New Mexico Statutes
N.M. Stat. § 3-21-6 (2026)
Zoning; mode of determining regulations, restrictions and
✓ current as of May 2026
Find cases:
SyfertCases citing this section
NM-LEGnmonesource.com
JustiaChapter on Justia
CornellLII Search
CasesGoogle Scholar
boundaries of district; public hearing required; notice.
A. The zoning authority within its jurisdiction shall provide by ordinance for the
manner in which zoning regulations, restrictions and the boundaries of districts are:
(1) determined, established and enforced; and
(2) amended, supplemented or repealed.
B. No zoning regulation, restriction or boundary shall become effective, amended,
supplemented or repealed until after a public hearing at which all parties in interest and
citizens shall have an opportunity to be heard. Notice of the time and place of the public
hearing shall be published, at least fifteen days prior to the date of the hearing, within its
respective jurisdiction. Whenever a change in zoning is proposed for an area of one
block or less, notice of the public hearing shall be mailed by certified mail, return receipt
requested, to the owners, as shown by the records of the county treasurer, of lots of
land within the area proposed to be changed by a zoning regulation and within one
hundred feet, excluding public right-of-way, of the area proposed to be changed by
zoning regulation. Whenever a change in zoning is proposed for an area of more than
one block, notice of the public hearing shall be mailed by first class mail to the owners,
as shown by the records of the county treasurer, of lots or [of] land within the area
proposed to be changed by a zoning regulation and within one hundred feet, excluding
public right-of-way, of the area proposed to be changed by zoning regulation. If the
notice by first class mail to the owner is returned undelivered, the zoning authority shall
attempt to discover the owner's most recent address and shall remit the notice by
certified mail, return receipt requested, to that address.
C. If the owners of twenty percent or more of the area of the lots and [of] land
included in the area proposed to be changed by a zoning regulation or within one
hundred feet, excluding public right-of-way, of the area proposed to be changed by a
zoning regulation, protest in writing the proposed change in the zoning regulation, the
proposed change in zoning shall not become effective unless the change is approved
by a majority vote of all the members of the governing body of the municipality or by a
two-thirds vote of all the members of the board of county commissioners.
History: 1953 Comp., § 14-20-4, enacted by Laws 1965, ch. 300; 1979, ch. 319, § 1;
1981, ch. 91, § 1.
ANNOTATIONS
Cross references. — For definition of "publish" or "publication," see 3-1-2 NMSA 1978.
Bracketed material. — The bracketed material in Subsections B and C was inserted by
the compiler and is not part of the law.
1979 amendment unconstitutional. — Laws 1979, ch. 319, § 1, which purported to
amend this section, is unconstitutional because it violated N.M. Const., art. IV, § 16,
which requires that the subject of any act be embraced in the title of the act. City of
Albuquerque v. State, 102 N.M. 38, 690 P.2d 1032 (1984).
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.
Zoning ordinances strictly construed. — Since zoning ordinances are in derogation
of the common law, they are to be strictly construed. Nesbit v. City of Albuquerque,
1977-NMSC-107, 91 N.M. 455, 575 P.2d 1340.
Municipal legislative body is bound to follow the zoning regulations it has
adopted, in the exercise of its delegated legislative power. Miller v. City of Albuquerque,
1976-NMSC-052, 89 N.M. 503, 554 P.2d 665.
Intent of enabling statute. — Allowing the legislature to paint with a broad brush, and
to leave the details to local governmental entities, is reflected in an enabling statute,
which grants counties the authority to pass ordinances defining how their land use
ordinances may be enforced. Cerrillos Gravel Products, Inc. v. Board of Cnty. Comm'rs
of Santa Fe, 2004-NMCA-096, 136 N.M. 247, 96 P.3d 1167, cert. granted, 2004-
NMCERT-008, 136 N.M. 493, 100 P.3d 198.
State law does not require that ordinance precisely track enabling statute to be
authorized. Cerrillos Gravel Products, Inc. v. Board of Cnty. Comm'rs, 2004-NMCA-096,
136 N.M. 247, 96 P.3d 1167, cert. granted, 2004-NMCERT-008, 136 N.M. 493, 100
P.3d 198.
Creation of buffer zone nullifies demand for vote in Subsection C. — Petitioner,
who owned 20% or more of the land within 100 feet of tract proposed to be rezoned,
could no longer demand a three-fourths vote of all members of the governing body of
the city, as required by Subsection C of this section, where applicant for a zoning
change created a buffer zone of 100 feet between that portion of his property sought to
be rezoned and the lands of adjacent property owners, including petitioner. St. Bede's
Episcopal Church v. City of Santa Fe, 1973-NMSC-046, 85 N.M. 109, 509 P.2d 876.
Ordinance held not uncertain. — A city code provision prohibiting the operation of an
adult theatre "within 500 feet of a residential zone" is not so uncertain that the court is
unable, by use of accepted rules of construction, to determine the intent of the city
council. Texas Nat'l Theatres, Inc. v. City of Albuquerque, 1982-NMSC-004, 97 N.M.
282, 639 P.2d 569.
Zoning of private land that was previously federally held. — A county may not
adopt a comprehensive zoning ordinance that specifically excludes federally owned
land, then later apply the ordinance to private land that was federally owned at the time
the ordinance was passed; to zone such land, the county must comply with the notice
requirements of this section. Bonito Land & Livestock v. Valencia Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs,
1998-NMCA-127, 125 N.M. 638, 964 P.2d 199.
Municipal agreement to rezone illegal. — A contract in which a municipality promised
to zone property in a specified manner in exchange for a party's conveyancing of
property that it needed for a highway right of way was illegal because such a promise
preempted the power of the zoning authority to zone the property according to
prescribed legislative procedures. Dacy v. Village of Ruidoso, 1992-NMSC-066, 114
N.M. 699, 845 P.2d 793.
II. SCOPE OF AUTHORITY.
Suspension or revocation of permit. — Santa Fe County's ordinance providing for
suspension or revocation of mining permit is consistent with the statutory authority
granted by the legislature to pass ordinances defining how land use ordinances will be
enforced. Cerrillos Gravel Products, Inc. v. Santa Fe Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 2005-
NMSC-023, 138 N.M. 126, 117 P.3d 932.
Express authority to enact ordinances for enforcement. — Section 3-12-6 NMSA
1978 grants counties the authority to enact ordinances to provide for enforcement of
zoning regulations and restrictions. Cerrillos Gravel Products, Inc. v. Santa Fe Bd. of
Cnty. Comm'rs, 2005-NMSC-023, 138 N.M. 126, 117 P.3d 932.
Absence of language including "revocation of any permit" in enabling statute
does not require a court to hold that such authority is not authorized. Cerrillos Gravel
Products, Inc. v. Board of Cnty. Comm'rs of Santa Fe, 2004-NMCA-096, 136 N.M. 247,
96 P.3d 1167, aff’d, 2005-NMSC-023, 138 N.M. 126, 117 P.3d 932.
Authority of air quality control board to issue special use permits. — There can be
no doubt of a county air quality control board's authority to entertain applications for
special use permits, and to issue or withhold them after consideration. McCabe v.
Hawk, 1982-NMCA-039, 97 N.M. 622, 642 P.2d 608.
Santa Fe County's ordinance, specifically providing for revocation or suspension
of mining permit, is consonant with the legislature's grant of power to pass ordinances
defining how land use ordinances may be enforced, and within the legislature's grant of
authority to institute “any appropriate action or proceedings” to confront violations of
land use ordinances. Cerrillos Gravel Products, Inc. v. Board of Cnty. Comm'rs of Santa
Fe, 2004-NMCA-096, 136 N.M. 247, 96 P.3d 1167, aff’d, 2005-NMSC-023, 138 N.M.
126, 117 P.3d 932.
III. HEARING.
Failure to comply denies procedural due process. — By failing to comply with its
own published procedures, specifically by failing to give reasons for the proposed
change, the environmental planning commission deprived petitioner of notice and the
opportunity to prepare an adequate defense to the proposed down zoning, and this was
a denial of procedural due process. Miller v. City of Albuquerque, 1976-NMSC-052, 89
N.M. 503, 554 P.2d 665.
Conduct of hearing. — It is within a city council's authority to restrict testimony fairly on
both sides in a zoning dispute, provided that each party has an opportunity to be heard
in accordance with this section and any local rules. Bennett v. City Council, 1999-
NMCA-015, 126 N.M. 619, 973 P.2d 871.
Presumption regarding hearing and notice. — In view of the presumption of validity
attending the ordinance, and the due performance of duty by public officials, absent any
proof to the contrary, it will be presumed the prepassage requirements as to public
hearings and notice thereof were had and given. City of Alamogordo v. McGee, 1958-
NMSC-078, 64 N.M. 253, 327 P.2d 321.
Postponement of hearing. — Where proper notice was originally provided, an
announcement at the hearing of the postponement of consideration of an issue to a
later date substantially complied with notice requirements because actual notice of the
original hearing and, at that meeting, of the postponed-to hearing was given to affected
property owners. Bennett v. City Council, 1999-NMCA-015, 126 N.M. 619, 973 P.2d
871.
New notice and hearing not required where rezoning affected lesser amount of
land than originally requested. — Where proper notice was given of the requested
change in zoning of a tract and of the public hearing thereon, and the rezoning change
ultimately effected varied from that request only to the extent that a lesser amount of
land was rezoned than was originally requested, this did not amount to a change in
fundamental character as would require new notice and another hearing. St. Bede's
Episcopal Church v. City of Santa Fe, 1973-NMSC-046, 85 N.M. 109, 509 P.2d 876.
IV. NOTICE.
Lack of statutory notice is generally held to be jurisdictional defect which renders
the action taken by the zoning authority void. Nesbit v. City of Albuquerque, 1977-
NMSC-107, 91 N.M. 455, 575 P.2d 1340.
Substantial compliance with statutory notice provisions required. — Although
some courts have held that even a minor defect in notice, e.g., 19-day notice instead of
20-day, will invalidate an action taken by the zoning authority, New Mexico does not
take such a strict view. Nesbit v. City of Albuquerque, 1977-NMSC-107, 91 N.M. 455,
575 P.2d 1340.
Purpose of section. — In New Mexico, substantial compliance with the statutory notice
provisions would satisfy the purpose of this section, but where substantial compliance
with mandatory publication requirements is not met, the action of the zoning authority is
invalid. Nesbit v. City of Albuquerque, 1977-NMSC-107, 91 N.M. 455, 575 P.2d 1340.
Determination of adequate notice. — In order to meet the statutory requirement of
adequate notice, it must be determined whether notice, as published, fairly apprised the
average citizen reading it with the general purpose of what was contemplated. If the
notice is insufficient, ambiguous, misleading or unintelligible to the average citizen, it is
inadequate to fulfill the statutory purpose of informing interested persons of the hearing
so that they may attend and state their views. Bogan v. Sandoval Cnty. Planning &
Zoning Comm'n, 1994-NMCA-157, 119 N.M. 334, 890 P.2d 395, cert. denied, 119 N.M.
168, 889 P.2d 203 (1995); Nesbit v. City of Albuquerque, 1977-NMSC-107, 91 N.M.
455, 575 P.2d 1340.
Actual notice constituted substantial compliance. — Where property owner within
100 feet of property to be rezoned did not receive notice of public hearing by mail, as
required by this section, but had actual notice of the hearing, property owner was
properly notified and this constituted substantial compliance with the statute. Hawthorne
v. City of Santa Fe, 1975-NMSC-033, 88 N.M. 123, 537 P.2d 1385.
Applicability of notice provisions. — The appropriate notice for a new,
comprehensive zoning ordinance that distributes its impact over an entire community is
notice by publication, as set forth in 3-21-14 NMSA 1978, rather than the individualized
notice set forth in this section for zoning changes directly affecting relatively small
numbers of people. Miles v. Board of Cnty. Comm'rs, 1998-NMCA-118, 125 N.M. 608,
964 P.2d 169, cert. denied, 126 N.M. 107, 967 P.2d 447.
Law reviews. — For article, "Existing Legislation and Proposed Model Flood Plain
Ordinance for New Mexico Municipalities," see 9 Nat. Resources J. 629 (1969).
For comment, "Statutory Notice in Zoning Actions: Nesbit v. City of Albuquerque," see
10 N.M.L. Rev. 177 (1979-80).
For annual survey of New Mexico law relating to property, see 13 N.M.L. Rev. 435
(1983).
Am. Jur. 2d, A.L.R. and C.J.S. references. — Validity and construction of statutory
notice requirements prerequisite to adoption or amendment of zoning ordinance or
regulation, 96 A.L.R.2d 449.
Disqualification for bias or interest of administrative officer sitting in zoning proceeding,
10 A.L.R.3d 694.
Enforcement of zoning regulation as affected by other violations, 4 A.L.R.4th 462.
Zoning: validity and construction of provisions of zoning statute or ordinance regarding
protest by neighboring property owners, 7 A.L.R.4th 732.Notes of Decisions
Cited in 14
cases (4 in the last 5 years), 1982–2024 · leading case: Cerrillos Gravel Prods., Inc. v. Bd. of Cnty. Commissioners, 117 P.3d 932 (N.M. 2005).
Cerrillos Gravel Prods., Inc. v. Bd. of Cnty. Commissioners, 117 P.3d 932 (N.M. 2005). “Thus, Cerrillos Gravel contends, the only statutory remedy available to the County to address zoning violations requires a sheriff or district attorney to bring an action in court, and the only possible penalties are a nominal monetary fíne and up to ninety days in jail.”
Cerrillos Gravel Prods., Inc. v. Bd. of Cnty. Commissioners, 96 P.3d 1167 (N.M. Ct. App. 2004). “Sections 3-21-6 and -10(B) grant counties broad power to enact ordinances to determine how their ordinances are enforced, and to “institute any appropriate action or proceedings” to prevent and abate violations.”
Bennett v. City Council for Las Cruces, 973 P.2d 871 (N.M. Ct. App. 1998). “The Court rejected the argument that “failure to give notice in strict compliance” with an earlier version of Section 3-21-6 was error, stating that despite failure to mail notice to the adjacent property owner, the property owner was fully aware of the proposed zone changes.”
Miles v. Bd. of Cnty. Commissioners, 964 P.2d 169 (N.M. Ct. App. 1998). “Statutory Notice {15} Two statutes are under consideration: NMSA 1978, Sections 3-21-6 and -14 (1981). Miles contends that both apply to the current case.”
VanderVossen v. City of Espanola, 24 P.3d 319 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001). “See NMSA 1978, § 3-21-6 (1981). Second, although the special exception passed on a 4-0 vote, the Board needed 5 votes to meet the two-thirds majority required under Espanola’s zoning ordinances.”
Texas Nat'l Theatres, Inc. v. City of Albuquerque, 639 P.2d 569 (N.M. 1982). “The zoning authority within its jurisdiction shall provide by ordinance for the manner in which zoning regulations, restrictions and the boundaries of districts are: (1) determined, established and enforced .”
Dacy v. Vill. of Ruidoso, 845 P.2d 793 (N.M. 1992). “A contract in which a municipality promises to zone property in a specified manner is illegal because, in making such a promise, a municipality preempts the power of the zoning authority to zone the property according to prescribed legislative procedures.”
Bonito Land & Livestock, Inc. v. Valencia Cnty. Bd. of Commissioners, 964 P.2d 199 (N.M. Ct. App. 1998). “Subsequent enactments or changes of zoning which affect a small number of citizens require notice comporting with NMSA 1978, § 3-21-6(B) (1981). See id ¶ 15.”
City of Albuquerque v. State, 690 P.2d 1032 (N.M. 1984). “Laws, Chapter 319 is unconstitutional insofar as it attempts to amend NMSA 1978, Section 3-21-6. It is our opinion that Chapter 319, Section 1, which is the portion of Chapter 319 that purports to amend NMSA 1979, Section 3-21-6, is unconstitutional because it violates N.”
Shook v. City of Santa Fe (N.M. Ct. App. 2023). “The City directs us to rely on 16 NMSA 1978, Section 3-21-6(B) (1981), and argues that the statute permits the City 17 “to determine the manner in which the public hearing .”
Shook v. City of Santa Fe (N.M. Ct. App. 2023). “The City directs us to rely on NMSA 1978, Section 3-21-6(B) (1981), and argues that the statute permits the City “to determine the manner in which the public hearing .”
McCabe v. Hawk, 642 P.2d 608 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982). “The use of the word “jurisdiction” is incorrect; the plaintiffs’ complaint was that the Board did not follow the procedural requirements of the zoning ordinance and statutes when the permit was issued.”
— N.M. Stat. § 3-21-6(A) — 1 case
Cerrillos Gravel Prods., Inc. v. Bd. of Cnty. Commissioners, 117 P.3d 932 (N.M. 2005). “Thus, Cerrillos Gravel contends, the only statutory remedy available to the County to address zoning violations requires a sheriff or district attorney to bring an action in court, and the only possible penalties are a nominal monetary fíne and up to ninety days in jail.”
— N.M. Stat. § 3-21-6(A)(1) — 1 case
Cerrillos Gravel Prods., Inc. v. Bd. of Cnty. Commissioners, 117 P.3d 932 (N.M. 2005). “Thus, Cerrillos Gravel contends, the only statutory remedy available to the County to address zoning violations requires a sheriff or district attorney to bring an action in court, and the only possible penalties are a nominal monetary fíne and up to ninety days in jail.”
— N.M. Stat. § 3-21-6(A)(l) — 1 case
Cerrillos Gravel Prods., Inc. v. Bd. of Cnty. Commissioners, 96 P.3d 1167 (N.M. Ct. App. 2004). “Sections 3-21-6 and -10(B) grant counties broad power to enact ordinances to determine how their ordinances are enforced, and to “institute any appropriate action or proceedings” to prevent and abate violations.”
— N.M. Stat. § 3-21-6(B) — 8 cases
Bennett v. City Council for Las Cruces, 973 P.2d 871 (N.M. Ct. App. 1998). “The Court rejected the argument that “failure to give notice in strict compliance” with an earlier version of Section 3-21-6 was error, stating that despite failure to mail notice to the adjacent property owner, the property owner was fully aware of the proposed zone changes.”
Dacy v. Vill. of Ruidoso, 845 P.2d 793 (N.M. 1992). “A contract in which a municipality promises to zone property in a specified manner is illegal because, in making such a promise, a municipality preempts the power of the zoning authority to zone the property according to prescribed legislative procedures.”
Bonito Land & Livestock, Inc. v. Valencia Cnty. Bd. of Commissioners, 964 P.2d 199 (N.M. Ct. App. 1998). “Subsequent enactments or changes of zoning which affect a small number of citizens require notice comporting with NMSA 1978, § 3-21-6(B) (1981). See id ¶ 15.”
Miles v. Bd. of Cnty. Commissioners, 964 P.2d 169 (N.M. Ct. App. 1998). “Statutory Notice {15} Two statutes are under consideration: NMSA 1978, Sections 3-21-6 and -14 (1981). Miles contends that both apply to the current case.”
Shook v. City of Santa Fe (N.M. Ct. App. 2023). “The City directs us to rely on 16 NMSA 1978, Section 3-21-6(B) (1981), and argues that the statute permits the City 17 “to determine the manner in which the public hearing .”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.