New Jersey Statutes
N.J. Stat. § 34:19-8 (2026)
Other rights, remedies unaffected
✓ current as of May 2026
Nothing in this act shall be deemed to diminish the rights, privileges, or remedies of any employee under any other federal or State law or regulation or under any collective bargaining agreement or employment contract; except that the institution of an action in accordance with this act shall be deemed a waiver of the rights and remedies available under any other contract, collective bargaining agreement, State law, rule or regulation or under the common law.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 62
cases (19 in the last 5 years), 1989–2026 · leading case: Brian Royster v. New Jersey State Police(075926), 152 A.3d 900 (N.J. 2017).
Brian Royster v. New Jersey State Police(075926), 152 A.3d 900 (N.J. 2017). “” N.J.S.A. 34:19-8. This provision does not apply to those causes of action that are substantially independent of the CEPA claim.”
Steven Trzaska v. LOreal USA Inc, 865 F.3d 155 (3rd Cir. 2017). “See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:19-8 ; Battaglia v. United Parcel Serv.”
Ivan v. Cnty. of Middlesex, 595 F. Supp. 2d 425 (D.N.J. 2009). “The relevant statutory text reads: “Nothing in this act shall be deemed to diminish the rights, privileges, or remedies of any employee under any other federal or State law or regulation or *465 under any collective bargaining agreement or employment contract; except that the…”
Mehlman v. Mobil Oil Corp., 707 A.2d 1000 (N.J. 1998). “Although the trial court vacated the compensatory damages award, on Mehlman’s motion the court amended the complaint to conform to evidence supporting a prima facie tort claim, entering judgment for Mehlman on that claim and on that basis sustaining only Mehlman’s punitive…”
Est. of Oliva Ex Rel. McHugh v. New Jersey, 604 F.3d 788 (3rd Cir. 2010). “N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:19-8 . The New Jersey Supreme Court has construed this provision to preclude a litigant who has instituted a CEPA claim either from pursuing a separate state law claim for retaliatory discharge, or any other state law claim that requires the same proofs as…”
Smith v. Twp. of East Greenwich, 519 F. Supp. 2d 493 (D.N.J. 2007). “” N.J. Stat. § 34:19-8. The waiver provision applies to claims that are ‘substantially related’ to the CEPA claim.”
Kadetsky v. Egg Harbor Twp. Bd. of Educ., 82 F. Supp. 2d 327 (D.N.J. 2000). “” and are therefore barred by CEPA’s waiver provision, N.J.S.A. 34:19-8 (West Supp.1999). Del’s Br.”
Patterson v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 262 F. Supp. 2d 453 (D.N.J. 2003). “N.J.S.A. 34:19-8. Defendants concede that they are not aware of any case addressing the significance of the CEPA statutory provision in the removal context, but argue that statutory language virtually identical to this supports preemption, citing Bishop v.”
Casper v. Paine Webber Grp., Inc., 787 F. Supp. 1480 (D.N.J. 1992). “N.J.S.A. 34:19-8 (emphasis added). Although the New Jersey Supreme Court has not ruled on CEPA, other courts have interpreted CEPA to be a comprehensive remedy for retaliatory actions against employees who blow the whistle on their employers.”
Crane v. Yurick, 287 F. Supp. 2d 553 (D.N.J. 2003). “N.J.Stat.Ann. § 34:19-8. The New Jersey Supreme Court considered the scope of this waiver provision and wrote: [OJnce a CEPA claim is “instituted,” any rights or claims for retaliatory discharge based on a contract of employment; collective bargaining agreement; State law,…”
Stapleton v. DSW, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 2d 635 (D.N.J. 2013). “to Dismiss at 7-8) CEPA contains a waiver provision which provides that the “institution of an action” in accordance with CEPA “shall be deemed a waiver of the rights and remedies available under .”
Robles v. United States Env't Universal Servs., Inc., 469 F. App'x 104 (3rd Cir. 2012). “N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:19-8 ; Young v. Schering Corp.”
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