New Jersey Statutes

N.J. Stat. § 2C:41-2 (2026)

Prohibited activities

✓ current as of May 2026
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a. It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt in which he has participated as a principal within the meaning of N.J.S. 2C:2-6 to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of the income, or the proceeds of the income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of any enterprise which is engaged in or the activities of which affect trade or commerce. A purchase of securities on the open market for purposes of investment, and without the intention of controlling or participating in the control of the issuer or of assisting another to do so, shall not be unlawful under this section, provided that the sum total of the securities of the issuer held by the purchaser, the members of his family, and his or their accomplices in any pattern of racketeering activity or in the collection of an unlawful debt does not amount in the aggregate to 1% of the outstanding securities of any one class, or does not, either in law or in fact, empower the holders thereof to elect one or more directors of the issuer, provided further, that if, in any proceeding involving an alleged investment in violation of this section, it is established that over half of the defendant's aggregate income for a period of 2 or more years immediately preceding the investment was derived from a pattern of racketeering activity, a rebuttable presumption shall arise that the investment included income derived from a pattern of racketeering activity.

b. It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in or activities of which affect trade or commerce.

c. It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in or activities of which affect trade or commerce to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of the enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.

d. It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire as defined by N.J.S. 2C:5-2, to violate any of the provisions of this section.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 98 cases (35 in the last 5 years), 1987–2025 · leading case: Curley v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 728 F. Supp. 1123 (D.N.J. 1990).
Curley v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 728 F. Supp. 1123 (D.N.J. 1990). · cites it 10× “§ 1962 and N.J.Stat.Ann. § 2C:41-2 (West 1982), along with a host of common law tort claims.”
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Bank of Am., Nat'l Ass'n, 14 F. Supp. 3d 591 (D.N.J. 2014). · cites it 8× “Neither opinion explains how this conclusion leads to a determination that NJRICO jurisprudence does not require an enterprise to be distinct from the “person,” within the meaning of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:41-2(c). 16 A third Superior Court case reached a contrary conclusion based…”
Kimberlee Williams v. BASF Catalysts LLC, 765 F.3d 306 (3rd Cir. 2014). · cites it 2× “” N.J. Stat. § 2C:41-2(c). The New Jersey RICO statute also forbids a person from conspiring to do the same.”
Fairfax Fin. Holdings Ltd. v. S.A.C., 160 A.3d 44 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2017). · cites it 3× “For an enterprise's pattern of racketeering to constitute a RICO violation, it must "affect trade or commerce," N.J.S.A. 2C:41-2, which is defined as including "all economic activity involving or relating to any commodity or service," N.”
Ross v. Celtron Int'l, Inc., 494 F. Supp. 2d 288 (D.N.J. 2007). · cites it 6× “] § 2C:41-2 may sue therefor in any appropriate court and shall recover threefold any damages he sustains and the cost of the suit.”
State of New Jersey v. Keith Drake, 132 A.3d 1270 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2016). “See N.J.S.A. 2C:41-2, -3(a). 10 A-1514-14T4 assault.”
Orsatti v. New Jersey State Police, 71 F.3d 480 (3rd Cir. 1995). “Lancaster, United States District Judge for the Western District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation 2 For reasons that are unclear, Orsatti focused his appellate arguments on the elements of conspiracy to commit racketeering under N.J.S.A. 2C:41-2(d), which is the subject…”
In Re Refco Inc. Sec. Litig., 826 F. Supp. 2d 478 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). · cites it 2× “" N.J.S.A. 2C:41-2(c). Thus, pursuant to Section c, the Plaintiffs must establish the following five elements: (1) the existence of an enterprise; (2) that the enterprise engaged in or its activities affected trade or commerce; [46] (3) that defendant was employed by, or…”
In Re Bernheim Litig., 290 B.R. 249 (D.N.J. 2003). · cites it 4× “§ 1962 (b) and (c), and the corresponding New Jersey racketeering statute, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:41-2(b) and (c). The Amended Complaint notably alleges the very same facts as the first Complaint described above.”
Curley v. Cumberland Farms, Inc., 134 F.R.D. 77 (D.N.J. 1991). · cites it 2× “§ 1962 and N.J.Stat.Ann. § 2C:41-2, as well as under several other state law theories.”
Coyer v. Hemmer, 901 F. Supp. 872 (D.N.J. 1995). · cites it 4× “§ 1961 (West 1984), and N.J.StatAnn. § 2C:41-2 (West 1982). Defendants seek compensatory and punitive damages pursuant to 18 U.”
Casper v. Paine Webber Grp., Inc., 787 F. Supp. 1480 (D.N.J. 1992). · cites it 2× “§§ 1962 (a), (b) and (c) and violations of the New Jersey RICO statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:41-2(a), (b), (c) and (d). 5 Count One of the Amended Complaint alleges the Defendants violated RICO, 18 U.”
— N.J. Stat. § 2C:41-2(a) — 6 cases
Curley v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 728 F. Supp. 1123 (D.N.J. 1990). “§ 1962 and N.J.Stat.Ann. § 2C:41-2 (West 1982), along with a host of common law tort claims.”
Casper v. Paine Webber Grp., Inc., 787 F. Supp. 1480 (D.N.J. 1992). “§§ 1962 (a), (b) and (c) and violations of the New Jersey RICO statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:41-2(a), (b), (c) and (d). 5 Count One of the Amended Complaint alleges the Defendants violated RICO, 18 U.”
Hygrosol Pharm. Corp. v. Roberts, 35 Pa. D. & C.5th 79 (2013).
In re Tyco MDL MD, 2007 DNH 072 (D.N.H. 2007).
— N.J. Stat. § 2C:41-2(a)(1) — 1 case
— N.J. Stat. § 2C:41-2(b) — 7 cases
In Re Bernheim Litig., 290 B.R. 249 (D.N.J. 2003). “§ 1962 (b) and (c), and the corresponding New Jersey racketeering statute, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:41-2(b) and (c). The Amended Complaint notably alleges the very same facts as the first Complaint described above.”
Bernheim v. Jacobs, 335 B.R. 218 (3rd Cir. 2005).
Hygrosol Pharm. Corp. v. Roberts, 35 Pa. D. & C.5th 79 (2013).
— N.J. Stat. § 2C:41-2(c) — 53 cases
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Bank of Am., Nat'l Ass'n, 14 F. Supp. 3d 591 (D.N.J. 2014). “Neither opinion explains how this conclusion leads to a determination that NJRICO jurisprudence does not require an enterprise to be distinct from the “person,” within the meaning of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:41-2(c). 16 A third Superior Court case reached a contrary conclusion based…”
Curley v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 728 F. Supp. 1123 (D.N.J. 1990). “§ 1962 and N.J.Stat.Ann. § 2C:41-2 (West 1982), along with a host of common law tort claims.”
Kimberlee Williams v. BASF Catalysts LLC, 765 F.3d 306 (3rd Cir. 2014). “” N.J. Stat. § 2C:41-2(c). The New Jersey RICO statute also forbids a person from conspiring to do the same.”
Fairfax Fin. Holdings Ltd. v. S.A.C., 160 A.3d 44 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2017). “For an enterprise's pattern of racketeering to constitute a RICO violation, it must "affect trade or commerce," N.J.S.A. 2C:41-2, which is defined as including "all economic activity involving or relating to any commodity or service," N.”
Keesling v. Beegle, 880 N.E.2d 1202 (Ind. 2008).
— N.J. Stat. § 2C:41-2(d) — 31 cases
Kimberlee Williams v. BASF Catalysts LLC, 765 F.3d 306 (3rd Cir. 2014). “” N.J. Stat. § 2C:41-2(c). The New Jersey RICO statute also forbids a person from conspiring to do the same.”
Orsatti v. New Jersey State Police, 71 F.3d 480 (3rd Cir. 1995). “Lancaster, United States District Judge for the Western District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation 2 For reasons that are unclear, Orsatti focused his appellate arguments on the elements of conspiracy to commit racketeering under N.J.S.A. 2C:41-2(d), which is the subject…”
Fairfax Fin. Holdings Ltd. v. S.A.C., 160 A.3d 44 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2017). “For an enterprise's pattern of racketeering to constitute a RICO violation, it must "affect trade or commerce," N.J.S.A. 2C:41-2, which is defined as including "all economic activity involving or relating to any commodity or service," N.”
Ross v. Celtron Int'l, Inc., 494 F. Supp. 2d 288 (D.N.J. 2007). “] § 2C:41-2 may sue therefor in any appropriate court and shall recover threefold any damages he sustains and the cost of the suit.”
Curley v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 728 F. Supp. 1123 (D.N.J. 1990). “§ 1962 and N.J.Stat.Ann. § 2C:41-2 (West 1982), along with a host of common law tort claims.”
— N.J. Stat. § 2C:41-2(e) — 4 cases
Ross v. Celtron Int'l, Inc., 494 F. Supp. 2d 288 (D.N.J. 2007). “] § 2C:41-2 may sue therefor in any appropriate court and shall recover threefold any damages he sustains and the cost of the suit.”
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Bank of Am., Nat'l Ass'n, 14 F. Supp. 3d 591 (D.N.J. 2014). “Neither opinion explains how this conclusion leads to a determination that NJRICO jurisprudence does not require an enterprise to be distinct from the “person,” within the meaning of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:41-2(c). 16 A third Superior Court case reached a contrary conclusion based…”
Marshall v. Fenstermacher, 388 F. Supp. 2d 536 (E.D. Pa. 2005).
Philadelphia Reserve Supply Co. v. Nowalk & Assocs., Inc., 864 F. Supp. 1456 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
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