N.M. Stat. § 30-2-4 (2026)

A. Assisting suicide consists of deliberately aiding another in the taking of the
person's own life, unless the person aiding another in the taking of the person's own life
is a person acting in accordance with the provisions of the End-of-Life Options Act
[Chapter 24, Article 7C NMSA 1978].

   B. A person who commits assisting suicide is guilty of a fourth degree felony.

History: 1953 Comp., § 40A-2-5, enacted by Laws 1963, ch. 303, § 2-5; 2021, ch. 132,
§ 10.

                                     ANNOTATIONS

The 2021 amendment, effective June 18, 2021, removed criminal liability for aiding
another in the taking of another person's life if the person is acting in accordance with
the provisions of the End-of-Life Options Act; added new subsection designations "A"
and "B"; in Subsection A, after "own life", deleted "Whoever" and added "unless the
person aiding another in the taking of the person's own life is a person acting in
accordance with the provisions of the End-of-Life Options Act"; and in Subsection B,
added "A person who".

Physician aid in dying is prohibited by this section. — The practice of aid in dying
involves a physician deliberately prescribing a lethal dose of barbiturates with the
understanding that the patient will self-administer the entire dose to end his or her life,
should the patient choose to do so, conduct clearly encompassed by the plain language
of 30-2-4 NMSA 1978. Morris v. Brandenburg, 2016-NMSC-027, aff’g 2015-NMCA-100,
356 P.3d 564.

Constitutionality. — Where petitioners, two doctors and their patient, sought
declaratory and injunctive relief to the effect that either 30-2-4 NMSA 1978, New
Mexico’s criminal statute prohibiting assisted suicide, did not apply to the conduct
defined by petitioners as physician aid in dying, or even if the statute did apply to
physician aid in dying, such an application would be unconstitutional, petitioners failed
to establish a fundamental liberty interest protected by the inherent rights clause or the
due process clause of the New Mexico constitution, because the inherent rights clause
has never been interpreted to be the exclusive source for a fundamental constitutional
right, and on its own has always been subject to reasonable regulation, and there is a
firm legal rationale behind the interest in protecting the integrity and ethics of the
medical profession, the interest in protecting vulnerable groups, including the poor, the
elderly, and disabled persons, from abuse, neglect, and mistakes due to the risk of
subtle coercion and undue influence in end-of-life situations, and the legitimate concern
that recognizing a right to physician aid in dying will lead to voluntary or involuntary
euthanasia. Morris v. Brandenburg, 2016-NMSC-027, aff’g 2015-NMCA-100, 356 P.3d
564.

Constitutionality. — Aid in dying is not a fundamental liberty interest under the New
Mexico constitution, and therefore a mentally competent, terminally ill patient’s interest
in a physician’s assistance in dying is not a fundamental liberty interest protected by the
due process clause of N.M. Const., Art. II, § 18 and is not entitled to protection under
the state constitutional provision protecting inherent individual rights to life, liberty and
happiness provided for in N.M. Const. Art. II, § 4. The district court, holding otherwise,
erred in permanently enjoining the state from enforcing 30-2-4 NMSA 1978. Morris v.
Brandenberg, 2015-NMCA-100, cert. denied, 2015-NMCERT-008.

Aid in dying is prohibited by this section. — A patient’s choice to achieve a peaceful
end of life through aid in dying, or the practice of a willing physician providing a lethal
dose of a prescribed medication at the request of a mentally competent, terminally ill
patient, is the taking of one’s own life, and thus suicide within the meaning of this
section; a physician’s conduct of providing a patient a lethal dose of a prescribed
medication, and thus the means to take his or her own life, is prohibited by this section.
Morris v. Brandenberg, 2015-NMCA-100, cert. denied, 2015-NMCERT-008.

Second degree murder, assisted suicide, not same offense. — The second degree
murder statute (Section 30-2-1B NMSA 1978) is aimed at preventing an individual from
actively causing the death of someone contemplating suicide, whereas the assisting
suicide statute is aimed at preventing an individual from providing someone
contemplating suicide with the means to commit suicide. Thus, the two statutes do not
condemn the same offense. State v. Sexson, 1994-NMCA-004, 117 N.M. 113, 869 P.2d
301, cert. denied, 117 N.M. 215, 870 P.2d 753.

Suicide pact not exemption from conviction for murder. — The existence of a
suicide pact does not exempt someone from a conviction for committing murder.
However, that general rule may not apply if the means of attempted suicide used
presents the same risk to both of the parties at the same time, such as when a couple
drive off a cliff together. Such is not the case when the victim is killed by a rifle, the
trigger of which is pulled by the defendant. State v. Sexson, 1994-NMCA-004, 117 N.M.
113, 869 P.2d 301, cert. denied, 117 N.M. 215, 870 P.2d 753.

Suicide pact not assisting suicide. — There was enough evidence to support a
conviction of second degree murder because there was sufficient evidence to show that
the defendant actively participated in a suicide by holding the gun to the victim's head
and pulling the trigger. "Aiding", in the context of determining whether one is criminally
liable for their involvement in the suicide of another, is intended to mean providing the
means to commit suicide, not actively performing the act which results in death. State v.
Sexson, 1994-NMCA-004, 117 N.M. 113, 869 P.2d 301, cert. denied, 117 N.M. 215,
870 P.2d 753.

Am. Jur. 2d, A.L.R. and C.J.S. references. — 40 Am. Jur. 2d Homicide § 585.

Criminal liability for death of another as result of accused's attempt to kill self or assist
another's suicide, 40 A.L.R.4th 702.

83 C.J.S. Suicide § 4.