New Mexico Statutes

N.M. Stat. § 2-11-8 (2026)

Contingent fees prohibited in lobbying the legislative

✓ current as of May 2026
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branch of state government.
    No person shall accept employment as a lobbyist and no lobbyist's employer shall
employ a lobbyist for compensation contingent in whole or in part upon the outcome of
the lobbying activities before the legislative branch of state government or the approval
or veto of any legislation by the governor.

History: 1953 Comp., § 2-13-8, enacted by Laws 1977, ch. 261, § 8.

                                    ANNOTATIONS

Section does not abrogate common law prohibition of contingency-fee
agreements for legislative lobbying. — Where a lobbyist brought an action against
the seller of construction equipment, alleging that the seller breached an agreement
under which the lobbyist would assist the seller in securing approval of industrial
revenue bonds from the county in exchange for a portion of the seller's property tax
savings from those industrial revenue bonds, and where the seller moved for summary
judgment, arguing that the contingency-fee agreement was unenforceable as in
contravention of New Mexico's public policy, and where the lobbyist claimed that the
state legislature abrogated the common law's prohibition of contingency-fee agreements
for legislative lobbying by adopting § 2-11-8 NMSA 1978, the district court did not err in
granting the seller's motion for summary judgment, because in the absence of explicit
statutory abrogation, the common law continues to prohibit enforcement of contingency-
fee agreements for legislative lobbying. Midway Leasing, Inc. v. Wagner Equip. Co., 842
Fed.Appx. 209 (10th Cir. 2021), aff'g 356 F. Supp. 3d 1207 (D. N.M. 2018).

Agreement in contravention of state's public policy against lobbying pursuant to
contingent fee agreement. — Where a real estate developer brought an action against
the seller of construction equipment, alleging that the seller breached an agreement
under which the developer would assist the seller in securing approval of industrial
revenue bonds from the county in exchange for a portion of the seller's property tax
savings from those industrial revenue bonds, and where the seller moved for summary
judgment, arguing that the alleged agreement was unenforceable as in contravention of
New Mexico's public policy, it was held that although this section only prohibits
contingent fee agreements for lobbying before the state legislature or governor, the
public policy expressed in this section by the New Mexico legislature voids the
contingency fee agreement for lobbying before the county commission at issue here.
All agreements whose object or tendency is to improperly interfere with or influence
legislative action are contrary to public policy and void. Midway Leasing, Inc. v. Wagner
Equipment Co., 356 F. Supp.3d 1207 (D. N.M. 2018).
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 3 cases (2 in the last 5 years), 2018–2021 · leading case: Midway Leasing, Inc. v. Wagner Equip. Co., 356 F. Supp. 3d 1207 (D.N.M. 2018).
Midway Leasing, Inc. v. Wagner Equip. Co., 356 F. Supp. 3d 1207 (D.N.M. 2018). · cites it 30× “But, at issue in this case is Midway's alleged lobbying before the Bernalillo County Commission. Defendant Wagner suggests that Section 2-11-8 reflects a broader common law public policy against contingency fee agreements that should extend to legislative lobbying efforts before…”
Midway Leasing v. Wagner Equip. (10th Cir. 2021). · cites it 4× “Midway Leasing suggests that the New Mexico legislature abrogated the prohibition by adopting N.M. Stat. Ann. § 2-11-8 , which bans enforcement of contingency-fee agreements for lobbying the state legislature.”
United States v. Dahda (Los) (10th Cir. 2021). · cites it 3× “Midway Leasing suggests that the New Mexico legislature abrogated the prohibition by adopting N.M. Stat. Ann. § 2-11-8 , which bans enforcement of contingency-fee agreements for lobbying the state legislature.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.