NRS
37.175 Interest paid by plaintiff; posttrial hearing to determine award
of interest.
1. Except as otherwise provided in this
section, the plaintiff shall pay interest on the final judgment on the
difference between the amount deposited pursuant to NRS 37.100 or 37.170 and the sum of the amount awarded
for the taking and any damages awarded for the severance of the property,
excluding costs and attorney’s fees, from the date ordered by the district
court pursuant to paragraph (a) of subsection 4 until the date the judgment is
satisfied, at the rate provided in paragraph (b) of subsection 4.
2. The plaintiff is not required to pay
interest on any amount deposited pursuant to the provisions of NRS 37.100 or 37.170.
3. No interest is required to be paid for
the period from the date of a trial which is continued past 2 years after the
date of the first service of the summons, until the date of entry of judgment,
if the continuance was caused primarily by the defendant or, if there is more
than one defendant, the total delay caused by all the defendants. As used in
this subsection, “primarily” means the greater amount, quantity or quality of
acts of the plaintiff or the defendant or, if there is more than one defendant,
the total delay caused by all defendants, that would cause the trial to be
continued past 2 years after the date of the first service of the summons.
4. The court shall determine, in a
posttrial hearing, the award of interest and award as interest the amount of
money which will put the person from whom the property is taken in as good a
position monetarily as if the property had not been taken. The district court
shall enter an order concerning:
(a) The date on which the computation of interest
will commence;
(b) The rate of interest to be used to compute
the award of interest, which must not be less than the prime rate of interest
plus 2 percent; and
(c) Whether the interest will be compounded
annually.
(Added to NRS by 1960,
421; A 1967,
816; 1979,
830; 1981,
1859; 1987,
940; 1991,
1642; 1999,
3534; 2007,
336)
Notes of Decisions
Cnty. of Clark v. Alper, 685 P.2d 943 (Nev. 1984).
· cites it 8× “The district court allowed prejudgment interest from the date of taking at seven percent per annum under NRS 37.175. The court below nevertheless refused to amend the judgment to conform with the 1979 and 1981 amendments to NRS 37.”
State Ex Rel. Dep't of Transp. v. Barsy, 941 P.2d 971 (Nev. 1997).
· cites it 7× “The district court entered a judgment of condemnation in the amount awarded by the jury, plus an additional amount for prejudgment interest pursuant to NRS 37.175. The district court subsequently amended the prejudgment interest rate, finding that the statutory rate unreasonably…”
City of Sparks v. Armstrong, 748 P.2d 7 (Nev. 1987).
· cites it 3× “Although the trial court’s award was properly within the ambit of the NRS 37.175 mandate, 1 it was insufficient to meet the *623 constitutional requirements of “just compensation.”
Manke v. Airport Auth. of Washoe Cnty., 710 P.2d 80 (Nev. 1985).
“6 If the condemned property is neither vacant, nor unimproved, nor of value to the condemnee for purposes of investment or development, the condemnee is only entitled to interest pursuant to NRS 37.175(2). A condemnee is entitled to interest from the date of the service of…”
Wilson v. Pac. Maxon, Inc., 714 P.2d 1001 (Nev. 1986).
“130, providing for interest on judgments when interest is not otherwise provided by contract or law; NRS 37.175, providing for interest in eminent domain actions; NRS 99.”
City of N. Las Vegas v. 5th & Centennial, 2014 NV 66 (Nev. 2014).
· cites it 12× “2d 7 (1987), because Armstrong applied a former version of NRS 37.175. We disagree. In Manke, the Airport Authority of Washoe County filed and served a summons and complaint to condemn the Mankes' property, which consisted of 4.”
City of N. Las Vegas v. 5th & Centennial, 2014 NV 66 (Nev. 2014).
· cites it 10× “2d 7 (1987), because Armstrong applied a former version of NRS 37.175. We disagree. In Manke, the Airport Authority of Washoe County filed and served a summons and complaint to condemn the Mankes' property, which consisted of 4.”
City of N. Las Vegas v. 5th & Centennial, 2014 NV 66 (Nev. 2014).
· cites it 10× “2d 7 (1987), because Armstrong applied a former version of NRS 37.175. We disagree. In Manke, the Airport Authority of Washoe County filed and served a summons and complaint to condemn the Mankes' property, which consisted of 4.”
Lia Arnold Roberts Revocable Trust v. Cnty. of Clark, 942 P.2d 133 (Nev. 1997).
· cites it 8× “Therefore, we reverse that portion of the district court’s judgment pertaining to prejudgment interest and remand based upon that recent decision. FACTS On September 23, 1991, Clark County brought an eminent domain action against Roberts seeking a .”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 37.175(1) — 1 case
State Ex Rel. Dep't of Transp. v. Barsy, 941 P.2d 971 (Nev. 1997).
“The district court entered a judgment of condemnation in the amount awarded by the jury, plus an additional amount for prejudgment interest pursuant to NRS 37.175. The district court subsequently amended the prejudgment interest rate, finding that the statutory rate unreasonably…”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 37.175(2) — 5 cases
City of Sparks v. Armstrong, 748 P.2d 7 (Nev. 1987).
“Although the trial court’s award was properly within the ambit of the NRS 37.175 mandate, 1 it was insufficient to meet the *623 constitutional requirements of “just compensation.”
Manke v. Airport Auth. of Washoe Cnty., 710 P.2d 80 (Nev. 1985).
“6 If the condemned property is neither vacant, nor unimproved, nor of value to the condemnee for purposes of investment or development, the condemnee is only entitled to interest pursuant to NRS 37.175(2). A condemnee is entitled to interest from the date of the service of…”
City of N. Las Vegas v. 5th & Centennial, 2014 NV 66 (Nev. 2014).
“2d 7 (1987), because Armstrong applied a former version of NRS 37.175. We disagree. In Manke, the Airport Authority of Washoe County filed and served a summons and complaint to condemn the Mankes' property, which consisted of 4.”
City of N. Las Vegas v. 5th & Centennial, 2014 NV 66 (Nev. 2014).
“2d 7 (1987), because Armstrong applied a former version of NRS 37.175. We disagree. In Manke, the Airport Authority of Washoe County filed and served a summons and complaint to condemn the Mankes' property, which consisted of 4.”
City of N. Las Vegas v. 5th & Centennial, 2014 NV 66 (Nev. 2014).
“2d 7 (1987), because Armstrong applied a former version of NRS 37.175. We disagree. In Manke, the Airport Authority of Washoe County filed and served a summons and complaint to condemn the Mankes' property, which consisted of 4.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 37.175(4) — 3 cases
City of N. Las Vegas v. 5th & Centennial, 2014 NV 66 (Nev. 2014).
“2d 7 (1987), because Armstrong applied a former version of NRS 37.175. We disagree. In Manke, the Airport Authority of Washoe County filed and served a summons and complaint to condemn the Mankes' property, which consisted of 4.”
City of N. Las Vegas v. 5th & Centennial, 2014 NV 66 (Nev. 2014).
“2d 7 (1987), because Armstrong applied a former version of NRS 37.175. We disagree. In Manke, the Airport Authority of Washoe County filed and served a summons and complaint to condemn the Mankes' property, which consisted of 4.”
City of N. Las Vegas v. 5th & Centennial, 2014 NV 66 (Nev. 2014).
“2d 7 (1987), because Armstrong applied a former version of NRS 37.175. We disagree. In Manke, the Airport Authority of Washoe County filed and served a summons and complaint to condemn the Mankes' property, which consisted of 4.”
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