NRS
40.495 Waiver of rights; separate action to enforce obligation;
limitation on amount of judgment; available defenses.
1. The provisions of NRS 40.475 and 40.485 may be waived by the guarantor,
surety or other obligor only after default.
2. Except as otherwise provided in
subsection 5, a guarantor, surety or other obligor, other than the mortgagor or
grantor of a deed of trust, may waive the provisions of NRS 40.430. If a guarantor, surety or other
obligor waives the provisions of NRS 40.430,
an action for the enforcement of that person’s obligation to pay, satisfy or
purchase all or part of an indebtedness or obligation secured by a mortgage or
lien upon real property may be maintained separately and independently from:
(a) An action on the debt;
(b) The exercise of any power of sale;
(c) Any action to foreclose or otherwise enforce
a mortgage or lien and the indebtedness or obligations secured thereby; and
(d) Any other proceeding against a mortgagor or
grantor of a deed of trust.
3. If the obligee maintains an action to
foreclose or otherwise enforce a mortgage or lien and the indebtedness or
obligations secured thereby, the guarantor, surety or other obligor may assert
any legal or equitable defenses provided pursuant to the provisions of NRS 40.451 to 40.4639, inclusive.
4. If, before a foreclosure sale of real
property, the obligee commences an action against a guarantor, surety or other
obligor, other than the mortgagor or grantor of a deed of trust, to enforce an
obligation to pay, satisfy or purchase all or part of an indebtedness or
obligation secured by a mortgage or lien upon the real property:
(a) The court must hold a hearing and take
evidence presented by either party concerning the fair market value of the
property as of the date of the commencement of the action. Notice of such
hearing must be served upon all defendants who have appeared in the action and
against whom a judgment is sought, or upon their attorneys of record, at least 15
days before the date set for the hearing.
(b) After the hearing, if the court awards a
money judgment against the guarantor, surety or other obligor who is personally
liable for the debt, the court must not render judgment for more than:
(1) The amount by which the amount of the
indebtedness exceeds the fair market value of the property as of the date of
the commencement of the action; or
(2) If a foreclosure sale is concluded
before a judgment is entered, the amount that is the difference between the
amount for which the property was actually sold and the amount of the
indebtedness which was secured,
Ê whichever is
the lesser amount.
5. The provisions of NRS 40.430 may not be waived by a
guarantor, surety or other obligor if the mortgage or lien:
(a) Secures an indebtedness for which the
principal balance of the obligation was never greater than $500,000;
(b) Secures an indebtedness to a seller of real
property for which the obligation was originally extended to the seller for any
portion of the purchase price;
(c) Is secured by real property which is used
primarily for the production of farm products as of the date the mortgage or
lien upon the real property is created; or
(d) Is secured by real property upon which:
(1) The owner maintains the owner’s
principal residence;
(2) There is not more than one residential
structure; and
(3) Not more than four families reside.
(Added to NRS by 1987,
1643; A 1989,
1001; 2011,
1743; 2013,
3810; 2015,
3344)
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPAIRMENT OF REAL COLLATERAL OF SECURED
LENDER
Notes of Decisions
Bank of Nevada Vs. Petersen, 2016 NV 64 (Nev. 2016).
· cites it 68× “Applying the pre-2011 version of NRS 40.495, 1 we held that: When Lavi waived the one-rule action, BB&T was allowed to bring an action against him prior to completing the foreclosure on the secured property, but that waiver did not terminate the procedural requirements for…”
Bank of Nevada Vs. Petersen, 2016 NV 64 (Nev. 2016).
· cites it 34× “Applying the pre-2011 version of NRS 40.495, 1 we held that: When Lavi waived the one-rule action, BB&T was allowed to bring an action against him prior to completing the foreclosure on the secured property, but that waiver did not terminate the procedural requirements for…”
Hefetz Vs. Beavor, 2017 NV 46 (Nev. 2017).
· cites it 30× “453 ("Except as otherwise provided in NRS 40.495. ."). Before 3 Hefetz does not refute that Beavor does, in fact, fall within the enumerated provisions of NRS 40.”
Lavi v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 2014 NV 38 (Nev. 2014).
· cites it 47× “Further, this interpretation can be fairly harmonized with NRS 40.495's 2011 amendment adding subsection 4.”
Lavi v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 2014 NV 38 (Nev. 2014).
· cites it 42× “Further, this interpretation can be fairly harmonized with NRS 40.495's 2011 amendment adding subsection 4.”
Hefetz Vs. Beavor, 2017 NV 46 (Nev. 2017).
· cites it 15× “453 ("Except as otherwise provided in NRS 40.495. ."). Before 3 Hefetz does not refute that Beavor does, in fact, fall within the enumerated provisions of NRS 40.”
Lavi v. Dist. Ct. (Branch Banking) (Nev. 2013).
· cites it 12× “453: "Except as otherwise provided in NRS 40.495." (Emphasis added.) Here, in permitting waivers by guarantors of NRS 40.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 40.495(2) — 9 cases
Lavi v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 2014 NV 38 (Nev. 2014).
“Further, this interpretation can be fairly harmonized with NRS 40.495's 2011 amendment adding subsection 4.”
Lavi v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 2014 NV 38 (Nev. 2014).
“Further, this interpretation can be fairly harmonized with NRS 40.495's 2011 amendment adding subsection 4.”
Hefetz Vs. Beavor, 2017 NV 46 (Nev. 2017).
“453 ("Except as otherwise provided in NRS 40.495. ."). Before 3 Hefetz does not refute that Beavor does, in fact, fall within the enumerated provisions of NRS 40.”
Bank of Nevada Vs. Petersen, 2016 NV 64 (Nev. 2016).
“Applying the pre-2011 version of NRS 40.495, 1 we held that: When Lavi waived the one-rule action, BB&T was allowed to bring an action against him prior to completing the foreclosure on the secured property, but that waiver did not terminate the procedural requirements for…”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 40.495(2)(b) — 2 cases
Lavi v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 2014 NV 38 (Nev. 2014).
“Further, this interpretation can be fairly harmonized with NRS 40.495's 2011 amendment adding subsection 4.”
Lavi v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 2014 NV 38 (Nev. 2014).
“Further, this interpretation can be fairly harmonized with NRS 40.495's 2011 amendment adding subsection 4.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 40.495(2)(c) — 2 cases
Lavi v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 2014 NV 38 (Nev. 2014).
“Further, this interpretation can be fairly harmonized with NRS 40.495's 2011 amendment adding subsection 4.”
Lavi v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 2014 NV 38 (Nev. 2014).
“Further, this interpretation can be fairly harmonized with NRS 40.495's 2011 amendment adding subsection 4.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 40.495(3) — 9 cases
Bank of Nevada Vs. Petersen, 2016 NV 64 (Nev. 2016).
“Applying the pre-2011 version of NRS 40.495, 1 we held that: When Lavi waived the one-rule action, BB&T was allowed to bring an action against him prior to completing the foreclosure on the secured property, but that waiver did not terminate the procedural requirements for…”
Lavi v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 2014 NV 38 (Nev. 2014).
“Further, this interpretation can be fairly harmonized with NRS 40.495's 2011 amendment adding subsection 4.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 40.495(4) — 8 cases
Bank of Nevada Vs. Petersen, 2016 NV 64 (Nev. 2016).
“Applying the pre-2011 version of NRS 40.495, 1 we held that: When Lavi waived the one-rule action, BB&T was allowed to bring an action against him prior to completing the foreclosure on the secured property, but that waiver did not terminate the procedural requirements for…”
Bank of Nevada Vs. Petersen, 2016 NV 64 (Nev. 2016).
“Applying the pre-2011 version of NRS 40.495, 1 we held that: When Lavi waived the one-rule action, BB&T was allowed to bring an action against him prior to completing the foreclosure on the secured property, but that waiver did not terminate the procedural requirements for…”
Lavi v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 2014 NV 38 (Nev. 2014).
“Further, this interpretation can be fairly harmonized with NRS 40.495's 2011 amendment adding subsection 4.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 40.495(4)(a) — 2 cases
Bank of Nevada Vs. Petersen, 2016 NV 64 (Nev. 2016).
“Applying the pre-2011 version of NRS 40.495, 1 we held that: When Lavi waived the one-rule action, BB&T was allowed to bring an action against him prior to completing the foreclosure on the secured property, but that waiver did not terminate the procedural requirements for…”
Bank of Nevada Vs. Petersen, 2016 NV 64 (Nev. 2016).
“Applying the pre-2011 version of NRS 40.495, 1 we held that: When Lavi waived the one-rule action, BB&T was allowed to bring an action against him prior to completing the foreclosure on the secured property, but that waiver did not terminate the procedural requirements for…”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 40.495(4)(b) — 2 cases
Bank of Nevada Vs. Petersen, 2016 NV 64 (Nev. 2016).
“Applying the pre-2011 version of NRS 40.495, 1 we held that: When Lavi waived the one-rule action, BB&T was allowed to bring an action against him prior to completing the foreclosure on the secured property, but that waiver did not terminate the procedural requirements for…”
Bank of Nevada Vs. Petersen, 2016 NV 64 (Nev. 2016).
“Applying the pre-2011 version of NRS 40.495, 1 we held that: When Lavi waived the one-rule action, BB&T was allowed to bring an action against him prior to completing the foreclosure on the secured property, but that waiver did not terminate the procedural requirements for…”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 40.495(5) — 4 cases
Hefetz Vs. Beavor, 2017 NV 46 (Nev. 2017).
“453 ("Except as otherwise provided in NRS 40.495. ."). Before 3 Hefetz does not refute that Beavor does, in fact, fall within the enumerated provisions of NRS 40.”
Hefetz Vs. Beavor, 2017 NV 46 (Nev. 2017).
“453 ("Except as otherwise provided in NRS 40.495. ."). Before 3 Hefetz does not refute that Beavor does, in fact, fall within the enumerated provisions of NRS 40.”
Lavi v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 2014 NV 38 (Nev. 2014).
“Further, this interpretation can be fairly harmonized with NRS 40.495's 2011 amendment adding subsection 4.”
Lavi v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 2014 NV 38 (Nev. 2014).
“Further, this interpretation can be fairly harmonized with NRS 40.495's 2011 amendment adding subsection 4.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 40.495(5)(a) — 2 cases
Hefetz Vs. Beavor, 2017 NV 46 (Nev. 2017).
“453 ("Except as otherwise provided in NRS 40.495. ."). Before 3 Hefetz does not refute that Beavor does, in fact, fall within the enumerated provisions of NRS 40.”
Hefetz Vs. Beavor, 2017 NV 46 (Nev. 2017).
“453 ("Except as otherwise provided in NRS 40.495. ."). Before 3 Hefetz does not refute that Beavor does, in fact, fall within the enumerated provisions of NRS 40.”
— Nev. Rev. Stat. § 40.495(5)(d) — 2 cases
Hefetz Vs. Beavor, 2017 NV 46 (Nev. 2017).
“453 ("Except as otherwise provided in NRS 40.495. ."). Before 3 Hefetz does not refute that Beavor does, in fact, fall within the enumerated provisions of NRS 40.”
Hefetz Vs. Beavor, 2017 NV 46 (Nev. 2017).
“453 ("Except as otherwise provided in NRS 40.495. ."). Before 3 Hefetz does not refute that Beavor does, in fact, fall within the enumerated provisions of NRS 40.”
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