v. STATE, CLARK CTY., 635 P.2d 281 (Nev. 1981).
· cites it 2× “[6] Moreover, some of the advertisements preserved in the record on appeal have the potential of enticing persons under 21 years of age to visit or become employed as prostitutes in contravention of NRS 201.300 and 201.360(1)(g). Also noteworthy is the fact that the ads refer to…”
Sheriff v. Hilliard, 608 P.2d 1111 (Nev. 1980).
· cites it 2× “*346 OPINION Per Curiam: The Clark County Grand Jury returned an indictment charging Leon Hilliard with pandering, a felony under NRS 201.300. 1 Hilliard subsequently petitioned the district court for a writ of habeas corpus contending that the indictment was not supported by…”
Sheriff v. Gordon, 606 P.2d 533 (Nev. 1980).
· cites it 2× “See NRS 201.300. 1 Gordon subsequently petitioned the district *206 court for a writ of habeas corpus contending, among other things, that the indictment was not supported by sufficient evidence because the incriminating testimony lacked required corroboration.”
Stanifer v. State, 849 P.2d 282 (Nev. 1993).
“NRS 201.300(l)(a). Although NRS 201.354 3 is unclear as to what constitutes solicitation for prostitution, the Clark County ordinance proscribing solicitation specifically includes agreeing to “afford an opportunity to commit an act of prostitution.”
Belcher (Kevin) v. State (Nev. 2022).
· cites it 18× “3d 1123, 1126-27 (2011) (holding that pandering under NRS 201.300 is a specific intent crime). A victim's testimony is enough to support a conviction for sex trafficking under NRS 201.”
Sheriff, Clark Cnty. v. Horner, 608 P.2d 1106 (Nev. 1980).
· cites it 2× “NRS 201.300 1 and NRS 201.320. 2 Horner subsequently petitioned the district court for a writ of habeas corpus contending that the indictment was not supported by sufficient evidence because, among other things, the incriminating testimony lacked required corroboration.”
Fan v. Jiang (D. Nev. 2025).
· cites it 10× “) Fan does not specifically respond to Jiang’s statute of limitations 15 argument as to this claim, but counters that a commercial sex act under NRS § 201.300 16 includes sex in exchange for anything of value.”
Miguel v. Howell (D. Nev. 2025).
· cites it 4× “” NRS § 201.300(1)(a), as amended by 1997 Laws, p.”
Unknown, 598 F.3d 592.
· cites it 2× “Nev.Rev.Stat. § 201.300; see also Nev.Rev.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 201.300(1) — 3 cases
Ford v. State, 262 P.3d 1123 (Nev. 2011).
“After this court reversed a pandering conviction under NRS 201.300, holding that one police officer could not corroborate another’s testimony, Sheriff v.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 201.300(1)(a) — 2 cases
Miguel v. Howell (D. Nev. 2025).
“” NRS § 201.300(1)(a), as amended by 1997 Laws, p.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 201.300(2) — 1 case
Belcher (Kevin) v. State (Nev. 2022).
“3d 1123, 1126-27 (2011) (holding that pandering under NRS 201.300 is a specific intent crime). A victim's testimony is enough to support a conviction for sex trafficking under NRS 201.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 201.300(2)(a)(1) — 2 cases
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 201.300(4) — 1 case
Belcher (Kevin) v. State (Nev. 2022).
“3d 1123, 1126-27 (2011) (holding that pandering under NRS 201.300 is a specific intent crime). A victim's testimony is enough to support a conviction for sex trafficking under NRS 201.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 201.300(a)(1) — 1 case
Ford v. State, 262 P.3d 1123 (Nev. 2011).
“After this court reversed a pandering conviction under NRS 201.300, holding that one police officer could not corroborate another’s testimony, Sheriff v.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 201.300(l)(a) — 2 cases
Ford v. State, 262 P.3d 1123 (Nev. 2011).
“After this court reversed a pandering conviction under NRS 201.300, holding that one police officer could not corroborate another’s testimony, Sheriff v.”
Stanifer v. State, 849 P.2d 282 (Nev. 1993).
“NRS 201.300(l)(a). Although NRS 201.354 3 is unclear as to what constitutes solicitation for prostitution, the Clark County ordinance proscribing solicitation specifically includes agreeing to “afford an opportunity to commit an act of prostitution.”
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