New Jersey Statutes

N.J. Stat. § 39:4-98 (2026)

Rates of speed

✓ current as of May 2026
Find cases: SyfertCases citing this section JustiaN.J. Stat. CornellLII Search CasesGoogle Scholar

39:4-98. Rates of speed. Subject to the provisions of R.S.39:4-96 and R.S.39:4-97 and except in those instances where a lower speed is specified in this chapter, it shall be prima facie lawful for the driver of a vehicle to drive it at a speed not exceeding the following:

a. (1) Twenty-five miles per hour, when passing through a school zone during recess, when the presence of children is clearly visible from the roadway, or while children are going to or leaving school, during opening or closing hours;

(2) Twenty-five miles per hour on certain portions of Route 130 in Burlington City, Burlington County, as provided by paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection a. of section 3 of P.L.2019, c.5 (C.39:4-98.12);

(3) Thirty-five miles per hour on certain portions of Route 130 in Burlington City, Burlington County, as provided by paragraphs (3) and (4) of subsection a. of section 3 of P.L.2019, c.5 (C.39:4-98.12);

b. (1) Twenty-five miles per hour in any business or residential district;

(2) Thirty-five miles per hour in any suburban business or residential district;

c. Fifty miles per hour in all other locations, except as otherwise provided in the "Sixty-Five MPH Speed Limit Implementation Act," pursuant to P.L.1997, c.415 (C.39:4-98.3 et al.).

Whenever it shall be determined upon the basis of an engineering and traffic investigation that any speed hereinbefore set forth is greater or less than is reasonable or safe under the conditions found to exist at any intersection or other place or upon any part of a highway, the Commissioner of Transportation, with reference to State highways, may by regulation and municipal or county authorities, with reference to highways under their jurisdiction, may by ordinance, in the case of municipal authorities, or by ordinance or resolution, in the case of county authorities, subject to the approval of the Commissioner of Transportation, except as otherwise provided in R.S.39:4-8, designate a reasonable and safe speed limit thereat which, subject to the provisions of R.S.39:4-96 and R.S.39:4-97, shall be prima facie lawful at all times or at such times as may be determined, when appropriate signs giving notice thereof are erected at such intersection, or other place or part of the highway. Appropriate signs giving notice of the speed limits authorized under the provisions of paragraph (1) of subsection b. and subsection c. of this section may be erected if the commissioner or the municipal or county authorities, as the case may be, so determine they are necessary. Appropriate signs giving notice of the speed limits authorized under the provisions of subsection a. and paragraph (2) of subsection b. of this section shall be erected by the commissioner or the municipal or county authorities, as appropriate.

When designating reasonable and safe speed limits for a street under its jurisdiction pursuant to this subsection, as part of an engineering and traffic investigation, a municipality or county shall consider, but not be limited to, the following criteria: residential density; the presence, or lack, of sidewalks; the prevalence of entry and exit ways for business and commercial establishments; whether school children walk adjacent to the street on their way to and from school; and the proximity of recreational or park areas, schools, community residences, family day care homes, child care centers, assisted living facilities, or senior communities. Nothing in this paragraph shall substitute for traffic count, accident, and speed sampling data as appropriate.

The driver of every vehicle shall, consistent with the requirements of this section, drive at an appropriate reduced speed when approaching and crossing an intersection or railway grade crossing, when approaching and going around a curve, when approaching a hill crest, when traveling upon any narrow or winding roadway, and when special hazard exists with respect to pedestrians or other traffic or by reason of weather or highway conditions.

The Commissioner of Transportation shall cause the erection and maintenance of signs at such points of entrance to the State as are deemed advisable, setting forth the lawful rates of speed, the wording of which shall be within the commissioner's discretion.

Amended 1939, c.211; 1942, c.325,(1942, c.325 repealed 1946, c.8); 1951, c.23, s.55; 1983, c.227, s.2; 1993, c.315, s.2; 1997, c.415, s.1; 2009, c.258; 2019, c.5, s.4.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 24 cases (9 in the last 5 years), 1942–2026 · leading case: State v. Green, 9 A.3d 172 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010).
State v. Green, 9 A.3d 172 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010). · cites it 4× “The statute in question provides: It shall be prima facie unlawful for a person to exceed any of the foregoing speed limitations or any speed limitation in effect as established by authority of section 39:4-98 of this Title. In every charge of violation of section 39:4-98 of…”
Bryce Patrick v. City of Elizabeth, 159 A.3d 906 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2017). “See N.J.S.A. 39:4-98 ("Appropriate signs giving notice of the speed limits .”
United States v. Golden, 825 F. Supp. 667 (D.N.J. 1993). · cites it 2× “§ 13 (1988), and N.J.S.A. § 39:4-98 (1990). For the following reasons defendant’s motion to dismiss is granted.”
Weinstein v. City of Newark, 241 A.2d 478 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1968). · cites it 2× “Altering speed limitations as provided in section 39:4-98 of this Title; b. Limiting use of streets to certain class of vehicles; c.”
State v. Panther Valley Prop. Owners Ass'n, 704 A.2d 1010 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998). “However, PVPOA is not “otherwise” regulating use of its private roads when it fines its residents for exceeding the very speed limits ■ established by the Department of Transportation, pursuant to N.J.S.A 39:4-98 (rates of speed) and for careless or reckless driving, conduct…”
United States v. Cline, 58 F. App'x 249 (9th Cir. 2003). “§ 265:60), New Jersey (N.J.Stat.Ann. § 39:4-98), New Mexico (N.M.”
Andrew Richmond Vs. Derek Khorozian (l-3681-17, Bergen Cnty. & Statewide) (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2019). · cites it 9× “39:4-90, on the right of way at intersections, and N.J.S.A. 39:4-98, on rates of speed. The judge declined to charge the jury on these statutes.”
Warren v. Haines, 126 F.2d 160 (3rd Cir. 1942). “737 as amended, N.J.S.A. 39:4-98. “In passing upon a motion for a non-suit, the evidence will not be weighed, The party against whom the motion is made is entitled to [have] all the evidence in his favor and all the legitimate inferences to be drawn therefrom treated as true;…”
State of New Jersey Vs. Lisa D. Ward(009-24-14, Bergen Cnty. & Statewide) (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2017). · cites it 2× “1 In exchange for defendant's guilty plea, the State dismissed the summons charging her with speeding, N.J.S.A. 39:4-98. 2 A-2647-14T2 While monitoring the traffic, Letavish saw a vehicle traveling at a high rate of speed in the left northbound lane of Route 17 where the posted…”
State of New Jersey Vs. Michael Herbst (6229, Union Cnty. & Statewide) (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2020). · cites it 2× “39:4-88(e), and speeding, N.J.S.A. 39:4-98. Defendant was assessed a fine of $406 and $33 in court costs on the prohibited lane of travel charge and an identical fine and costs on the speeding conviction.”
Jessica Tawil Vs. Shivam Travel, Inc. (l-1277-17, Passaic Cnty. & Statewide) (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2020). · cites it 2× “" As for the speed limit at the accident site, citing N.J.S.A. 39:4-98 and Kolitch v. Lindedahl, 100 N.”
Hartfelder v. New Jersey State Police (D.N.J. 2019). · cites it 2× “§ 2C:29-1(a), and (4) speeding in violation of N.J.S.A. § 39:4-98. (Defs.’ SOMF ¶¶ 75–79.”
— N.J. Stat. § 39:4-98(c) — 1 case
Dean v. Lenart (D.N.J. 2022).
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.