a. Minimum requirements of culpability. Except as provided in subsection c.(3) of this section, a person is not guilty of an offense unless he acted purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently, as the law may require, with respect to each material element of the offense.
b. Kinds of culpability defined.
(1) Purposely. A person acts purposely with respect to the nature of his conduct or a result thereof if it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result. A person acts purposely with respect to attendant circumstances if he is aware of the existence of such circumstances or he believes or hopes that they exist. "With purpose," "designed," "with design" or equivalent terms have the same meaning.
(2) Knowingly. A person acts knowingly with respect to the nature of his conduct or the attendant circumstances if he is aware that his conduct is of that nature, or that such circumstances exist, or he is aware of a high probability of their existence. A person acts knowingly with respect to a result of his conduct if he is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result. "Knowing," "with knowledge" or equivalent terms have the same meaning.
(3) Recklessly. A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor's conduct and the circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation. "Recklessness," "with recklessness" or equivalent terms have the same meaning.
(4) Negligently. A person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an offense when he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the actor's failure to perceive it, considering the nature and purpose of his conduct and the circumstances known to him, involves a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation. "Negligently" or "negligence" when used in this code, shall refer to the standard set forth in this section and not to the standards applied in civil cases.
c. Construction of statutes with respect to culpability requirements.
(1) Prescribed culpability requirement applies to all material elements. When the law defining an offense prescribes the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the commission of an offense, without distinguishing among the material elements thereof, such provision shall apply to all the material elements of the offense, unless a contrary purpose plainly appears.
(2) Substitutes for kinds of culpability. When the law provides that a particular kind of culpability suffices to establish an element of an offense such element is also established if a person acts with higher kind of culpability.
(3) Construction of statutes not stating culpability requirement. Although no culpable mental state is expressly designated in a statute defining an offense, a culpable mental state may nevertheless be required for the commission of such offense, or with respect to some or all of the material elements thereof, if the proscribed conduct necessarily involves such culpable mental state. A statute defining a crime, unless clearly indicating a legislative intent to impose strict liability, should be construed as defining a crime with the culpability defined in paragraph b.(2) of this section. This provision applies to offenses defined both within and outside of this code.
d. Culpability as to illegality of conduct. Neither knowledge nor recklessness nor negligence as to whether conduct constitutes an offense or as to the existence, meaning or application of the law determining the elements of an offense is an element of such offense, unless the definition of the offense or the code so provides.
e. Culpability as determinant of grade of offense. When the grade or degree of an offense depends on whether the offense is committed purposely, knowingly, recklessly or criminally negligently, its grade or degree shall be the lowest for which the determinative kind of culpability is established with respect to any material element of the offense.
Notes of Decisions
Fernandez-Ruiz v. Gonzales, 466 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2006).
· cites it 2× “The term “accidental,” the court explained, “is most often used to describe events that did not ‘occur [ ] as a result of anyone’s purposeful act.”
State v. Williams, 919 A.2d 90 (N.J. 2007).
· cites it 2× “[II The New Jersey Penal Code: Final Report of the New Jersey Criminal Law Revision Commission, commentary to § 2C:2-2, at 41-42 (1971).] Accordingly, when the State alleges criminal recklessness, it must demonstrate through legally competent proofs that defendant had knowledge…”
State v. Osborne S. Maloney (068877), 77 A.3d 1147 (N.J. 2013).
· cites it 2× “444, 458 (2009) (citing N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(a)). If the State’s theory is “that a defendant acted as an accomplice, the trial court is obligated to provide the jury with accurate and understandable jury instructions regarding accomplice liability even without a request by defense…”
State v. Green, 197 A.3d 1136 (N.J. 2018).
“See N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(b)(3). We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding defendant's two prior DWI convictions here.”
State of New Jersey v. Jonathan Zembreski, 138 A.3d 583 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2016).
“[N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(b)(3).] 23 A-0632-14T3 Here, the sum of defendant's actions leading up to the victim's injury — including following the victim to his room, entering the room and demanding payment to avoid prosecution, and ripping the phone out of the wall — led to the victim…”
State v. Campfield, 61 A.3d 1258 (N.J. 2013).
“Accordingly, to aid the ultimate determination, the Code points expressly to the factors to be weighed in judgment: the nature and degree of the risk disregarded by the actor, the nature and purpose of his conduct and the circumstances known to him in acting.”
Kamienski v. Hendricks, 332 F. App'x 740 (3rd Cir. 2009).
· cites it 2× “N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2. “A person acts knowingly with respect to the nature of his conduct or the attendant circumstances if he is aware that his conduct is of that nature, or that such circumstances exist, or he is aware of a high probability of their existence.”
State v. Dixon, 787 A.2d 211 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
“POINT II [THE JUDGE] COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN, CONTRARY TO N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(C), HE FAILED TO CHARGE THE JURY ON THE LEVEL OF CULPABILITY SUFFICIENT TO PROVE DEFENDANT CREATED A RISK OF DEATH OR INJURY TO ANY PERSON, THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF THE SECOND DEGREE OFFENSE *213…”
United States v. Troy Brasby, 61 F.4th 127 (3rd Cir. 2023).
“38 The New Jersey Model Criminal Jury Charges and the New Jersey Practice Series on Criminal Law explain that the phrase “under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life” is not part of the recklessness mens rea for aggravated assault: 38 N.J.…”
State v. Rhett, 601 A.2d 689 (N.J. 1992).
“[II The New Jersey Penal Code: Final Report of the New Jersey Criminal Law Revision Commission § 2C:2-2 commentary at 76 (1971).] Although an actor may be guilty of murder if he or she intended to kill or was practically certain that his or her actions would cause or would be…”
— N.J. Stat. § 2C:2-2(1) — 1 case
— N.J. Stat. § 2C:2-2(3) — 2 cases
Fernandez-Ruiz v. Gonzales, 466 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2006).
“The term “accidental,” the court explained, “is most often used to describe events that did not ‘occur [ ] as a result of anyone’s purposeful act.”
— N.J. Stat. § 2C:2-2(C) — 1 case
State v. Dixon, 787 A.2d 211 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
“POINT II [THE JUDGE] COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN, CONTRARY TO N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(C), HE FAILED TO CHARGE THE JURY ON THE LEVEL OF CULPABILITY SUFFICIENT TO PROVE DEFENDANT CREATED A RISK OF DEATH OR INJURY TO ANY PERSON, THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF THE SECOND DEGREE OFFENSE *213…”
— N.J. Stat. § 2C:2-2(a) — 12 cases
State v. Osborne S. Maloney (068877), 77 A.3d 1147 (N.J. 2013).
“444, 458 (2009) (citing N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(a)). If the State’s theory is “that a defendant acted as an accomplice, the trial court is obligated to provide the jury with accurate and understandable jury instructions regarding accomplice liability even without a request by defense…”
— N.J. Stat. § 2C:2-2(a)(1) — 1 case
— N.J. Stat. § 2C:2-2(b) — 6 cases
— N.J. Stat. § 2C:2-2(b)(1) — 49 cases
— N.J. Stat. § 2C:2-2(b)(2) — 52 cases
Kamienski v. Hendricks, 332 F. App'x 740 (3rd Cir. 2009).
“N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2. “A person acts knowingly with respect to the nature of his conduct or the attendant circumstances if he is aware that his conduct is of that nature, or that such circumstances exist, or he is aware of a high probability of their existence.”
— N.J. Stat. § 2C:2-2(b)(3) — 44 cases
State v. Green, 197 A.3d 1136 (N.J. 2018).
“See N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(b)(3). We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding defendant's two prior DWI convictions here.”
State of New Jersey v. Jonathan Zembreski, 138 A.3d 583 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2016).
“[N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(b)(3).] 23 A-0632-14T3 Here, the sum of defendant's actions leading up to the victim's injury — including following the victim to his room, entering the room and demanding payment to avoid prosecution, and ripping the phone out of the wall — led to the victim…”
United States v. Troy Brasby, 61 F.4th 127 (3rd Cir. 2023).
“38 The New Jersey Model Criminal Jury Charges and the New Jersey Practice Series on Criminal Law explain that the phrase “under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life” is not part of the recklessness mens rea for aggravated assault: 38 N.J.…”
— N.J. Stat. § 2C:2-2(b)(4) — 2 cases
— N.J. Stat. § 2C:2-2(b)(l) — 1 case
— N.J. Stat. § 2C:2-2(c) — 5 cases
— N.J. Stat. § 2C:2-2(c)(1) — 5 cases
— N.J. Stat. § 2C:2-2(c)(2) — 2 cases
— N.J. Stat. § 2C:2-2(c)(3) — 17 cases
— N.J. Stat. § 2C:2-2(d) — 2 cases
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