2A:14-22. a. If (1) any person against whom there is any of the causes of action specified in sections 2A:14-1 to 2A:14-5 and 2A:14-8, or if any surety against whom there is a cause of action specified in any of the sections of article 2 of this chapter, is not a resident of this State when such cause of action accrues, or removes from this State after the accrual thereof and before the expiration of the times limited in said sections, or if any corporation or corporate surety not organized under the laws of this State, against whom there is such a cause of action, is not represented in this State by any person or officer upon whom summons or other original process may be served, when such cause of action accrues or at any time before the expiration of the times so limited, and (2) it appears by affidavit of plaintiff's attorney or of any person having knowledge of the facts that, after diligent inquiry and effort, long-arm service cannot be effectuated, the time or times during which such person or surety is not residing within this State or such corporation or corporate surety is not so represented within this State shall not be computed as part of the periods of time within which such an action is required to be commenced by the section. The person entitled to any such action may commence the same after the accrual of the cause therefor, within the period of time limited therefor by said section, exclusive of such time or times of nonresidence or nonrepresentation.
b. A corporation shall be deemed represented for purposes of this section if the corporation has filed with the Secretary of State a notice designating a representative to accept service of process.
c. A person shall be deemed a resident for purposes of this section if such person has filed with the Secretary of State a notice designating a representative to accept service of process.
d. A designation by a corporation pursuant to subsection b. of this section or by a person pursuant to subsection c. of this section shall expose such corporation or person to suit only as to those causes of action as to which such corporation or person has sufficient contacts with this State to satisfy the requirements of due process of law.
Notes of Decisions
Robinson v. Visual Packaging, Inc., 705 F. Supp. 216 (D.N.J. 1989).
· cites it 25× “Plaintiff argues that under N.J.Stat.Ann. § 2A:14-22, which tolls the running of the statute of limitations in actions against nonresident defendants who are not represented within New Jersey during the limitation period, Hub Plastics and Polytop, foreign corporations that have…”
Cohn v. G.D. Searle & Co., 598 F. Supp. 965 (D.N.J. 1984).
· cites it 13× “Plaintiffs resisted the motion, relying on N.J.S.A. 2A:14-22 which tolls the statute of limitations for a cause of action against a foreign corporation that “is not represented” in New Jersey “by any person or officer upon whom summons or other original process may be served.”
Cutler v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 707 F. Supp. 168 (D.N.J. 1989).
· cites it 17× “Defendants contend that the New Jersey tolling statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:14-22, is unconstitutional as an impermissible burden on interstate commerce under the dictates of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Bendix Autolite Corporation v.”
Cohn v. G. D. Searle & Co., 447 F. Supp. 903 (D.N.J. 1978).
· cites it 3× “2A:14-22 (1952), 2 deprives Searle of the statute of limitations because Searle is a foreign corporation not *906 represented within the state by “any person or officer” upon whom process could be served within the meaning of the tolling statute.”
Holzsager v. Warburton, 452 F. Supp. 1267 (D.N.J. 1978).
· cites it 3× “2A:14-2, and this in turn could bring into play the tolling provisions of N.J.S.A. 2A:14-22, which applies to actions governed by N.”
Hopkins v. Kelsey-Hayes, Inc., 463 F. Supp. 539 (D.N.J. 1978).
· cites it 2× “Because we find that the running of the statute has been tolled by N.J.S.A. 2A:14-22, we deny the motion. Plaintiff is a New Jersey resident.”
Ronald Rowell v. Jeffrey Stecker, 698 F. App'x 693 (3rd Cir. 2017).
“The plaintiffs also argue that tolling is appropriate under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-22(a). This statute tolls the limitations period where the defendant is not a New Jersey resident when, or leaves the state after, the cause of action accrues and “after diligent inquiry and…”
Juzwin v. Asbestos Corp., 900 F.2d 686 (3rd Cir. 1990).
· cites it 3× “The district court concluded that NJ.Stat.Ann. § 2A:14-22 (West 1987) (the “tolling statute”) is constitutional.”
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Baker, 504 A.2d 1250 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985).
“2A:14-28, applicable where a cause of action is governed by a limitation statute such as 2A:14-1, provides in pertinent part: If, in any of the actions or proceedings specified in sections 2A:14-1 to 2A:14-19, sections 2A:14-22 to 2A:14-25 or section 2A:14-27 of this title,…”
Zelson v. Thomforde, 412 F.2d 56 (3rd Cir. 1969).
“Believing New Jersey law to be applicable, appellants claimed relief from the New Jersey statute of limitations under N.J.S.A. 2A:14-22, 5 which tolls the statute when the cause of action is against nonresidents of the state for as long a period as the defendant is not available…”
— N.J. Stat. § 2A:14-22(a) — 1 case
Ronald Rowell v. Jeffrey Stecker, 698 F. App'x 693 (3rd Cir. 2017).
“The plaintiffs also argue that tolling is appropriate under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-22(a). This statute tolls the limitations period where the defendant is not a New Jersey resident when, or leaves the state after, the cause of action accrues and “after diligent inquiry and…”
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